is a declaration of the animus by which it is done; that it was done hostili animo, and it is to be considered as a hostile measure, ab initio, against persons guilty of injuries which they refuse to redeem by any amicable alteration of their measures. This is the necessary course, if no compact intervenes for the restoration of such property, taken before a formal declaration of hostilities.''

§ 28. The right of granting reprisals, or of authorising seizures and embargoes, is vested in the sovereign, or supreme power of the State. It being little short of the right to carry on war, it is usually conferred only by the war-making power of the State. This, however, is regulated by municipal law. The English statute (4 Henry V., cap. 7) declared that 'the king will grant marque in due form to all that feel themselves grieved.' The marine ordinance of Louis XIV., of 1681, described the form to be observed in issuing letters of marque to French subjects. But these special reprisals, in time of peace, as has been already said, have almost entirely fallen into disuse. In case of general reprisals, the State duly authorises its officers and subjects by commissions, or by some general law or decree. Without such authority previously given, or its exercise subsequently ratified, by the supreme authority of the State, reprisals or seizures are not justified by the law of nations.2

§ 29. A State may authorise seizures and reprisals in favour of its own citizens, and for the redress of its own grievances, but not in favour of foreigners, or in an affair in which the nation has no concern.3 In 1664, England granted

1 The 'Boedes Lust,' 5 Rob., 246; the 'Diana,' 5 Rob., 60.

2 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. iv. ch. i. § 5; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, liv. viii. ch. ii. § 260; Emerigon, Traité des Assurances, ch. xii. sec. xxxv.; Bouchaud, Théorie des Traités de Commerce, ch. xiii. § 4; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit de la Nat., etc., lib. ii. ch. xii.; Heffter, Droit International, § 110; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. i. ch. xi. § 3.

3 Another kind of seizure, known as the Jus angaria, is mentioned by Hautefeuille, Massé, and other writers, as a right of a belligerent character, though exercised, strictly speaking, in time of peace. It is an act of the State by which foreign, as well as domestic, vessels, which happen to be within the jurisdiction of the State, are seized upon and compelled to transport soldiers, ammunition, or other instruments of war, and against their will to carry on hostilities against a Power with whom they are at peace. The owners of these vessels receive payment of freight beforehand. See Phillimore, Int. Law, pt. iii., ch. 3.

During the Franco-Prussian war, 1870, the Prussian troops sank six British vessels in the river Seine. This act was defended by Prussia on

reprisals against the United Provinces in favour of the knights of Malta. On this subject the grand pensionary, De Witt, protested, saying: 'It is evident that no sovereign can grant or make reprisals, except for the defence or indemnification of his own subjects, whom he is, in the sight of God, bound to protect; but he never can grant reprisals in favour of a foreigner who is not under his protection, and with whose sovereign he has not an engagement to that effect, ex pacto vel fædere. Besides, it is certain that reprisals cannot be granted except in case of an open denial of justice. Finally, it is also evident that, even in case of a denial of justice, he cannot empower his subjects to make reprisals until he has repeatedly demanded justice for them, and added, that in the event of a refusal, he will be obliged to grant them letters of marque and reprisal.' The court of France strongly condemned the conduct of the British admiralty in this case, and the king of England himself testified his disapprobation of it, and gave orders for the release of the Dutch vessels which had been seized by way of reprisal.1

§ 30. Valin is of opinion that the exception of foreigners does not apply to aliens domiciled in the country (regnicola), the State being bound to protect them, and to consider an injury done to them as an affront to its own sovereignty. Letters of reprisal may, therefore, issue not only to a subject by birth or naturalisation, but also to a foreigner domiciled in the ground of military necessity, although, on the demand of the British Government, an indemnification was subsequently made.-Parl. Papers, 1871.

By

By the Civil Law, a King is justified in pressing into his service, or seizing ships of every description and of any nation, which may be found in his ports, for purposes of urgent necessity, but, nevertheless, a tacit condition of safe return is annexed to such seizure or pressing. the ancient laws of England, the admiral might arrest any ship for the King's service, and after he or his lieutenant had made a return of the arrest in chancery, the owner of the ship could not plead against such return, because 'l'admiral et son lieutenant sont de record.'-Black Book, Admir., fol. 28-29 and 157–158, 15 R. II., c. 3.

Further, it is evident, from the ancient writs and patents of England, that the Admiral, the wardens of the Cinque Ports, and others, were ordered to arrest and provide ships of war and other vessels, as well as to impress mariners, and collect provisions and arms for the defence of Great Britain.-And see Rot. Scotia, 10 E. III., m. 2-17, 34.

