concerned in what is morally evil. Evil he permits to take place, and efficaciously overrules it for good-for the promotion of his glory.

It must also be here distinctly noted, although it is clearly implied in the general statement, and will afterwards be more particularly considered, that the decrees of God relate as much to the means or secondary causes, by which events are brought about, as to the events themselves. Means and ends are equally, and undividedly, the subject of the decree. And the nature and character of the means, whether moral or natural, are not changed, but fixed and preserved, by the

divine purpose.

Thus have I endeavoured to ascertain and state distinctly, the doctrine contained in the answer of the Catechism before us. I am now to endeavour

II. To prove it, from reason and from scripture.

Here I shall not detain you long. For whatever difficulty some may find in receiving this doctrine, the process of reasoning by which it is established, is, as I apprehend, both short and conclusive; and the scriptural proof is extremely plain and direct. The reasoning process is this-We must believe that the Deity foreknew all things, or we cannot believe in the perfection of his nature. To say that he was,

or could be, ignorant of a single future event, is to deny his omniscience-one of his essential perfections; and it is also directly to impeach his wisdom, by supposing that he acted without a perfect plan. But nothing can be foreknown while it remains uncertain. What is not certain, may be the subject of conjecture, but not of absolute knowledge. Future events, then, to be foreknown, must be perfectly certain. Now, before the events took place-innumerable ages before they took place-nothing could make their occurrence perfectly certain, but the determination of God-of God unchangeably ordaining that a system should go into operation, which would infallibly produce these events at a certain time, and with all their attendant circumstances. Thus, we think, that the decree and the foreknowledge of God are inseparably

connected together; and that, according to human concep tions, the decree, in point of order, must precede foreknowledge.

The reverse of all this, is the doctrine of the Arminians. They say that the foreknowledge of God is the ground of his decree and some, that he foreknew all things without properly decreeing any thing. But it seems to us that the whole of this system exhibits nothing more than an abortive attempt to avoid a startling difficulty.* We think so, because what its advocates say, appears to us, when fairly viewed, not to afford any relief whatever, in regard to the difficulty from which they seek to escape. We do by no means deny that the future and contingent actions of free moral agents, may be foreknown by the Deity. We think that Reid, in his essays on the intellectual powers of man-in the chapter on memory-has very satisfactorily illustrated this point. But it really affords no sort of solution of the difficulty in question. For it must still be admitted, that with a full and perfect view of what free moral agents would do and be, and all the consequences that would follow, the Deity gave being to those agents-He put into operation the system that was certainly to result in all their actions with all their consequences: and what is this, but virtually to admit, that he determined that these actions, and events, and consequences, should take place? For if he had not determined that they should take place, could he not, and would he not, have forborne to put in train, what he knew would infallibly produce them? So that it comes precisely to the same thing at last. But the doctrine of divine foreordination, as seems to us, is more fair than the Arminian system, in statement-more conclusive in reasoning more agreeable to scripture, and more calculated. to honour God. It was a just and striking reply, which King William the Third of England, made to one, who asked him,

It is believed that the Socinians, on this subject, generally agree with the Arminians. There have been some Socinians, however, (and perhaps there may be some still,) who have even denied the omniscience and foreknowledge of God altogether. But of these, it has been well observed by Dr. Witherspoon, that they are so directly opposite to the letter of scripture, that they deserve no regard."

The

if he could believe in this doctrine of foreordination. reply was to this effect-"I cannot help believing it-for I cannot degrade my Maker below the character of a wise man, by thinking that he acted without a plan, and without regarding the consequences of what he did."

