chief duty and pleasure it should be to acquire a knowledge of their particular business, and by pursuing it as a profession, acquire proficiency therein. These men might eventually obtain, by the force of knowledge and personal merits alone, the permanent confidence of their constituents. But it is useless to speculate upon what might be done in such an imaginary Republic-a Utopia which never existed. My object is rather to show what has been done, and what is actually doing at this hour, in America.

Since, in all the twenty-four States forming the Union, the members of the most numerous and influential legislative House are elected for one year only, it seems nearly out of the question that, with so short a period of service, the members can feel themselves independent of their constituents; neither is it intended that they should so feel. The moment of re-election is always close at hand; ,and if the members fail to conform strictly to the wishes of the electors, they are ousted as a matter of course. Even if they do attend to these wishes at one moment, the chances are, that if they hope to continue in favour they must take an opposite part before the session is out,-inasmuch as the popular opinion shifts about as often, and sometimes more swiftly than the wind, with no more visible cause! The most sagacious manager that

ever lived, therefore, could not regulate his conduct under a system such as this, so as to please a mass of people who, let them or their admirers say what they please, must of absolute necessity be ignorant of most of the subjects brought before them for their consideration.

6

Accordingly, we do find that no great number of members are allowed to remain longer at their public post than one term; for at the end of each year, a large proportion of new legislators always come in, fresh from the people,' more full of confidence, probably, in their own wisdom, than well grounded in what has been done by their predecessors; and not very profoundly versed, it may be reasonably supposed, in the general science of go

vernment.

The legislature of New York consists of 160 members, including the Senate and House of Assembly. In the year 1823, only 15 members of the legislature of 1822 were re-elected, and 145 out of the whole 160 were new, or about ninetenths.

In 1824, only 37 members who sat in 1823 were re-elected, and 123 were new, or eight-tenths.

In 1825, 34 were re-elected from 1824, and 126 were new, or about eight-tenths, as before.

These numbers are taken from the lists given in vol. II., pages 602 to 605, of the laws relating to

the canals of New York, printed by authority of that State in 1825.

From the same, and other official sources of information, the following table has been drawn up, to show how long the members of the legislature of New York, in 1827, had held seats in one or other of the houses:

Total number, 160.

Of these, 1 member had sat for 11 years.

Thus, nearly of the whole were new; had sat from 4 to 1 years; and had sat from 11 to 5 years. The average time of the old members sitting is 23 years nearly. The new members are to the old as 3 to 2.

CHAPTER XIV.

EVERY Legislator in America in Congress, as well as in the different States, receives, for his trouble during the Session, a certain daily pecuniary compensation. This, it will be observed, gives a distinctive feature to these bodies, and, coupled with another very important circumstance, almost completes the democratical character. The members are returned to the legislature, not merely to represent the particular spot for which they are chosen, but they are absolutely required by law to have been residents on it for a certain stated period previous to the election. Neither can they be elected for any other place. This regulation is one of the most destructive that can well be conceived of true independence, as it forces men to consider local, not general objects. The Representatives, although not bound by law to do so, invariably consider the interests of their

constituents as the paramount object. If any man, therefore, be public-spirited enough to oppose those interests, in consideration of the general good, his dismissal follows quite as a matter of course, at the ensuing election; which, it will be recollected, is always close at hand. Thus, the doctrine that the will of the constituents is to guide the conduct of persons sent to the legislature, is almost universally acted upon. Consequently, these Representatives are, in strictness, neither more nor less than mere agents, engaged to do the will of their respective constituents, for such short periods, of service as may best tend to establish and keep alive that unbounded want of confidence which avowedly pervades the whole system, and is, according to the American doctrine, the truest antidote to the corrupt selfishness which, they say, poisons every man's political nature.

There is another consideration, tending the same way, which it is impossible to overlook. When a member is certain, or next to certain, do what he, may, that he is not to remain beyond one year in the legislature, he will be irresistibly impelled, unless human nature is different on different sides, of the Atlantic, to make the most of his brief authority to serve his own particular purposes; or, which is nearly the same thing in practice, to serve those of the persons amongst whom he is again to