time, either in a certain, regular order, or one determined by lot. Thus, in drawing up public treaties and conventions, it is the usage of certain powers to alternate, both in the preamble and the signatures, so that each power occupies, in the copy intended to be delivered to it, the first place. The regulation of the Congress of Vienna, above referred to, provides that in acts and treaties between those powers which admit the alternat, the order to be observed by the different. ministers shall be determined by lot. (a) Another expedient which has frequently been adopted to avoid controversies respecting the order of signatures to treaties and other public acts, is that of signing in the order assigned by the French alphabet to the respective powers represented by their ministers. (b) lomatic in § 158. The primitive equality of nations authorizes Language each nation to make use of its own language in treat- used in diping with others; and this right is still, in a certain tercourse. degree, preserved in the practice of some States. But general convenience early suggested the use of the Latin language in the diplomatic intercourse between the different nations of Europe. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the preponderance of Spain contributed to the general diffusion of the Castilian tongue as the ordinary medium of political correspondence. This, again, has been superseded by the language of France, which, since the age of Louis XIV., has become the almost universal diplomatic idiom of the civilized world. Those States which still retain the use of their national language in treaties and diplomatic correspondence, usually annex to the papers transmitted by them a translation in the language of the opposite party, wherever it is understood that this comity will be reciprocated. Such is the usage of the Germanic Confederation, of Spain, and the Italian courts. Those States which have a common language generally use it in their transactions with each other. Such is the case between the Germanic Confederation and its different members, and between the respective members themselves; between the different States of Italy; and between Great Britain and the United States of America. (a) Annexe, xvii. à l'Acte du Congrès de Vienne, art. 7. (b) Klüber, Uebersicht der diplomatischen Verhandlungen des Wiener Congresses, § 164. Titles of sovereign princes and § 159. All sovereign princes, or States may assume whatever titles of dignity they think fit, and may exact States. from their own subjects these marks of honor. But their recognition by other States is not a matter of strict right, especially in the case of new titles of higher dignity, assumed by sovereigns. Thus the royal title of King of Prussia, which was assumed by Frederick I. in 1701, was first acknowledged by the Emperor of Germany, and subsequently by, the other princes and States of Europe. It was not acknowledged by the Pope until the reign of Frederick William II. in 1786, and by the Teutonic knights until 1792, this once famous military order still retaining the shadow of its antiquated claims to the Duchy of Prussia until that period. (a) So also the title of Emperor of all the Russias, which was taken by the Czar, Peter the Great, in 1701, was successively acknowledged by Prussia, the United Netherlands, and Sweden in 1723, by Denmark in 1732, by Turkey in 1739, by the emperor and the empire in 1745-6, by France in 1745, by Spain in 1759, and by the Republic of Poland in 1764. In the recognition of this title by France, a reservation of the right of precedence claimed by that crown was insisted on, and a stipulation entered into by Russia in the form of Reversales, that this change of title should make no alteration in the ceremonies observed between the two courts. On the accession of the Empress Catharine II. in 1762, she refused to renew this stipulation in that form, but declared that the imperial title should make no change in the ceremonial observed between the two courts. This declaration was answered by the court of Versailles in a counter-declaration, renewing the recognition of that title, upon the express condition, that, if any alteration should be made by the court of St. Petersburg in the rules previously observed by the two courts as to rank and precedence, the French crown would resume its ancient style, and cease to give the title of Imperial to that of Russia. (b) The title of Emperor, from the historical associations with which it is connected, was formerly considered the most eminent and honorable among all sovereign titles; but it was never regarded by other crowned heads as conferring, except in the single case (a) Ward's History of the Law of Nations, ii. 245–248. Klüber, Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, Part II. tit. 1, ch. 2, § 107, note c. (b) Flassan, Histoire de la Diplomatie Française, tom. vi. liv. iii. pp. 328–364. of the Emperor of Germany, any prerogative or precedence over those princes.99 § 160. The usage of nations has established certain Maritime maritime ceremonials to be observed, either on the ocean ceremonials. or those parts of the sea over which a sort of supremacy is claimed by a particular State. Among these is the salute by striking the flag or the sails, or by firing a certain number of guns on approaching a fleet or a shipof-war, or entering a fortified port or harbor. Every sovereign State has the exclusive right, in virtue of its independence and equality, to regulate the maritime ceremonial to be observed by its own vessels towards each other, or towards those of another nation, on the high seas, or within its own territorial jurisdiction. It has a similar right to regulate the ceremonial to be observed within its own exclusive jurisdiction by the vessels of all nations, as well with respect to each other, as towards its own fortresses and ships of war, and the reciprocal honors to be rendered by the latter to foreign ships. These regulations are established either by its own municipal ordinances, or by reciprocal treaties with other maritime powers. (a) Where the dominion claimed by the State is contested by foreign nations, as in the case of Great Britain in the narrow seas, the maritime honors to be rendered by its flag are also the subject of contention. The disputes on this subject have not unfrequently formed the motives or pretexts for war between the powers asserting these pretensions, and those by whom they were resisted. The maritime honors required by Denmark, in consequence of the supremacy claimed by that power over the Sound and Belts, at the entrance of the Baltic Sea, have been regulated and modified by different treaties with other States, and especially by the convention of the 15th of January, 1829, between Russia and Denmark, suppressing most of the formalities required by former treaties. This convention is to continue in force until a general regulation shall be established among all the maritime powers of Europe, [99 The great powers regard the assumption of royal titles as more than matter of etiquette, and as involving important relations and entailing serious consequences. They, therefore, make grave points of the recognition of such titles.] -D. (a) Bynkershoek, de Dominio Maris, cap. 2, 4. Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, liv. iv. ch. 4, § 159. Klüber, Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, Part II. tit. 1, ch. 3, §§ 117-122. according to the protocol of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed on the 9th November, 1818, by the terms of which it was agreed, by the ministers of the five great powers, Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, that the existing regulations observed by them should be referred to the ministerial conferences at London, and that the other maritime powers should be invited to communicate their views of the subject in order to form some such general regulation. (b)100 CHAPTER IV. RIGHTS OF PROPERTY. National § 161. THE exclusive right of every independent State proprietary to its territory and other property, is founded upon the rights. title originally acquired by occupancy, conquest, or cession, and subsequently confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of time, or by treaties and other compacts with foreign States. Public § 162. This exclusive right includes the public propand private erty or domain of the State, and those things belonging property. to private individuals, or bodies corporate, within its territorial limits. Eminent § 163. The right of the State to its public property or domain. domain is absolute, and excludes that of its own subjects as well as other nations. The national proprietary right, in respect to those things belonging to private individuals, or bodies corporate, within its territorial limits, is absolute, so far as it excludes that of other nations; but, in respect to the members of the State, it is paramount only, and forms what is called the emi (b) J. H. W. Schlegel, Staats Recht des Königreichs Dänemark, Theil I. p. 412. Martens, Nouveau Recueil, tom. viii. p. 73. Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tom. i. liv. ii. ch. 15. [100 This article has not been executed. On the subject of sovereign and maritime ceremonials, see also Phillimore's Intern. Law, ii. §§ 27-45. Mackintosh's Works, iii. 408. Heffter, Europ. Völker. §§ 194-197, 218. Ortolan, Règl. Intern. i. 316, 332, 845.1-D. nent domain; (a) that is, the right, in case of necessity or for the public safety, of disposing of all the property of every kind within the limits of the State. § 164. The writers on natural law have questioned how Prescripfar that peculiar species of presumption, arising from the tion. lapse of time, which is called prescription, is justly applicable, as between nation and nation; but the constant and approved practice of nations shows that, by whatever name it be called, the uninterrupted possession of territory, or other property, for a certain length of time, by one State, excludes the claim of every other; in the same manner as, by the law of nature and the municipal code of every civilized nation, a similar possession by an individual excludes the claim of every other person to the article of property in question. This rule is founded upon the supposition, confirmed by constant experience, that every person will naturally seek to enjoy that which belongs to him; and the inference fairly to be drawn from his silence and neglect, of the original defect of his title, or his intention to relinquish it. (a) 101 (a) Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. i. ch. 20, §§ 235, 244. Rutherforth's Inst. of Natural Law, ii. ch. 9, § 6. Heffter, Europ. Völker. §§ 64, 69, 70. (a) Grotius, de Jur. tium, lib. iv. cap. 12. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. cap. 4. Puffendorf, Jus Naturæ et Gen- Inst. of Natural Law, i. ch. 8; ii. ch. 9, §§ 3, 6. "Sic qui rem suam ab alio teneri scit, nec quicquam contradicit multo tempore, is nisi causa alia manifeste appareat, non videtur id alio fecisse animo, quam quod rem illam in suaram rerum numero esse nollet." Grotius, in loc. cit. [101 The subject of international prescription is treated at great length by Phillimore. Intern. Law, i. §§ 255–260. He considers Klüber and Martens as denying to prescription any place in international law, and cites against them Grotius, Heineccius, Wolff, Mably, Vattel, Bynkershoek, Rutherforth, Wheaton, and Burke. The last writer (Works, ix. 449, letter to R. Burke, Esq.) calls prescription "the soundest, the most general, the most recognized title between man and man, that is known in municipal or public jurisprudence; a title in which not arbitrary institutions, but the eternal order of things, gives judgment; a title which is not the creature, but the master, of positive law :" and says that "all nations have always had a prescription and limitation against each other." Still the question discussed by Phillimore is, rather, how far and in what manner the technical rules attending prescription in private law are to be applied between nations. It cannot be seriously doubted, that long-continued firm possession, especially if practically undisputed by force, is sufficient to create sovereign title, and to give to all attempts to subvert it the character of mere rebellion, if by subjects, or of attempted conquest, if by other nations. Where a nation has lost its separate existence by conquest, but has not submitted farther than overruling force required, and regains it in a reasonable time, it is remitted to its old status of independence, and allowed a continuous sovereign recognition. As to what is a reasonable time in such cases, it is generally said, that the lapse of time allowed |