CONQUEST OF NAPLES.

A. D. 1707.

AFTER the evacuation of Lombardy by the French in the spring of 1707, the court of Vienna, according to a very natural and obvious policy, indicated a strong desire to effect the farther acquisition of Naples and Sicily, and great preparations were made for this purpose. But a project having been formed by the courts of London, Turin, and the Hague, for an invasion of France on the side of Provence, and the consequent siege of Toulon, they joined in an obstinate opposition to the expedition to Naples, as necessarily subversive of the success of that which they considered as of infinitely greater moment. And the earl of Manchester was dispatched to the imperial court, with instructions to represent in her majesty's name, "how destructive any such design would be to the carrying on the war in Dauphiné and Provence, which is," says lord Sunderland, "the only way by which France can be affected, or a diversion made in favour of king Charles." In return the earl of Manchester informed the secretary of state, in a letter dated Vienna April 25, that notwithstanding its being holy week, he had, immediately on his arrival, seen the imperial ministers Zinzendorf and Wratislau, and acquainted them with the orders he had received from her majesty. "As for count Zinzendorf," says the earl," he was not so positive as the latter, but they both agreed in this, that it would not in

VOL. II.

the least prejudice that undertaking; for since the French were entirely out of Italy, there were troops sufficient for both, that prince Eugene was to stay, though his presence would have been of very great consequence. On the next day the earl had an audience of the emperor, to whom he stated, "that the expedition into France was of the last consequence, not only in relation to the common cause, but also to the securing the crown of Spain to the king; that her majesty did hope that he had given the necessary directions in order to support it as far as it is possible." "His imperial majesty answered," says the ambassador, "with all the acknowledgment imaginable, and declared that he would do all that remained for him in relation both to the duke of Savoy and the queen." In his dispatch of May 4th, the earl of Manchester writes, that "they are still zealous for the expedition of Naples. I take all occasions to dissuade them from it, but their answer is always that there will be more troops left than can be employed. The emperor will have 35,000 men in Italy, and in our pay 20,000; the duke of Savoy has 13,000, so that the army will consist of about 68,000 men, sufficient for garrisons, and a very great army for the expedition, and more than can be subsisted. These are the arguments they make use of both to the envoy of Holland and myself. We still persist to persuade them to lay aside this expedition for the present. May 11th the ambassador writes, I believe you will have received, before this comes to your lordship, the certainty of the detachments going to Naples. It consists of five regiments of foot, and five of horse, which though not complete, will amount to ten thousand men. They are

at present in the Modonese, and about the 16th inst. they begin their march to Naples. I have done all I could to persuade them to defer it. Their arguments are still the same. Only they say farther, that prince Eugene has wrote to England to satisfy the queen, that it will not prejudice the great design against France. They have all often repeated, and do still promise, that there shall not be a man more sent, let the success be what it will, till they see the event of the other expedition, which, as I can perceive, they have no great opinion of, though they agree that it ought to be attempted."

It should seem that the continued and pertinacious opposition of the allied courts to the Neapolitan expedition, was somewhat invidious and unreasonable; and it is sufficiently evident from the expressions used by the earl of Manchester, that he did by no means approve of the warmth with which he was compelled to urge a matter so disagreeable to the court of Vienna. "They are very much surprized," says the ambassador (May 7th), "at our being so much against this expedition. I must confess, that by all the informations I can get, I cannot see but there will be 70,000 men in Italy; and if the detachment to Naples should amount to 10,000 men, and the garrisons in Lombardy to 10,000 more, there will still remain a very great army." But the aversion of the British cabinet to this project, appears to have been insurmountable.

On the 6th of May the earl of Sunderland writes to the earl of Manchester, that he is very glad to find the ambassador has some hopes that the court of Vienna

will lay aside their thoughts of the expedition to Naples. "It was always," says his lordship, "very unseasonable, but particularly so now, since our great misfortune in Spain. Upon these accounts her majesty would have your lordship insist, in the strongest manner possible, against this expedition." And, in a subsequent dispatch from Mr. secretary Harley to the earl of Manchester, May 17th, it is said, "I am heartily glad your excellency has had so much success as to shake that court from their speculative expedition against Naples. But I am very sorry that the misfortune of our army in Spain is an irresistible argument to lay aside wholly that project. The queca has done all that is possible on the sudden event, and in this great uncertainty. Orders are gone this night to encourage the king of Portugal to keep firm to the alliance; and likewise to Holland to consult with them the best way

to recover the blow. But all will be to no purpose, unless the emperor will exert himself upon this occasion, not only to lay aside the expedition to Naples, to push vigorously into France, but also to act offensively upon the Rhine. These are points which the queen hath so much at heart, that her majesty hath wrote to the emperor with her own hand, which I inclose herewith. Your excellency will enforce it with such arguments as you will find, according to your great sagacity, may best incline his imperial majesty to comply with so reasonable a desire."

THE QUEEN TO THE EMPEROR.

SIR, MY BROTHER,

Kensington, May 6, 1707.

THE advantage which the enemy has now obtained in Spain might have such dismal consequences, that I could not forbear to tell you, that it is of the utmost importance that all your troops that are in Italy should be employed to make an invasion in France; and that at the same time the army in the empire should act with vigor on the Rhine. Spain is so far from the countries in which my troops and those of the States General are, that there is no remedy so quick nor so powerful as that of making this invasion: your majesty is too well informed to amuse yourself with a little expedition for some member or dependency of that kingdom, when the noble and principal parts of the monarchy in question, the honor and welfare of my brother the catholic king, and in his person the dignity of the august house of Austria, are concerned. I promise myself, therefore, from your prudence, that you will think only on the re-establishment of the affairs of that prince, by obliging his enemies to recall their troops for the defence of their own dominions. I am,

your majesty's affectionate sister,

ANNE R.

These pressing instances and representations proved, however, ultimately ineffectual; the court of Vienna constantly insisting that the forces of the allies were sufficient to carry on both these enterprizes at once. Count Thaun, with a strong body of imperialists,