The course pursued by Mr. Adams, after the Russian note had been submitted to him, is fully told in his diary, from which I again quote:

"I told Baron Tuyl that we should be disposed to do every thing to accommodate the views of his Government that was in our power, but that a modification of the Convention could be made no otherwise than by a new Convention, and that the construction of the Convention as concluded belonged to other Departments of the Government, for which the Executive had no authority to stipulate. .... I added that the Convention would be submitted immediately to the Senate; that if anything affecting its construction, or, still more, modifying its meaning, were to be presented on the part of the Russian Government before or at the exchange of the ratifications, it must be laid before the Senate, and could have no other possible effect than of starting doubts, and, perhaps, hesitation, in that body, and of favouring the views of those, if such there were, who might wish to defeat the ratification itself of the Convention. . . . . If, therefore, he would permit me to suggest to him what I thought would be his best course, it would be to wait for the * exchange of the ratifications, and make it purely and simply; that afterwards, if the instructions of his Government were imperative, he might present the note, to which I now informed him what would be, in substance, my answer. It necessarily could not be otherwise. But, if his instructions left it discretionary with him, he would do still better to inform his Government of the state of things here, of the purport of our conference, and of what my answer must be if he should present the note. I believed his Court would then deem it best that he should not present the note at all. Their apprehension had been excited by an interest not very friendly to the good understanding between the United States and Russia. Our merchants would not go to trouble the Russians on the coast of Siberia, or north of the 57th degree of latitude, and it was wisest not to put such fancies into their heads. At least the Imperial Government might wait to see the operation of the Convention before taking any further steps, and I was confident they would hear no complaint resulting from it. If they should, then would be the time for adjusting the construction or negotiating a modification of the Convention." ..

The Russian Minister was deeply impressed by what Mr. Adams had said. He had not before clearly perceived the inevitable effect if he should insist on presenting the note in the form of a demand. He was not prepared for so serious a result as the destruction or the indefinite postponement of the Treaty between Russia and the United States, and Mr. Adams readily convinced him that at the exchange of ratifications no modification of the Treaty could be

made. The only two courses open were, first, to ratify; or, second, to refuse, and annul the Treaty. Mr. Adams reports the words of the Minister in reply :

"The Baron said that these ideas had occurred to himself; that he had made this application in pursuance of his instructions, but he was aware of the distribution of powers in our Constitution, and of the incompetency of the Executive to adjust such questions. He would therefore wait for the exchange of the ratifications without presenting his note, and reserve for future consideration whether to present it shortly afterwards or to inform his Court of what he has done and ask their further instructions upon what he shall definitely do on the subject." . . .

As Baron Tuyl surrendered his opinions to the superior judgment of Mr. Adams, the ratifications of the Treaty were exchanged cn the 11th day of January, and on the following day the Treaty was formally proclaimed. A fortnight later, on the 25th January, 1825, Baron Tuyl, following the instructions of his Government, filed his note in the Department of State. Of course, his act at that time did not affect the text of the Treaty; but it placed in the hands of the Government of the United States au uuofficial note which significantly told what Russia's construction of the Treaty would be if, unhappily, any difference as to its meaning should arise between the two Governments. But Mr. Adams' friendly intimation removed all danger of dispute, for it conveyed to Russia the assurance that the Treaty, as negotiated, contained, in effect, the provisions which the Russian note was designed to supply. From that time until Alaska, with all its rights of land and water, was transferred to the United States a period of forty-three years-no act or word on the part of either Government ever impeached the full validity of the Treaty as it was understood both by Mr. Adams and by Baron Tuyl at the time it was formally proclaimed.

While these important matters were trauspiring in Washington, negotiations between Russia and England (ending in the Treaty of 1825) were in progress in St. Petersburgh. The instructions to Baron Tuyl concerning the Russian-American Treaty were fully reflected in the care with which the Anglo-Russian Treaty was constructed, a fact to which I have already adverted in full. The re was, indeed, a possibility that the true meaning of the Treaty with the United States might be misunderstood, and it was therefore the evident purpose of the Russian Government to make the Treaty with England so plain and so clear as to leave no room for doubt and to baffle all attempts at misconstruction. The Government of the United States finds the full advantage to it in the caution taken by Russia in 1825, and can therefore quote the Anglo-Russian Treaty, with the utmost confidence that its meaaing cannot be changed from

that clear unmistakable text which, throughout all the Articles, sustains the American contention.

The "explanatory note," filed with this Government by Baron Tuyl, is so plain in its text that, after the lapse of sixty-six years, the exact meaning can neither be misapprehended nor misrepre sented. It draws the distinction between the Pacific Ocean and the waters now known as the Behring Sea so particularly and so perspicuously that no answer can be made to it. It will bear the closest analysis in every particular. "It is not the intention of Russia to impede the free navigation of the Pacific Ocean!" This frank and explicit statement shows with what entire good faith Russia had withdrawn, in both Treaties, the offensive Ukase of Alexander, so far as the Pacific Ocean was made subject to it. Another avowal is equally explicit, viz., that "the coast of Siberia, the north-west coast of America to 59° 30′ of north latitude [that is, down to 59° 30′, the explanatory note reckoning from north to south], and the Aleutian Islands are positively excepted from the liberty of hunting, fishing, and commerce stipulated in favour of citizens of the United States for ten years." The reason given for this exclusion is most siguificant in connection with the pending discussion, namely, that the coasts of Siberia are washed by the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Kamschatka, and the Icy Sea, and not by the "South Sea" [Pacific Ocean] mentioned in Article I of the Convention of the th April, 1824. The Aleutian Islands are also washed. by the Sea of Kamschatka, or Northern Ocean (Northern Ocean being used in contradistinction to South Sea or Pacific Ocean). The liberty of hunting, fishing, and commerce mentioned in the Treaties was therefore confined to the coast of the Pacific Ocean south of 59° 30' both to the United States and Great Britain. It must certainly be apparent now to Lord Salisbury that Russia never intended to include the Behring Sea in the phrase "Pacific Ocean" The American argument on that question has been sigually vindicated by the official declaration of the Russiau Government.

