§ 2. The right of every sovereign State to establish, alter, or abolish, its own municipal constitution and form of government, would seem to follow, as a necessary conclusion, from these premises. And from the same course of reasoning, it will be inferred, that no foreign State can interfere with the exercise of this right, no matter what political or civil institutions such sovereign State may see fit to adopt for the government of its own subjects and citizens.' It may freely change from a monarchy to a republic, from a republic to a limited monarchy, or to a despotism, or to a government of any imaginable shape, so long as such change is not of a character to immediately, or of necessity, affect the independence, freedom and security of others."

3. The right of a sovereign State to the choice of its own rulers rests upon the same foundation as its right to determine the form of its own internal constitution; and the interference of a foreign State in the one case cannot be justified except under the same circumstances and upon the same grounds as in the other, viz., the immediate and pressing danger to its own independence and security. In other words, the change must involve external as well as internal relations, in order to render foreign interference in such case justifiable, even under the most liberal and extended rules of construction. Moreover, even in the case supposed, if the danger is only remote and problematical, it would fail to make the interference justifiable in the eye of international law.3

§ 4. No writer of authority, on international law, advo

' Vattel says that the Spaniards broke this law when they judged the Inca of Peru, concerning the administration of his government, by their own laws. Other examples of the breach of this law are the invasion of Holland in 1787 by Prussia; that of France by the same nation in 1792; that of Poland, and the annihilation of its separate independence by the joint action of Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

In 1794 Mr. Grey drew the attention of the House of Commons to the fact that foreign troops were suffered to be landed in England without the consent of Parliament, and that the same was contrary to the Bill of Rights, but the case was defended by the Government on the ground that the prohibition merely extended to time of peace, not to time of war.-Massey, Hist. of Eng., vol. ii. p. 52.

2 Wildman, Int. Law, vol. i. pp. 47, 68; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. § 148; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, § 78; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. ch. ix. § 8; Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. ii. ch. xxi. § I.

Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. i. p. 21; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. §§ 389, 390; Vattel, Droit des Gens, prelim. § 22, liv. i. ch. v. §§ 66, 67.

cates any general right of one sovereign and independent State to interfere with the domestic concerns and internal Government of another sovereign and independent State. Some, however, make numerous exceptions to the general rule, and attempt to justify interference by one State, in the internal affairs of another, in particular cases and for certain specified objects. The principal grounds upon which such interference has been justified are: first, self-defence; second, the obligations of treaty stipulations; third, humanity; and fourth, the invitation of the contending parties in a civil war. We will here examine each of these grounds, with respect to pacific interference, reserving for another place a discussion of how far they will justify a resort to force or a war of intervention.'

5. Foreign interference, in the internal affairs of a State, has sometimes been defended on the ground of a necessity on the part of the interfering States, involving their own particular security. That a right of pacific interference, and even of armed intervention, may sometimes grow out of such threatened danger to a particular State, cannot be doubted. So, also, there may be an impending danger, affecting the general security of nations, which may justify an interference on their part, for the security of their own independence and the preservation of peace. But such danger must be threatening and immediate, and not a mere remote contingency; and even then the interference must be limited to the removal of the danger itself; beyond that it would be unlawful.2

§ 6. But this impending or contingent danger to the general peace of nations, or to the independence of particular States, is more frequently appealed to as an excuse, than as a

1 Vide post, ch. xiv.; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i. § 400; Wenck, Codex Juris Gent. t. i.

2 Heffter, Droit International, §§ 44, 46; Manning, Law of Nations PP. 97, 98.

Mr. Canning has said that interference is justifiable against a nation which attempts to propagate, first her principles, and afterwards her dominion, by the sword, or encourages the subjects of another to resist authority, or assist rebellious projects.'

The interference of a Confederation in the affairs of its own confederate states, may either be looked upon as an exception to the rule of noninterference, or as a sovereign body regulating the affairs of an individual member. The Schleswig-Holstein difficulty of 1863 is an example of this interference. See also pamphlet by Dr. Twiss on the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty of 1848.

justifiable reason, for foreign interference in the internal affairs of others. And instead of preserving peace, such unlawful interference has frequently been the cause of wars the most cruel and bloody that have ever stained the annals of history. We scarcely need refer to the wars which resulted from foreign interference in the internal affairs of France in the revolution. of 1789, in proof of our assertion. Unfortunately historians and jurisconsults are too apt to draw their arguments from the fact to the right, and to infer the right of interference from the numerous examples of its actual exercise, without testing the legality of the usage by reference to fundamental principles. If foreign interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State (except in cases of imminent and actual danger to the general or particular security, freedom, and independence of nations) is contrary to natural law, as the fundamental principle of international jurisprudence, usage and custom cannot make it justifiable or lawful, for no length of usage can justify a wrong.1

§ 7. That the general rule of natural law is opposed to all interference in the internal affairs of another State, cannot be doubted. It is confirmed by reason, and the concurring opinions of the most eminent publicists of all ages and all nations. It must nevertheless be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule. The principal difficulty is in confining the exceptions so as not to infringe upon the principle of the rule. The general rule, and the possible exception to it, were both very clearly stated by M. de Chateaubriand in his speech in the French Chamber, on the Spanish war

1 Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 80, 88; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. ii. ch. i. § 7; Bynkershoek, Foro Legatorum, cap. ii. § 4; Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. xxv. ; Edinburgh Review, No. 156, p. 329; Le Louis, 2 Dod. R. 257.

