Avis des internautes - Rédiger un commentaire
Aucun commentaire n'a été trouvé aux emplacements habituels.
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century
Rudolf von Caemmerer
Affichage du livre entier - 1905
able according action advance advantage adversary already army corps Artillery attack Austrian base battle become body called campaign carried centre century certainly chap chapter circumstances Clausewitz close columns command communication completely concentration considerably considered course cover danger decisive defence direction divisions effect enemy enemy's enveloping fact field fighting finally fire flank forces France French front gain German give ground hand idea importance inner Italy Jomini lead looked manner masses matter means military mind mode Moltke move movement Napoleon nature necessary never object offensive once operation opinion owing portion position possible practical present principle Prussian question railway reason regards remain retreat Rhine roads rule separate shows side situation Staff strategic strong success superior tactical theory thought tion troops turn victory wants whole wing
Page v - There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of and then to keep to that point, for we can only apprehend the mass of events in the unity from one standpoint, and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency.
Page 91 - Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to war, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until someone steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.
Page 80 - ... is to be done than on the form of execution. Where the latter is the principal question, as in the single acts both great and small in War, the moral quantities are already reduced to a very small number. Thus, then, in Strategy everything is very simple, but not on that account very easy. Once it is determined from the relations of the State what should and may be done by War, then the way to it is easy to find; but to follow that way straightforward, to carry out the plan without being obliged...
Page 97 - A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive— the flashing sword of vengeance — is the most brilliant point in the defensive ; he who does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the defensive will never understand the superiority of the defensive as a form of War...
Page 112 - ... to be again revised. In this revision the two kinds of War will be everywhere kept more distinctly in view, by which all ideas will acquire a clearer meaning, a more precise direction, and a closer application. The two kinds of War are, first, those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy, whether it be that we aim at his destruction, politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms ; and next, those in which our object is merely to make some conquests...
Page 75 - ... conceptions and demonstration of the inherent relations, and so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle course really without any value...
Page 276 - In a right-angled triangle the square on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the sum of the squares on the sides containing the right angle.
Page 84 - This is perfectly natural, none of the principal plans which are required for a War can be made without an insight into the political relations; and, in reality, when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a War, they say in reality something very different from what they intend.
Page 83 - We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history.
Page 215 - Very large concentrations of troops are in themselves a calamity. The army which is concentrated at one point is difficult to supply and can never be billeted; it cannot march, it cannot operate, it cannot exist at all for any length of time ; it can only fight.