The scripture proof of this doctrine is abundant, and as we believe palpable. We know indeed, that many learned and ingenious criticisms and arguments have been used, to show that the passages we allege will admit of another construction. But with all the erudition and talent which have been employed for this purpose, we do not think that, in regard to many passages, even a plausible interpretation has been given to them, so as to set aside the doctrine in question: And we do maintain, that it is a very strong presumption against any exposition of a passage of scripture, of which the language is plain and the subject evident, if the expositor labours hard to make out a sense different from that which would otherwise occur, and be received as the most obvious and natural. The sacred writers are certainly to be understood in the sense in which they would most naturally be understood, by those to whom they wrote and spoke. A portion of scripture, already referred to, the first chapter of the epistle to the Ephesians, may be taken as an example of what I have here in view. After all the learned and elaborate efforts which have been used, to show that this chapter may consist with a different construction, its obvious and natural import must, we think, have been understood by the Ephesians, and must now strike every unprejudiced reader, as decisively in favour of the doctrine of foreordination or predestination, and of particular election and so it seems to me it must for ever stand, in opposition to all human ingenuity that may be employed to give it another bearing. The very same might be said of several other extended passages in Paul's epistles, especially in his epistle to the Romans. But such passages are not confined to the writings of Paul, or to any one part of the sacred writings. They are scattered throughout the whole Bible: so that I might spend the greater part of the time assigned to

this lecture in repeating texts or portions of scripture, which either plainly and distinctly, or by fair implication, teach this doctrine. The passages need no comment, and therefore I will not repeat them. I will only refer you, in a Bible with marginal references, to the 9th and 11th chapters of the epistle to the Romans; or to that first chapter only of the epistle to the Ephesians, which I have repeatedly mentioned.*

I am now-

III. Not only to admit, but to assert and vindicate, other truths, with which the doctrine of the divine decrees may seem to be in conflict; to repel the false allegations which have been made, in relation to those who believe in the absolute sovereignty of God; and to show in what manner the apparently militating truths in regard to this subject ought to be received and held.

I cannot better introduce what I have in view in this part of our discussion, than by a quotation from our Confession of Faith, chap. iii. sec. 1-Let it be well observed, that this section was manifestly intended to contain both an exhibition and an explanation of the creed of our church, relative to the subject before us; that it may distinctly appear that what I have to offer is in perfect accordance with that creed. The section referred to, stands as follows-"God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

The first important guard or restriction of the truth here exhibited is, that we are never to consider the decrees of God

*In committing his lecture to the press, the author thinks proper to specify some of the portions of scripture which he thinks establish the doctrine of divine foreordination and particular election.-Rom. viii. 28–39. ix. 6—33. xi. throughout. Ephes. i. 4-12. 2 Tim. i. 9. Acts ii. 23. iv. 27, 28. xv. 18. 2 Thes. ii. 13. 1 Pet. i. 5. ii. 8. 2 Pet. i. 10. Mat. xi. 25, 26. John vi. 37. 64, 65. viii. 47. x. 26. xvii. 9. Jude 4. Rev. xiii. 8. xvii. 8. Gen. 1. 20. Isa. x. 6, 7. 12. xii. 7. Prov. xvi. 4. Ex. iv. 21. Job xiii. 13, 14. xxxiv. 29.

in any such light as to make Him the author of sin. Judge then, with what propriety the members of our communion have sometimes been charged with holding this horrible tenet. It cannot possibly be renounced in more unequivocal language than is here used, in the standards of our church. And if any who call themselves Calvinists hold this tenet, we reject them, with as much promptitude as we reject the impious principle which they embrace. Calvin himself never held it -On the contrary, no man could more earnestly express his abhorrence of it, or more cautiously guard his followers against it. But, say our opposers, your doctrine of the decrees must draw this consequence after it-The consequence must necessarily follow from that doctrine. No-we reply -That is your consequence, not ours. We utterly deny the consequence. And you have no right to draw it for us, and to charge us with it; for that is to take for granted the whole matter in dispute.

And here, by the way, I would remark, that however frequently it may be done-and it is done very frequently— nothing can be more unfair or illiberal, in controversy of any kind, and especially in religious controversy, than to make our own inferences from opinions which we dislike, and then to charge those inferences on the holders of the hated opinions -when the holders themselves utterly disclaim the inferences, and give sufficient evidence that they are not influenced by them. We may not only think that certain inferences follow from a given position, but admitting that they actually and legitimately follow, yet if those with whom we litigate deny them, and are manifestly not influenced by them, to charge them with the guilt or criminality of such inferences, is most uncandid and unjust. Now, in the present instance, I affirm without fear of contradiction, that there is no sect or denomination of Christians whatever, that would more generally or more deeply shudder at the thought of making God the author of sin, than those who hold that he hath "foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." They are sensible that to make such a charge would be to deny the moral character of