A rough outline of what is lawful and what is unlawful in the interference of States might be suggested in the following rules :-Interference in the internal affairs of a State is unlawful; in cases of civil war, or of war between two States, other States may lawfully interfere, but such interference is not interference in the true sense of the word, it is an act of hostility, and a State so interfering loses at once all claim of neutrality. See speech of Lord Palmerston, Parl. Deb. xxviii. p. 1163. If civil war or internal commotion prevails in a State, and menaces the tranquillity or interests of another State, in a substantial, distinct, and immediate manner, that latter State may interefere with amicable negotiation, or even with arms; and when two States are at war, other States may interfere in a similar manner for the purpose of preserving the balance of power, should it in reality be menaced. See Mr. Canning's Despatch, Mar. 31, 1823, Ann. Reg., 1823, Pub. Doc., 140.

of 1823. Has,' said he, a Government of one country a right to interfere in the affairs of another? This great question of international law has been resolved in different ways, by different writers on the subject. Those who incline to the natural right, such as Bacon, Puffendorff, Grotius, and all the ancients, mention that it is lawful to take up arms in the name of the human race against a society which violates the principles on which the social order reposes, on the same ground on which, in particular States, you punish an individual malefactor who disturbs the public repose. Those who consider the question as one depending on civil right, are of opinion that no one Government has a right to interfere in the affairs of another. I adopt, in the abstract, the principles of the last. I maintain that no Government has a right to interfere in the affairs of another Government. truth, if this principle is not admitted, and above all by all people who enjoy a free constitution, no nation could be in security. It would always be possible for the corruption of a minister, or the ambition of a king to attack a State which attempted to ameliorate its condition. In many cases wars would be multiplied; you would adopt a principle of eternal hostility-a principle of which every one would constitute himself judge, since every one might say to his neighbour, 'Your institutions displease me; change them, or I declare war.'

'But when the modern political writers rejected the right of intervention, by taking it out of the category of natural to place it in that of civil rights, they felt themselves very much embarrassed at the result; for they saw that cases will occur in which it is impossible to abstain from intervention without putting the State in danger. At the commencement of the revolution, it was said, "Perish the colonies rather than one principle," and the colonies perished. Shall we also say, "Perish the social order rather than sacrifice a principle;" and let the social order perish? In order to avoid being shattered against a principle which they themselves had established, the modern jurists have introduced an exception. They said, no Government has a right to interfere in the affairs of another Government, except in the case where the security and immediate interests of the first Government are compromised.'

1 De Cussy, Précis Historique, ch. iv. ; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. i.

§ 8. Another ground of foreign interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, advocated by some text-writers, is the obligations of treaty stipulations. There can be no

§§ 390 et seq.; Alison, Hist. of Europe, ch. xii. §§ 41 et seq.; Moniteur, Feb. 15, 1823, and compare Mons. De Chateaubriand's despatch to Mr. Canning, Jan. 23, 1823, and the answer of Mr. Canning; Annuaire Historique (Leseur), 1823, p. 708; Ann. Reg., 1823, Pub. Doc., 110.

The revolution of 1820 in Spain and in Naples called forth a circular despatch from Austria, Prussia, and Russia (the result of the Congress of Troppau and of Laybach), proclaiming their intention to oppose revolution and change of government in Europe. This was based on the principles enunciated in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1818, when the five great European Powers, who became parties to the political system established in 1815, engaged 'to be observant of the great principles they profess to recognise as the foundation of this compact, in the various conferences which may from time to time be held, either between themselves or their respective ministers, whether the conference in question be devoted to a common deliberation upon their own affairs, or whether they concern matters in which other Governments shall have formally requested their mediation, the same disposition which is to guide their own deliberations and govern their own diplomatic transactions shall also preside at these conferences, and have for its constant object the general peace and tranquillity of the world.'

In reply to the above circular despatch, the British Government in 1821 declared that no Government was more prepared than their own 'to uphold the right of any State or States to interfere where their own security or essential interests were seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another State. That the assumption of the right was only to be justified by the strongest necessity, and to be limited and regu lated thereby; that it could not receive a general and indiscriminate application to all revolutionary movements without reference to their immediate bearing upon some particular State or States; that its exercise was an exception to the general principles of the greatest value and importance, and as one that only properly grows out of the circumstances of the special case; and exceptions of this description could never without the utmost danger be so far reduced to rule as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of States, or into the institutes of the Law of Nations' (British and Foreign State Pap., vol. viii. p. 1128); and the British Government adhered to the same principles at the Congress of Verona the following year, declaring that so long as the Spanish revolution was maintained within the Spanish dominions, there could be no justification for a foreign interference. (Ann. Reg., 1823, Pub. Doc., 93 et seq.) After perusal of the above it is not apparent on what principle of international law Great Britain in 1840, in unison with Austria, Prussia, and Russia, assisted the Sultan Abdul Medjid to reduce Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, to obedience, and to interfere in the domestic concerns of a foreign State. France, indeed, refused to take coercive measures against the Pasha. If,' said the late M. Thiers, 'the proposals to curtail the power of Mehemet Ali and to divide Syria are persisted in, I shall advise my country not indeed to come to a rupture, but to retire within herself and await the course of events.' The reasons which led to this interference on the part of Great Britain are worthy of the attention of the student, for although, as before suggested, it is difficult to explain the mere facts on the grounds of law, it cannot be doubted but that they were based on a sound policy, owing to the secret Russian intrigues then at work, of which the British Ministry was cognisant. (See Ann. Reg., lxxxii. 162.)