The Critical Mass in Collective ActionCambridge University Press, 26 mars 1993 - 206 pages The problem of collective action is that each member of a group wants other members to make necessary sacrifices while he or she "free rides," reaping the benefits of collective action without doing the work. Inevitably the end result is that no one does the work and the common interest is not realized. This book analyzes the social pressure whereby groups solve the problem of collective action. The authors break new ground in showing that the problem of collective action requires a model of group process and cannot be deduced from simple models of individual behavior. They employ formal mathematical models to emphasize the role of small subgroups of especially motivated individuals who form the "critical mass" that sets collective action in motion. |
Table des matières
1 The critical mass and the problem of collective action | 1 |
goods groups and processes | 14 |
3 The paradox of group size | 38 |
4 The dynamics of production functions | 58 |
density centralization and cliques | 101 |
6 Selectivity in social networks | 130 |
7 Reach and selectivity as strategies of recruitment | 157 |
8 Unfinished business | 180 |
| 194 | |
| 201 | |
| 203 | |
| 206 | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
accelerating production functions accelerative affected employees afford to contact analysis assume assumptions benefit centralization Chapter cliques collective action collective dilemma complex constant contribution level cost function critical mass curve decelerating decelerative decision defined density dynamics empirical equation example factors free-ride free-rider problem grandfather clause greater group heterogeneity group members group-size Hardin homogeneous group important individuals interaction interdependence interest and resources interest heterogeneity interest level jointness of supply JON ELSTER large number larger interest group less lognormal distributions Marwell maximum provision level mean mobilizing network sizes number of contributors Olson organizer network organizing cost outcome participate payoff population possible potential contributions predict probability problem profit proportion recruitment strategies relative resource and interest resource heterogeneity resource level selectivity inflation function simply simulation situation slope smaller social movements social networks standard deviation subset surplus target subgroup theory threshold variables vary zero