§ 6. A State, being regarded in public law as a body politic, or distinct moral being, naturally sovereign and independent, it is considered as capable of the same rights, duties and obligations, with respect to other States, as individuals with respect to other individuals. Among the most important of these natural rights is that of acquiring, possessing and enjoying property. And this right applies not only to property of the State, as exclusive of other States, but to such property as exclusive of individuals. But international law generally considers only the former kind of property, or international domain. When, however, we consider the rights of conquest and cession, the rights of maritime capture and of capture on land, it becomes necessary to consider the interior or municipal rights of property in the State, and to distinguish between the absolute and paramount rights of the State, in respect to property considered in its interior relations under municipal laws, rather than its exterior relations under international laws. As a general rule, the property of a State, of whatsoever description, is marked by the same characteristics relatively to other States, as the property of individuals relatively to other individuals; that is to say, 'it is exclusive of foreign interference, and susceptible of free disposition.' '

§ 7. A State may acquire property or domain, in various ways its title may be acquired originally by mere occupancy, and confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of

1 A Sovereign Prince is exempted from the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the State in which he happens to be, absolutely so far as his person is concerned, and with respect to his property, at least so far as that is connected with the dignity of his position and the exercise of his public functions. No proceedings in rem can be instituted against the property of a Sovereign Prince if the res can, in. any fair sense, be said to be connected with the jus corone of the Sovereign; but other property of a Sovereign may be proceeded against in rem.

A Sovereign Prince, by engaging in trade, may waive the privilege which he otherwise possesses of being exempt from the jurisdiction of the tribunals of a State, in respect of the property so engaged. A ship belonging to a foreign Sovereign, but used by him as a merchant vessel for trading purposes, is liable to be proceeded against in rem in the British Admiralty Court for damage done to another ship by collision. Semble, that mail packets, although the property of a Government, are not exempt from the ordinary process of the tribunals of a foreign State. unless expressly exempted by treaty.

The Khedive of Egypt is not a Sovereign Prince, and is therefore not entitled to claim the exemption for himself and his property, from the ordinary process of the courts of Great Britian, which is by international law founded upon the comity of nations accorded to foreign Sovereigns. The Charkieh,' Aspinall's Mar. L.C., 581.

time; or by discovery and lawful possession; or by conquest, confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or by grants, cession, purchase, or exchange; in fine, by any of the recognised modes by which private property is acquired by individuals. It is not our object to enter into any general discussion of these several modes of acquisition, any further than may be necessary to distinguish the character of certain rights of property which are the peculiar objects of international jurisprudence.1

§ 8. A sovereign State has the same absolute right to dispose of its territorial or other public property, as it has to acquire such property, but it depends upon its own municipal constitution and laws, how, and by what department of its government, the disposition shall be made. This is sometimes a question of peculiar interest to foreign States, who may acquire such property by purchase, exchange, cession, conquest, and treaties of confirmation, and especially where such acquisitions are made from States continually subject to revolutions and fluctuations in the character of its government and in the powers of its rulers. The act of a government de facto, a Government which is submitted to by the great body of the people, and recognised by other States, is binding as the act of the State; and it is not necessary for others to examine into the origin, nature and limits of that authority. If it is an authority de facto, and sufficient for the purpose, others will not inquire how that authority was obtained.2

§ 9. Nevertheless, in order to make such transfer valid, the authority, whether de facto or de jure, must be competent to bind the State. Hence the necessity of examining into and ascertaining the powers of the rulers, as the municipal constitutions of different States throw many difficulties in the way of alienations of their public property, and particularly of their territory. Especially, in modern times, the consent

1 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. ii. ch. iv. §§ 1, 4, 5; Puffendorf, de Fur. Nat. et Gent. lib. iv. chs. iv. v. vi.; Moser, Versuch, etc. b. v. cap. ix.; Schmaltz, Droit des Gens, liv. iv. ch. i.; Kluber, Droit des Gens, §§ 125, 126; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome iv. pt. iii. ch. v.