For a national defence in war, it is legal to pull down or injure the property of a private person: this is in accordance with the principle, Salus populi suprema lex.-See Governors v. Meredith, 4 Term R. 796.

1 Bynkershoek, De Foro Legat, cap. xxii. § 5; Bynkershoek, Quæst Jur. Pub., lib. i. cap. xxiv.; Garden, De la Diplomatie, liv. vi. sec. iii. § 2.

the country. This might be inferred from the rule of international law, which subjects the property of domiciled aliens to all the contingencies of the war, they being considered, in law, as the subjects of the State in which they are domiciled. Being themselves liable to reprisals against the country of their domicil, it would seem just that they be allowed to participate in their benefits.1

1 Valin, Traité des Prises, p. 225; Valin, Ord. de la M., i. iii., tit. x., Des Représailles.

439

CHAPTER XV.

JUST CAUSES OF WAR.

1. War should never be undertaken without just cause—2. Reasons and motives of a war-3. Justifiable causes of war-4. To secure what belongs, or is due to us-5. To punish an aggression-6. To protect ourselves from a threatened danger-7. Difficulty in ascertaining the real causes of a war-8. The aggrandisement of a neighbour not a just cause of war-9. Opinion of Grotius-10. Remarks of Kent-11. The motives of a war-12. Commendable motives—13. Vicious motives -14. Pretexts, or alleged reasons-15. Unjust wars always criminal -16. Opinions of the early Fathers of the Church on war-17. Dr. Wayland's objection that war is forbidden by the Bible-18. That even defensive war is not justifiable-19. That if moral suasion fail to prevent war, we must suffer the evil-20. That war is necessarily injurious to public morals—21. That its expenses exceed its benefits -22. That men, being rational beings, should never resort to force23. That war fails to accomplish its object-24. That one party is necessarily in the wrong-25. That nations, like individuals, should refer their differences to some tribunal-26. That the benefits of a war are more than counterbalanced by its evils-27. Remarks of Dr. Leiber on war.

§ 1. 'WHOEVER,' says Vattel, 'entertains a true idea of war, —whoever considers its terrible effects, its destructive and unhappy consequences, will readily agree that it should never be undertaken without the most cogent reasons. Humanity revolts against a sovereign who, without necessity, or without very powerful reasons, lavishes the blood of his most faithful subjects, and exposes his people to the calamities of war, when he has it in his power to maintain them in the enjoyment of an honourable and salutary peace. And if to this imprudence, this want of love for his people, he moreover adds injustice toward those he attacks, of how great a crime, or rather of what a series of crimes, does he not become guilty? Responsible for all the misfortunes which he draws down upon his subjects, he is, moreover, loaded with the guilt of all those which he inflicts on an innocent nation. The slaughter of men, the pillage of cities, the devastation of provincessuch is the black catalogue of his enormities. He is respon

sible to God, and accountable to human nature, for every individual that is killed, for every hut that is burned down. The violences, the crimes, the disorders of every kind, attendant on the tumult and licentiousness of war, pollute his conscience, and are set down to his account, as he is the original author of them all. Unquestionable truths! alarming ideas! which ought to affect the rulers of nations, and all their military enterprises, and inspire them with a degree of circumspection proportionate to the importance of the subject!' The foregoing words of Vattel, remarkable for the age in which they were written, are well worthy the consideration and study of the statesmen and rulers of our own time.'

§ 2. The reasons which determine a nation to undertake a war are divided, by publicists, into two distinct classes: those which relate to the right to make the war, and those which relate to the expediency or propriety of doing so. The former are called the causes of the war, and the latter the motives; these causes may be justifiable or unjustifiable, and the motives may be commendable or vicious. The distinction has not always been observed by publicists and historians, and we not unfrequently find reasons alleged as causes of a war which were only motives or mere pretexts for undertaking it.

§ 3. The justifiable causes of a war are injuries received or threatened. There must be a strong probability that the threat may be attempted to be carried into execution, as mere empty words will seldom justify us in declaring war. It is not necessary that the injury should be material or physical, as a national insult is often as injurious as the robbery of a province. The justifiable objects of a war may, therefore, be divided into three classes or sub-divisions: Ist. to secure what belongs or is due to us; 2nd. to provide for our future safety by obtaining reparation for injuries done to us, and 3rd. to protect ourselves and property from a threatened injury. We will consider each of these classes separately.2

§ 4. First, of wars undertaken to secure what belongs or is due to us. We have shown, in the preceding chapter, that the party in possession has a right to retain his possession till the other claimant shows a clear and valid title to the thing in 1 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. iii. § 24.

2 Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. vi. ch. xii.; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 49; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. ii. cap. i. § 3; Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome v. ch. ii. sec. ii. § 6.