Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-Machine Communication

Couverture
Cambridge University Press, 26 nov. 1987 - 203 pages
2 Avis
This lively and original book offers a provocative critique of the dominant assumptions regarding human action and communication which underlie recent research in machine intelligence. Lucy Suchman argues that the planning model of interaction favoured by the majority of AI researchers does not take sufficient account of the situatedness of most human social behaviour. The problems that can arise as a result are pertinently, and often amusingly, illustrated by the careful analysis of a recorded interaction between novice users and an intelligent machine, whose design has failed to accommodate essential resources of successful human communication. Plans and Situated Actions presents a compelling case for the re-examination of current models underlying interface design. Lucy Suchman's proposals for a fresh characterisation of human-computer interaction which also incorporates recent insights from the social sciences provides a challenge that everyone interested in machine intelligence will seriously need to consider.
 

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Table des matières

Humanmachine communication
118
Conclusion
178
References
190
Author index
199
Subject index
201
Droits d'auteur

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Page 78 - By conditional relevance of one item on another we mean; given the first, the second is expectable; upon its occurrence it can be seen to be a second item to the first; upon its nonoccurrence it can be seen to be officially absent. (Schegloff 1972, p. 364) Two utterances
Page 55 - cultural dope": By "cultural dope" I refer to the man-in-the-sociologist'ssociety who produces the stable features of the society by acting in compliance with preestablished and legitimate alternatives of action that the common culture provides. (1967,
Page 41 - A: Are you going to be here for ten minutes? B: Go ahead and take your break. Take longer if you want. A: I'll just be outside on the porch. Call me if you need me. B: OK. Don't worry. Gumperz points out that B's response to A's question clearly indicates that B interprets the
Page 62 - To treat instructions as though ad hoc features in their use was a nuisance, or to treat their presence as grounds for complaining about the incompleteness of instructions, is very much like complaining that if the walls of a building were gotten out of the way, one could see better what was keeping the roof up. (Garfinkel 1967, p. 22)
Page 27 - is that while the course of action can always be projected or reconstructed in terms of prior intentions and typical situations, the prescriptive significance of intentions for situated action is inherently vague. The coherence of situated action is tied in essential ways not to individual predispositions or conventional rules but to local interactions contingent on the actor's particular circumstances.
Page 50 - term underscores the view that every course of action depends in essential ways upon its material and social circumstances. Rather than attempting to abstract action away from its circumstances and represent it as a rational plan, the approach is to study how people use their circumstances to achieve intelligent action.
Page 1 - The famous anthropological absorption with the (to us) exotic ... is, thus, essentially a device for displacing the dulling sense of familiarity with which the mysteriousness of our own ability to relate perceptively to one another is concealed from us. (Geertz
Page 76 - as their task the recognition of them. Rather, the turn is a unit whose constitution and boundaries involve such a distribution of tasks (as we have noted): That a speaker can talk in such a way as to permit projection of possible completion to be made from his talk,
Page 50 - The basic premise is twofold: first, that what traditional behavioral sciences take to be cognitive phenomena have an essential relationship to a publicly available, collaboratively organized world of artifacts and actions, and secondly, that the significance of artifacts and actions, and the methods by which their significance is conveyed, have an essential relationship to their particular, concrete circumstances.
Page 83 - (Schegloff 1982). Our communication succeeds in the face of such disturbances not because we predict reliably what will happen and thereby avoid problems, or even because we encounter problems that we have anticipated in advance, but because we work, moment by moment, to identify and remedy the inevitable troubles that arise:

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