Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government

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CUP Archive, 30 sept. 1994 - 318 pages
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One of the key constitutional features of a parliamentary democracy is that the political executive, or cabinet, derives its mandate from - and is politically responsible to - the legislature. What makes a parliamentary democracy democratic is that, once a legislative election has been held, the new legislature has the power to dismiss the incumbent executive and replace it with a new one. Moreover, it sits essentially as a court, passing continual judgement on the record of the executive, and continuous sentence on its future prospects. That is how citizens, indirectly, choose and control their government. But the relationship between legislature and executive is not one-sided. The executive typically has the authority to recommend dissolution of parliament and is usually drawn from the parliament. Executive personnel, therefore, have intimate familiarity with parliamentary practices; and for their part, parliamentary personnel aspire to executive appointments. Surprisingly little is known about the constitutional relationship between legislature and executive in parliamentary regimes; the present volume seeks to remedy this.
 

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Table des matières

Models of government and the Austrian cabinet
15
The political role of Norwegian cabinet ministers
35
ministers and cabinet policy Rudy B
56
The political role of cabinet minsters in Ireland
73
ministerial autonomy constitutional collectivism
88
the
106
The role of cabinet ministers in the French Fourth
125
The political autonomy of cabinet ministers in the French
139
Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government in
169
The political role of cabinet ministers in Italy
187
Ministerial autonomy in Britain Anthony King
203
Collective cabinet decision making in New Zealand
226
The interpersonal dynamics of decision making in
251
Cabinet decision making in the Hellenic Republic 1974
270
CONCLUSION
280
Index
311

The role of German ministers in cabinet decision making
150

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À propos de l'auteur (1994)

Kenneth A. Shepsle is the George D. Markham Professor of Government and founding member of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University. He is the author or coauthor of several books, including Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability; The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House; Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition; Making and Breaking Governments; and Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. He has been a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1990, and he is the recipient of fellowships by the Hoover Institution, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, and Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

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