popular sovereignty, could never act in unison with those of kings and despots. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent war, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its decisions. For these, and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to rely on the present system of international law. Under this system, and with a constitutional government of limited and divided powers, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of impulse and passion, a yielding to the mere 'bestial propensities' of our nature; it is usually, in such governments, the deliberate and solemn act of the legislative power, of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the high council of the people.1

§ 26. Again, it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by the evils it entails, and that, 'most commonly, the very means by which we repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a military despotism at home.' Much has been said and written about military despotism, but we think he who studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a military despotism to a despotism of mere politicians. The governments of Alexander and Charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of the petty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them; and there is none so blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of Napoleon was no better than that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other 'lawyers' who preceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was dethroned. We could point to numerous instances where the benefits of war have more than compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not only to the generations who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for long ages. Had Rome adopted the non-resistance principle when Hannibal was at her gates, we should now be in the night of African ignorance and barbarism, instead of enjoying the benefits of Roman learning and Roman civilisation. Had France adopted this principle when the allied armies invaded her territories, in 1792, her fate had followed that of Poland. If the United States had adopted this principle in 1776, what would now be the character and condition of America?

§ 27. We have thus noticed, in detail, the various arguments against war used by the advocates of non-resistance, not because the arguments themselves have any real founda1 Legare, Rep. House of Rep., June 13, 1838.

tion or force, but on account of the character and influence of their authors, and the effect they apparently produce, not only upon religious enthusiasts, but also upon many Christian philanthropists. Such arguments need only to be examined to convince us of their weakness and absurdity, however plausible they may appear at first sight.1

We cannot better terminate this chapter than by quoting the following peculiarly just and appropriate remarks of Dr. Leiber, on the influence and character of war: 'The continued efforts,' he says, 'requisite for nations to protect themselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be infinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic war, which forever secures peace from that side. . . No human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance, nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the immeasurable blessings, and the unspeakable good, which have resulted to mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over the rolling masses of servile Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europe like the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over all the germs of civilisation, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that is good and noble. . . . Wars have frequently been, in the hands of Providence, the means of disseminating civilisation, if carried on by a civilised people-as in the case of Alexander, whose wars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extension of civilisation-or of rousing and re-uniting people who had fallen into lethargy, if attacked by less civilised and numerous hordes. Frequently we find, in history, that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to recover, as it were, civilisation, already on the wane, with a refined nation. Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless,

1A defensive war is always lawful, but an offensive war demands a serious and just cause, such as the public good, preservation of order, recovery of things unjustly abstracted, repression of rebels, and defence of innocent people.-Laym., lib. ii., t. iii., c. xii.; Mol., t. i., d. 114; Dian., p. 6. t. 4 r. 3; and St. Thomas Aquinas, 22, qu. 40, art. i.

But a subject is morally bound to wage war at the command of his prince, without enquiry into the justice or injustice of the war, unless he is (which is hardly possible) absolutely aware of its injustice.-Lugo, d. 18; De Just, s. i., n. 21; Sanchez, Dec. 1. vi. c. iii. n. 15; Salmer, De quint. præc., c. viii. punct. 3, § i. n. 29.

A person not bound to fight (¿.e, a volunteer or a mercenary), should carefully enquire into the merits of a war before offering his services.— Mol. d. 113, n. 171; Dian. t. ii, tract. v. misc. r. 96,

amply proved by history, that the closest contact, and consequent exchange of thought and produce, and enlargement of knowledge, between two otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by war. War is a struggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only that struggling process without which, in proportion to the good to be obtained, or, as would be a better expression for many cases, to the good that is to be born-no great and essential good falls ever to the share of man. Suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. Our religion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. No maternal rejoicing brightens up a mother's eye, without the anxiety of labour.'1

1 Leiber, Political Ethics, b. vii. §§ 20, 21; Halleck, Elem. Mil. Art and Science, ch. i. pp. 32, 33; for opinions of Grotius on the subjects of this chapter, vide his work, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. i.; lib. ii. caps. i. xx. and lib. iii. cap. v.

454

CHAPTER XVI.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF WARS.

§ 1. Definition of war-2. Divisions made by military writers-3. By historians-4. By publicists-5. Wars of insurrection and revolution6. Wars of independence-7. Wars of opinion-8. Wars of conquest -9. Civil wars-10. National wars-11. Wars of intervention-12. Armed intervention is war-13. For the preservation of the balance of power-14. Historical examples-15. Intervention of allies between Russia and Turkey in 1854-16. In internal affairs of States17. Treaty of Paris and Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815-18. British views of armed intervention-19. Intervention by reason of treaty obligations-20. By invitation of the contending parties-21. To stay the effusion of blood-22. For self-defence-23. Public wars -24. Private wars-25. Mixed wars—26. Perfect and imperfect wars —27. Solemn and non-solemn wars-28. Effect of subsequent ratification-29. Lawful and unlawful wars-30. Distinction between unlawful and unjust wars-31. Individual liability for acts of hostility.

§ I. WAR has been defined, 'A contest between States, or parts of States, carried on by force.' This definition is by some considered defective, and as excluding that class of civil wars which are sometimes carried on between families and factions which do not constitute either States or organised parts of States, like the wars of the Guelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, the guerilla wars in Spain, and the wars of factions in Mexico and South America. But a close examination into the origin and nature of these wars will show that they are, in most cases, waged by organised parts of a State, and have reference to some principle of internal organisation or party supremacy.

§ 2. Wars have been divided into different classes, according to the views and professions of those who discuss them. Military writers, generally, consider them in relation to the military operations which are carried on, and, therefore, divide them into offensive and defensive wars. But these terms are here used in a very different sense from that in which they are usually employed by political and ethical writers; for a war may be essentially defensive in its political and moral charac

ter, even where we begin it, if intended to prevent an attack or invasion, which is under preparation. A nation which first incites the war is the real offender, by its aggression on the rights of others, although, as a matter of policy, it may confine itself to operations which are, in a military point of view, merely defensive. Hence wars, which are entirely offensive in their military character, are sometimes essentially defensive in their nature and origin, and vice versa.1

§ 3. But historians and publicists have generally divided wars according to their origin, objects, and effects, having reference also to the character of the parties which engage in them. Thus, historians have classified these contests, as wars of intervention, wars of insurrection or of revolution, wars of independence, wars of conquest, wars of opinion, religious wars, national wars, and civil wars. They have also classified them according to the general theatre of military operations, as land wars and maritime wars; or as Asiatic, African, European, and American wars. Again, they are sometimes divided, with respect to periods of time or of history, as ancient and modern wars, or wars of antiquity, of classic history, of the middle ages, and of recent times. The exact periods of these several divisions are not definitively fixed, nor are the divisions themselves of much importance in international jurisprudence, except that it is to be remembered that the rules of international war, adopted at one period, may not be applicable to another period.2

§ 4. Publicists, on the other hand, have divided and classified these contests with reference to the affairs of State, the legal status of the parties engaged in them, and the international rights and obligations which result from them. Thus, text-writers usually classify them as public or solemn wars, perfect wars, and imperfect wars, mixed wars, the non-solemn kind of wars, and acts of hostility not followed by actual war, but governed by the laws of war. Such classification is of little importance, except so far as it may be necessary to distinguish between the rules applicable to particular cases. These distinctions, however, are sometimes adhered to with great tenacity, and argued with great learning in diplomatic

1 Jomini, Précis de l'Art de la Guerre, ch. i.; Halleck, Elem. Military Art and Science, ch. ii. p. 35.

2 De Felice, Droit de la Nat., tome ii. lec. xxii.