The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th CenturyHugh Rees, Limited, 1905 - 277 pages |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
The Development of Strategical Science During the 19th Century Rudolf von Caemmerer Affichage du livre entier - 1905 |
The Development of Strategical Science During the 19Th Century Rudolf Von Caemmerer Aucun aperçu disponible - 2018 |
The Development of Strategical Science During the 19Th Century Rudolf Von Caemmerer Aucun aperçu disponible - 2018 |
Expressions et termes fréquents
action advance advantage adversary Alsace Archduke army corps art of war Artillery assailant attack Austrian battalions battle of Königgrätz battlefield become Belgium Bohemia Bülow campaign Cavalry centre chap chapter circumstances Clausewitz closely concentrated columns command completely considerably course danger Danube decisive battle defence deployment direction divisions Duke of Broglie effect Elbe enemy enemy's flank enveloping favourable fighting fire fortifications fortresses France Frederic French front frontier gain Görlitz Hans Delbrück hostile idea importance Infantry inner line Jomini leaders Lewal line of communication line of retreat lines of operation manner masses Metz military forces mode Moltke Moltke's Moselle Napoleon object offensive opinion organisation owing penetration PENINSULAR WAR Pont-à-Mousson position possible principle Prussian Army railway reason Rhine right wing roads Schlichting sentence Silesia South German Staff strategic success superior tactical theatre theory tion Trèves turning movement victory Willisen
Fréquemment cités
Page v - There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of and then to keep to that point, for we can only apprehend the mass of events in the unity from one standpoint, and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency.
Page 91 - Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to war, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, until someone steps in with one that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.
Page 80 - ... is to be done than on the form of execution. Where the latter is the principal question, as in the single acts both great and small in War, the moral quantities are already reduced to a very small number. Thus, then, in Strategy everything is very simple, but not on that account very easy. Once it is determined from the relations of the State what should and may be done by War, then the way to it is easy to find; but to follow that way straightforward, to carry out the plan without being obliged...
Page 97 - A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive— the flashing sword of vengeance — is the most brilliant point in the defensive ; he who does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the defensive will never understand the superiority of the defensive as a form of War...
Page 112 - ... to be again revised. In this revision the two kinds of War will be everywhere kept more distinctly in view, by which all ideas will acquire a clearer meaning, a more precise direction, and a closer application. The two kinds of War are, first, those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy, whether it be that we aim at his destruction, politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms ; and next, those in which our object is merely to make some conquests...
Page 75 - ... conceptions and demonstration of the inherent relations, and so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle course really without any value...
Page 276 - In a right-angled triangle the square on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the sum of the squares on the sides containing the right angle.
Page 84 - This is perfectly natural, none of the principal plans which are required for a War can be made without an insight into the political relations; and, in reality, when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a War, they say in reality something very different from what they intend.
Page 83 - We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history.
Page 215 - Very large concentrations of troops are in themselves a calamity. The army which is concentrated at one point is difficult to supply and can never be billeted; it cannot march, it cannot operate, it cannot exist at all for any length of time ; it can only fight.