Economic Origins of Dictatorship and DemocracyCambridge University Press, 2006 - 416 pages What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal. Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association as the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the forthcoming text Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Harvard Faculty Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of the forthcoming book Natural Experiments in History. |
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Table des matières
PART ONE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS | 1 |
Our Argument | 15 |
What Do We Know about Democracy? | 48 |
Democratic Politics | 89 |
Nondemocratic Politics | 118 |
PART THREE THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION | 173 |
Coups and Consolidation | 221 |
Power in Democracy and Coups | 247 |
Costs of Coup on Capital and Land | 296 |
Capital Land and the Burden of Democracy | 300 |
Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists | 307 |
Industrialists Landowners and Democracy in Practice | 312 |
Economic Institutions | 313 |
Human Capital | 316 |
Conjectures about Political Development | 317 |
Conclusion | 319 |
Consolidation in a Picture | 249 |
Defensive Coups | 251 |
Conclusion | 253 |
PART FOUR PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK 8 The Role of the Middle Class | 255 |
The ThreeClass Model | 259 |
Emergence of Partial Democracy | 262 |
From Partial to Full Democracy | 267 |
The Middle Class as a Buffer | 273 |
Softliners versus Hardliners | 278 |
The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy | 283 |
Conclusion | 285 |
Economic Structure and Democracy | 287 |
Economic Structure and Income Distribution | 290 |
Political Conflict | 292 |
Capital Land and the Transition to Democracy | 293 |
Globalization and Democracy | 321 |
A Model of an Open Economy | 325 |
Political Conflict Democratic Consolidation | 331 |
Political Conflict Transition to Democracy | 334 |
Financial Integration | 338 |
Increased Political Integration | 343 |
Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade | 344 |
Conclusion | 347 |
PART FIVE CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY 11 Conclusions and the Future of Democracy | 349 |
Extensions and Areas for Future Research | 355 |
The Future of Democracy | 358 |
The Distribution of Power in Democracy | 361 |
Bibliography | 381 |
401 | |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Daron Acemoglu,James A. Robinson Aucun aperçu disponible - 2005 |
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Daron Acemoglu,James A. Robinson Aucun aperçu disponible - 2009 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
Acemoglu agent analysis apartheid Argentina avoid revolution Britain Chapter citizens collective-action problem Colombia commitment problem comparative statics concessions conflict consolidated democracy cost of repression costly countries coup coup constraint credible Daron Acemoglu democ developed dictatorship discussion Downsian economic institutions election elites equilibrium policy example facto political power factor financial integration Freedom House fully consolidated function future game tree Gini coefficient given globalization human capital ideal point implies important income increase inter-group inequality labor landowners Latin America majority median voter middle class Nash equilibrium nondemocracy nondemocratic regime parties payoff political institutions poor preferred tax rate prevent revolution promise Proposition reform relatively result revolution constraint rich set the tax single-peaked social society South Africa strategy subgame perfect equilibrium targeted transfers taxation threat of revolution trade transition to democracy University Press voting VP(N VP(R µ¹