marched from Lombardy through the ecclesiastical states, and struck no small terror into the court of Rome as they passed near it. The hatred which the Neapolitans bore the French, together with the severities of their government, had put that whole kingdom into such a disposition to revolt, that the small party which adhered to king Philip found it not advisable to offer any resistance, and had only time to convey their treasure and most valuable effects to Gaeta, and to retire thither. The imperialists were received into the metropolis with great rejoicings; and Gaeta being besieged in form, was carried by assault, and plundered: the garrison, retiring into the castle, were soon after forced to surrender, and were all made prisoners of war. It was proposed to follow this success, with an attempt upon Sicily; but the English fleet not being at liberty to assist them, the scheme was abandoned, though not without great reluctance, as the Sicilians were no less eager to exchange the tyranny of Spain for that of Austria, than the neighbouring and kindred nation in whose destiny theirs was naturally involved.

BATTLE OF ALMANZA.

A. D. 1707.

During the

THE battle of Almanza, fought April 14, 1707, between the confederate army, commanded by the earl of Galway, and that of Philip V. under the duke of Berwick, was so decisive in favour of that monarch, that the farther prosecution of the war for the purpose of reducing the kingdom of Spain to the dominion of his competitor, the archduke, became, in the view of all intelligent persons, romantic and hopeless. session of parliament which succeeded this fatal disaster, infinite pains were taken by the tories to fix a stigma on the character of the earl of Galway, who had distinguished himself by his personal exertions on that unfortunate day, and to extol the superior sagacity of the earl of Peterborough, whose opinion had been given in favour of a plan of defensive operations. Much time and trouble were wasted in a most perplexing and tedious investigation of the question in the house of lords, who at last found themselves incompetent to pass any judgment upon it.

In the session of 1710-11, the tories being now in power, the discussion of this intricate and obsolete bu siness was revived by the peers, with a pre-determination to throw all possible obloquy on lord Galway. For this purpose, certain queries were addressed by the house to his rival and enemy, the earl of Peterborough, who, in

his reply, gave vent to very bitter effusions of personal and party rancor. Having disgusted his friends, the whigs, by the indiscretion and extravagance of his conduct, that nobleman had now thrown himself into the arms of the tories, who equally hating him, and hated by him, were eager to render his caprice, his jealousy, and eccentricity instrumental in gratifying their spleen and revenge. On the other hand, and impelled by circumstances, the accused general vindicated his character, and the whole tenor of his proceedings, as commander of the allied forces in Spain, by a narrative drawn up in a manner singularly candid, perspicuous, and dispassionate. Few individuals were more obnoxious to the tory faction than the earl of Galway, which, from the blameless tenor of his life, might be accounted strange, were it not ascertained, by mela choly experience, that the rage of party, reversing the moral order of things, can make even the purity and perfection of an illustrious character an additional incentive to malevolence. The earl had also been distinguished by the cordial esteem and friendship of the late king William, and the political persecution of a man dear to that monarch, was assiduously urged by many, for the sake of offering an affront and insult to his glorious memory.

The earl of Peterborough had asserted in the debate, when the question came originally before the house, that the conclusive council for the operations of the ensuing campaign was held on the 15th January, (1707); and he offered to depose, on oath, that in that very council no person whatever was of opinion for making an offensive war, and against dividing the troops, but lord

Galway, lord Tyrawley, and general Stanhope. But in the paper delivered by lord Peterborough, in reply to the queries, he contented himself with saying, "that several councils of war were held in the month of January, 1706-7, at Valencia, in order to adjust the measures for the ensuing campaign; that the lords Galway, Tyrawley, and Mr. Stanhope, with the Portuguese general, were for marching towards Madrid, and seeking, the enemy: and that the king, the count de Noyelles, the Spanish ministers and generals, with himself, argued against offensive operations, as highly dangerous and impracticable." According to the earl of Peterborough's last account, therefore, the marquis das Minas was adverse to the plan of a defensive war: and the evidence of lord Tyrawley was express, that count Oropeza, one of the Spanish ministers, and also count D'Assumar, the Portuguese ambassador, and M. Freisheim, envoy of the States, were decidedly of the same opinion. "I do take upon me to aver," says lord Galway himself, “that nothing was ever transacted, during the time I had the honour to command the queen's troops, contrary to the positive resolution of any general council, or council of war, unless that resolution was afterwards repealed by some subsequent council."

On the present occasion the determination of the council was highly approved by the queen and her ministers. The earl of Sunderland, in his dispatch of February 14, 1706-7, declared to Mr. Stanhope, "that nothing but interest could incline any to a contrary opinion; and that, as to the earl of Peterborough's projects in Italy, the less attention he (Mr. S.) gave to them the better." "In order to execute the resolutions of those councils

of war," continues the earl of Galway," where it was agreed we should march to Madrid by the way of Arragon, but first to destroy the enemy's magazines on the frontiers of Valencia, I went with the marquis das Minas, in the beginning of April, to Yecla, and from thence to Villena, where we had advice of their troops being assembled at Almanza. Upon this advice, a council of war was held, where it was unanimously resolved to fight the enemy, which we were the rather induced to, because it was judged impossible to subsist upon the defensive in the kingdom of Valencia; for the country had already been so much exhaused by our winter quarters, that there was not two days provision to be found for the army, and we could not have been able to have subsisted there so long as we did, but for the supply we found in the enemy's magazines in Yecla. Nor did we think it proper to pursue the once intended march through that kingdom and Arragon, lest provisions should be wanting, leaving the enemy so near, and in a condition to follow us. For, though commissaries had been employed, there was reason to apprchend the towns we were to pass through would shut the gates against us, whilst we were closely followed by the enemy, and persecuted by the peasants of the country, who, grown desperate by seeing themselves abandoned, would naturally be up in arms in the mountains. Besides, we had certain advice that there was already a body of French troops, consisting of 8,000 men, in Spain, and upon their march to reinforce the enemy. Thus, as the army must inevitably have perished without fighting, it was thought reasonable to run the hazard of a battle, wherein we had an equal chance to come off victors."