2 Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. §§ 150, 283 et seq.; Kent, Com.on Am. Law, vol. i. p. 166; Webster to De la Rosa, Aug. 25, 1851; Cong. Doc. 32nd Cong. 1st sess. Senate, Ex. Doc. No. 97; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. i. cap. iv. § 2; Heffter, Droit International, § 71; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. i. tit. i. cap. 2.

of the governed, express or implied, is necessary, before the transfer of their allegiance can regularly take place. But formerly, what Grotius calls patrimonial kingdoms were considered in the light of absolute property of particular families, who, having received the blind submission of their subjects, sold and bartered them away, like any other property which they possessed. And such transfers of sovereignty included, not only the right of eminent domain, and the absolute property of the Sovereign or State, but all private lands, and the property and services of the subjects, who were transferred with the soil, in the same manner as a slaveholder may transfer his slaves and all they possess, together with the title to his plantation.'

§ 10. There are numerous examples of such treaties of sale. In 1301, Theodoric, Landgrave of Thuringia, sold the Marquisate of Lusatia to Burchard, Archbishop of Magdeburg, for 600 marks of silver,-'insuper cum ministerialibus, Vasalis et Mancipiis, et aliis hominibus cujuscunque conditionis in jam dicta terra commorantibus,' &c. In the same manner, in 1311, Dantzic, Derschovia and Swiecae, were sold by the Margrave of Brandenburg to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, for 10,000 marks. In 1333, the city and territory of Mechlin was transferred for one hundred thousand reals of gold, by a treaty of sale between its Sovereign and the Earl of Flanders, the fealty being reserved. About the same time, the city and county of Lucques were sold by John of Luxemburg to Philip of Valois, for 180,000 florins; and a few years after, the sovereignty of Frankenstein was sold by the Duke of Silesia, for 2,000 marks, to the King of Bohemia. The sovereignty which the Popes so long held over Avignon was purchased by Clement VI., for 80,000 florins, from Jane, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence.2

§ 11. The practice also extended to the mortgaging of sovereignties, and the sales of reversionary interests in kingdoms. Thus, Robert, Duke of Normandy, in order to raise money to engage in the first crusade, mortgaged his duchy for 6,666 lbs. weight of silver, to his brother William, and trans

1 Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. iii. ch. xi.

Ward, Law of Nations, vol. ii. pp. 256-260; Dumont, Corps Dip. liv. ii. pp. 330, 364, 365; Dupuy, Droits de Roy F. C. p. 70; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip. p. 200. Alaska was purchased from Russia by the United States by treaty of March 13, 1867.

ferred the possession before his departure for the Holy Land. In 1479, Louis XI. bought the right of the house of Penthievre, the next male heirs in reversion, to Brittany. And fifteen years later, Charles VIII. purchased, for an annual pension of 4,300 ducats, an estate of 5,000, in lands in France or Italy, and the disposition of the Morea (when conquered), of Paleologus, the nephew of Constantine, the last Christian Emperor, his right to the whole Empire of Constantinople. The act of sale being drawn up by two notaries, and ratified; Charles assumed the robes and ornaments of the imperial dignity, and made no scruples in claiming the imperial rights vested in him by virtue of this purchase.1

§ 12. It was also the custom to dispose of sovereignties and dominions by deeds of gift, and by bequests. The Emperor Lewis V. created the dauphin Humbert king, with the full privilege of disposing of his sovereignty at will, during life, or at his death. In 1343 Humbert ceded his dominions to Philip of Valois, by solemn deed of gift. By similar deeds, and upon a like principle, the Emperor Henry VI. conferred upon Richard I. the kingdom of Arles, and the Emperor Baldwin gave to the Duke of Burgundy the kingdom of Thessalonia. By bequests, not only were whole sovereignties disposed of, but the orders of succession were frequently changed. Thus, Charles II., King of Sicily and Count of Provence, changed by will the order of succession to the county, and the claims of Charles VIII. to the throne of Naples were founded upon the adoption of Louis of Anjou, by Jane, Queen of Naples, 1380, which was evidenced to all Europe by a solemn and public deed."

