Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Couverture
Cambridge University Press, 2006 - 416 pages
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal. Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association as the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the forthcoming text Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Harvard Faculty Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of the forthcoming book Natural Experiments in History.

À l'intérieur du livre

Table des matières

PART ONE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
1
Our Argument
15
What Do We Know about Democracy?
48
Democratic Politics
89
Nondemocratic Politics
118
PART THREE THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION
173
Coups and Consolidation
221
Power in Democracy and Coups
247
Costs of Coup on Capital and Land
296
Capital Land and the Burden of Democracy
300
Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists
307
Industrialists Landowners and Democracy in Practice
312
Economic Institutions
313
Human Capital
316
Conjectures about Political Development
317
Conclusion
319

Consolidation in a Picture
249
Defensive Coups
251
Conclusion
253
PART FOUR PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK 8 The Role of the Middle Class
255
The ThreeClass Model
259
Emergence of Partial Democracy
262
From Partial to Full Democracy
267
The Middle Class as a Buffer
273
Softliners versus Hardliners
278
The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy
283
Conclusion
285
Economic Structure and Democracy
287
Economic Structure and Income Distribution
290
Political Conflict
292
Capital Land and the Transition to Democracy
293
Globalization and Democracy
321
A Model of an Open Economy
325
Political Conflict Democratic Consolidation
331
Political Conflict Transition to Democracy
334
Financial Integration
338
Increased Political Integration
343
Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade
344
Conclusion
347
PART FIVE CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 11 Conclusions and the Future of Democracy
349
Extensions and Areas for Future Research
355
The Future of Democracy
358
The Distribution of Power in Democracy
361
Bibliography
381
Index
401
Droits d'auteur

Autres éditions - Tout afficher

Expressions et termes fréquents

À propos de l'auteur (2006)

Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the textbook Introduction to Modern Economic Growth and coeditor of Econometrica and NBER Macroannual. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and is a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of Natural Experiments in History (2009).

Informations bibliographiques