In addition to the foregoing, Russia claimed jurisdiction of two marine leagues from the shore in the Pacific Ocean, a point not finally insisted upon in either Treaty. The Protocols, however, show that Great Britain was willing to agree to the two marine leagues, but the United States was not; and, after the concession was made to the United States, Mr. G. Canning insisted upon its being made to Great Britain also.

In the interview between the American Secretary of State and the Russian Minister, in December 1824, it is worth noting that Mr. Adams believed that the application made by Baron Tuyl had its origin in the apprehension of the Court of Russia which had

been caused by an interest not very friendly to the good understanding between the United States and Russia." I presume no one need be told that the reference here made by Mr. Adams was to the Government of Great Britain; that the obvious effort of the British Government at that time was designed to make it certain that the United States should not have the power in the waters and on the shores of Behring Sea which, Lord Salisbury now argues, had undoubtedly been given both to the United States and Great Britain by the Treaties.

It is to be remembered that Mr. Adams' entire argument was to quiet Baron Tuyl with the assurance that the Treaty already negotiated was, in effect, just what the Russian Government desired it to be by the incorporation of the "explanatory note" of which Baron Tuyl was the bearer. Mr. Adams was not a man to seize an advantage merely by cunning construction of language which might have two meanings. He was determined to remove the hesitation and distrust entertained for the moment by Russia. He went so far, indeed, as to give an assurance that American ships would not go above 57° north latitude (Sitka), and he did not want the text of the Treaty so changed as to mention the facts contained in the explanatory note, because, speaking of the hunters and the fishermen, it "was wisest not to put such fancies into their heads."

It is still further noticeable that Mr. Adams, in his sententious expression, spoke of the Treaty in his interview with Baron Tuyl as "the North-West Coast Convention." This closely descriptive phrase was enough to satisfy Baron Tuyl that Mr. Adams had not taken a false view of the true limits of the Treaty, and had not attempted to extend the privileges granted to the United States a single inch beyond their plain and honourable intent.

The three most confident assertions made by Lord Salisbury, and regarded by him as unanswerable, are, in his own language, the following:

1. That England refused to admit any part of the Russian claim asserted by the Ukase of 1821 of a maritime jurisdiction and exclusive right of fishing throughout the whole extent of that claim, from Behring Straits to the 51st parallel.

2. That the Convention of 1825 was regarded on both sides as a renunciation on the part of Russia of that claim in its entirety.

3. That, though Behring Straits were known and specifically provided for, Behring Sea was not known by that name, but was regarded as a part of the Pacific Ocean.

The explanatory note of the Russian Government disproves and denies in detail these three assertions of Lord Salisbury. I think they are completely disproved by the facts recited in this despatch,

but the explanatory note is a specific contradiction of each one of them.

The inclosures which accompanied Lord Salisbury's despatch, and which are quoted to strengthen his arguments, seem to me to sustain, in a remarkable manner, the position of the United States. The first inclosure is a despatch from Lord Londonderry to Count Lieven, Russian Minister at London, dated Foreign Office, the 18th January, 1822. The first paragraph of this despatch is as follows:

"The Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the note addressed to him by Baron de Nicolai of the 12th September last, covering a copy of a Ukase issued by his Imperial Master, Emperor of all the Russias, bearing date the 4th September, 1821, for various purposes therein set forth, especially connected with the territorial rights of his Crown on the north-west coast of America bordering on the Pacific Ocean, and the commerce and navigation of His Imperial Majesty's subjects in the seas adjacent thereto."

It is altogether apparent that this despatch is limited to the withdrawal of the provisions of the Ukase issued by the Emperor Alexander, especially connected with the territorial rights on the north-west coast bordering on the Pacific Ocean. Evidently Lord Londonderry makes no reference, direct or indirect, to the Behring Sea. The whole scope of his contention, as defined by himself, lies outside of the field of the present dispute between the British and American Governments. This Government heartily agrees with Lord Londonderry's form of stating the question.

The Duke of Wellington was England's Representative in the Congress of Verona, for which place be set out in the autumn of 1822. His instructions from Mr. G. Canning, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, followed the precise line indicated by Lord Londonderry in the despatch above quoted. This is more plainly shown by a "Memorandum on the Russian Ukase" delivered by the Duke on the 17th October to Count Nesselrode, Russia's Representative at Verona. The Duke was arguing against the Ukase of Alexander, as it affected British interests, and his language plainly shows that he confined himself to the "north-west coast of America bordering on the Pacific Ocean." To establish this it is only necessary to quote the following paragraph from the Duke's Memorandum, viz. :

"Now, we can prove that the English North-West Company and the Hudson's Bay Company have for many years established forts and other trading places in a country called New Caledonia, situated to the west of a range of mountains called the Rocky Mountains, and extending along the shores of the Pacific Ocean from latitude 49° to latitude 60° north."