Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to PattonCambridge University Press, 1977 - 284 pages Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Were the railways vital to Prussia's victory over France in 1870? Was the famous Schlieffen Plan militarily sound? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only a few of the questions that form the subject-matter of this meticulously researched, lively book. Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the 'nuts and bolts' of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned - but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from a fresh and unusual point of view. The result is a fascinating book that has something new to say about virtually every one of the most important campaigns waged in Europe during the last two centuries. |
Table des matières
Introduction | 1 |
The background of two centuries | 5 |
Rise of the magazine system | 17 |
The age of linear warfare | 26 |
An umbilical cord of supply? | 36 |
An army marches on its stomach | 40 |
Boulogne to Austerlitz | 42 |
Many roads to Moscow | 61 |
Conclusions | 138 |
Russian roulette | 142 |
Planning for Barbarossa | 148 |
Leningrad and the Dnieper | 155 |
Storm to the gates of Moscow? | 166 |
Conclusions | 175 |
Sirte to Alamein | 181 |
Rommels first offensive | 182 |
Conclusions | 70 |
When demigods rode rails | 75 |
A joker in the pack | 82 |
Railways against France | 89 |
Logistics of the armed horde | 96 |
Did wheels roll for victory? | 103 |
The wheel that broke | 109 |
Logistics of the Schlieffen Plan | 113 |
The plan modified | 118 |
Logistics during the campaign of the Marne | 122 |
State of the railroads | 128 |
Strength and reinforcement of the right wing | 134 |
Annus Mirabilis | 192 |
supply and operations in Africa | 199 |
War of the accountants | 202 |
Normandy to the Seine | 206 |
Broad front or knifelike thrust? | 216 |
Conclusions | 227 |
Logistics in perspective | 231 |
Note on sources | 238 |
Bibliography | 239 |
Notes | 250 |
280 | |
Expressions et termes fréquents
advance Africa Allied ammunition Anlagen zum KTB Armée armoured Army Group Centre Army Group South army's artillery August B. H. Liddell Hart base battle Belgium Benghazi Berlin British campaign capture carry cavalry cent Clausewitz columns commanders concentrated consumption convoys corps Depôt difficulties distance divisions Eisenhower enemy entry fact feed fodder forces fortresses France French front fuel g.Kdos German Army Guerre Hitler horses ibid infantry Italian July June KTB/Halder later less Liddell Hart Liège lines of communication logistic London lorries Louvois magazines Marne Metz Meuse MGFA file miles military mobile Moltke Moltke's Moscow Napoleon October offensive OKH/Genst.d.H/Op.Abt operations organization Panzergruppe Paris Plan port possible problem provisions quantities railheads railways reached rear requisitioning result Rhine right wing roads Rommel Russian Schlieffen Schlieffen Plan September 1941 SHAEF shortage siege Smolensk strategic supply tion Tobruk tons trains Tripoli troops unloading vehicles wagons warfare Wehrmacht