Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade
Cambridge University Press, 16 janv. 2006 - 503 pages
It is widely believed that current disparities in economic, political, and social outcomes reflect distinct institutions. Institutions are invoked to explain why some countries are rich and others poor, some democratic and others dictatorial. But arguments of this sort gloss over the question of what institutions are, how they come about, and why they persist. This book seeks to overcome these problems, which have exercised economists, sociologists, political scientists, and a host of other researchers who use the social sciences to study history, law, and business administration.
Avis des internautes - Rédiger un commentaire
Aucun commentaire n'a été trouvé aux emplacements habituels.
Institutions and Transactions
Institutions as Systems in Equilibria
Securing Property Rights from the Grabbing Hand
Endogenous Institutions and GameTheoretic Analysis
Institutional Dynamics as a Historical Process
Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society
FV The Empirical Method of Comparative and Historical
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
ability actions agency relations agent backward induction beliefs and norms best response central transaction Chapter cheater cheating clan coalition cognitive collective punishment collectivist community responsibility system conjecture consider context-specific contract enforcement cooperation coordination cost court cultural beliefs dilemma game economic efficient embargo enabled endogenous ex ante example exogenous expected factors Fustat gain game theory game-theoretic Genoa Genoese Goitein Greif Hence hire historical honest impersonal exchange implies individualistic individuals influence insti institutional analysis institutional change institutional elements inherited institutionalized rules interactions interclan intertransactional linkages knowledge late medieval period lenders Maghribi traders merchant guild military motivated Muslim mutual-deterrence equilibrium Naharay Nash equilibrium optimal outcomes particular past institutions payoff player podesta podesteria political prisoner's dilemma privileges property rights quasi-parameters reflect reinforcement relationships relevant repeated games ruler self-enforcing institutions situations social structures society strategy subgame perfect equilibrium threat tions trade tutions undermining wage