§ 13. National territory consists of water as well as land. The maritime territory of every State extends to the ports, harbours, bays, mouths of rivers, and adjacent parts of the sea enclosed by headlands belonging to the same State. Within these limits, its rights of property and territorial jurisdiction are absolute, and exclude those of every other

1 Russell, Hist. Modern Europe, vol. i. pp. 185, 472; White, Hist. of France, p. 208.

In

2 Leibnitz, Cod. Dip. pp. 51, 237, 158, 220, 382; Pfeffel, Droit Pub. d'Allemagne, tome i. p. 541; Henault, Hist. Chron. tome i. p. 315. 1544 the English Parliament declared the succession to the Crown, but omitted to make any arrangement in the case of failure of issue of the children of Henry VIII. The King, by his will, named the descendants of his sister Mary, Duchess of Suffolk, as heirs in case of such failure.

State. The general usage of nations superadds to this extent of maritime territory an exclusive territorial jurisdiction over the sea for the distance of one marine league, or the range of a cannon-shot, along all the shores or coasts of the State. The maxim of law on this subject, is, terrae dominium finitur ubi finitur armorum vis, which is usually recognised to be about three miles from the shore. And even beyond this

In the case of the 'Franconia' (Reg. v. Keyn), a prisoner was indicted at the Central Criminal Court for manslaughter. He was a foreigner, and in command of a foreign ship, passing within three miles of the shore of England, on a voyage to a foreign port; and whilst within that distance, his ship ran into an English ship and sank her, whereby a passenger on board the latter ship was drowned. The facts of the case were such as to amount to manslaughter by English law. It was held by the majority of the Court (Cockburn, C.J., Kelly, C.B., Bramwell, J.A., Lush and Field, J.J., Sir R. Phillimore and Pollock, B.), on the ground that prior to 28 Hen. VIII. c. 15 the admiral had no jurisdiction to try offences by foreigners on board foreign ships, whether within or without the limit of three miles from the shore of England, and because the subsequent statutes only transferred to the common law courts the jurisdiction formerly possessed by the admiral, that therefore, in the absence of statutory enactment the Central Criminal Court had no power to try the above offence. On the other hand, Lord Coleridge, C.J., Brett and Amphlett, J.J.A., Grove, Denman, and Lindley, J.J., held that the sea within three miles of the coast of England is part of the territory of England; that the English criminal law extends over those limits; and that the admiral formerly had, and the Central Criminal Court now has, jurisdiction to try offences there committed, although on board foreign ships.

Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in the course of a very exhaustive summing-up, representing the opinion of the majority of the Court, thus epitomised the contention for the prosecution :—

'Although the occurrence on which the charge is founded took place on the high seas in this sense, that the place in which it happened was not within the body of a county, it occurred within three miles of the English coast; by the law of nations the sea, for a space of three miles from the coast, is part of the territory of the country to which the coast belongs; and consequently the "Franconia," at the time the offence was committed, was in English waters, and those on board were therefore subject to English law.' He then observes :-'From the earliest period of English legal history, the cognizance of offences committed on the high seas had been left to the jurisdiction of the admiral. Every offence was triable only in the county in which it had been committed. If an offence was committed in a bay or gulf, inter fauces terræ, the common law could deal with it, because the parts of the sea so circumstanced were held to be within the body of the adjacent county or counties; but along the coast, on the external sea, the jurisdiction of the common law extended no further than to low-water mark.

'The office of coroner could not be executed by the coroner of a county in respect of matters arising on the sea. An inquest could not be held by one of these officers on a body found on the sea. Such jurisdiction could only be exercised by a coroner appointed by the admiral.

'A similar difficulty existed as to wrongs done on the sea, and in respect of which the party wronged was entitled to redress by civil action,