conduct, indolence, prodigality, and such-like vices; in a word, as Isocrates tells us (Areop. p. 149),-'Eleúpovv Tòv Bíov Tòv ἑκάστου, καὶ τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας ἀνῆγον εἰς τὴν βουλήν· ἡ δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐνουθέτει, τοῖς δ ̓ ἠπείλει, τοὺς δ ̓ ὡς προσῆκον ἐκόλαζεν. To crown all, it maintained a sort of general supervision over the measures of the popular assembly, and took care that they should be in accordance with the existing laws. 63. It may easily be imagined that such privileges as these, however justly or moderately exercised, were found to be incompatible with the increasing preponderance of the democratic element. Pericles and the other orators, whose influence depended on their being able to sway the people by the mere force of eloquence, soon discovered an insuperable barrier to their ambitious schemes in the Areopagus. They would willingly have abolished it altogether. 64. But the feelings of veneration with which the citizens still continued to regard it, almost in spite of themselves, rendered this impossible. Revered by "It was invested," says Grote (vol. v. p. 481), " with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source; especially, the cognizance it took of intentional homicide, was a part of the old Attic religion not less than of judicature." In short, the Athenians generally would speak of it in terms similar to those employed by Æschines (in Ctes. 9),—Τὴν σκυθρωπὸν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν βουλήν. the people. Meier's and Boeckh's opinion. 65. Nevertheless, though the popular leaders dared not direct their attacks against the actual existence of the Areopagus, they determined to abridge its authority. Ephialtes, a partisan of Pericles, and, according to Plutarch, equal to him in probity, at length succeeded in carrying a decree, which (as Aristotle informs us, Pol. ii. 9,) "mutilated" the powers of the Areopagus,-v μὲν ἐν ̓Αρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς : and thus are we brought to the question which it will be the main object of this chapter to discuss: viz.-Against which part of its authority was the decree of Ephialtes directed: the Judicial, or the Senatorial? 66. The first critic who pronounced a decided opinion on this contested subject was, as we have already stated, Meier. He theory ex considered that the Areopagus was deprived not only of its functions as a Senate, but also of its whole jurisdiction in cases of wilful murder; and that its full rights were not restored until the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants, more than 50 years afterwards. 67. His opinion was followed by Boeckh, in the preface to his Index Lectionum, 1826-27; and finally adopted by Müller; who makes it the groundwork of his theory concerning the political intentions of Eschylus in the Eumenides. It is with Müller Müller's that we have chiefly to deal; and since he quotes the principal amined. arguments of Meier and Boeckh in support of his proposition, we cannot do better than examine them separately, and in juxtaposition with the evidence that other writers have collected for their refutation. 68. "In the first place," says Müller (Dissert. p. 113), "cases of homicide (Sikai povikai) formed the most important part of the Areopagus's jurisdiction, nearly the whole of which, according to Plutarch, it lost at that conjuncture; and this, moreover, was what gave its members (especially in times of civil commotions and riots) considerable political authority,the very thing of which Ephialtes wanted to deprive it." Now, the passage in Plutarch to which he alludes is as follows:Ὡς δὲ πάλιν ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐξέπλευσε (Κίμων) τελέως ἀνεθέντες οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ συγχέαντες τὸν καθεστῶτα τῆς πολιτείας κόσμον, τὰ πάτρια νόμιμα οἷς ἐχρῶντο πρότερον, Εφιάλτου προεστῶτος, ἀφείλοντο τῆς ἐξ ̓Αρείου πάγου βουλῆς τὰς κρίσεις πλην ỏλíуwv åπáσas. (Plut. Vit. Cim. cap. xv.) 69. "The word ploes," says Forchhammer in his able treatise,' page 15, "cannot be taken in the above passage as applying to any but the senatorial decisions of the Areopagus, since causes which were settled by it in the judicial character were invariably called δίκαι: as in such expressions as δικάζειν τὴν βουλὴν τὴν ἐν 'Apeiw Tayo póvov. The fact of Plutarch's using the word Kpíoes in this place, proves at least that judicial causes were not the only ones of which Ephialtes sought to deprive the court; and the additional words, πλὴν ὀλίγων ἁπάσας, implying that πάγῳ 1 "De Areopago non privato per Ephialten homicidii judiciis contra Boeckhium disputatio," published at Kiel in 1828. Müller's Second Argument. certain cases were excepted, may (cæteris paribus) be as reasonably referred to cases of homicide as to any other." The same writer proceeds to quote several passages in Plutarch of a like import, in all of which he considers the word Bouλn as pointing to the senatorial power; but these arguments are not conclusive, because the Areopagus, either as Court or Senate, had no other name than Βουλή: it was scarcely ever called δικαστήριον. 70. It is difficult to conceive how "its position as a court for trying homicide, gave the Areopagus considerable political authority." Trying prisoners for murder, however solemn and imposing a ceremonial, has nothing to do with politics. Let us hear what Bishop Thirlwall says on this point, (vol. iii. p. 24,)— "Pericles and his partisans could have had no object in attacking that part of the criminal jurisdiction, which was at once the most venerable, the most rarely exercised, and the least liable to abuse. For it does not appear that hitherto the spirit of party had become so furious at Athens, as to resort to assassination; though we shall meet with a remarkable instance of such an excess not long after." Since, then, the popular leaders could not apprehend being subjected to the penal authority of the court as murderers, what can be more improbable than that they should attack this part of its jurisdiction,-the part in which they would meet with the strongest opposition from the people,—the only one, in short, of all its powers, which was not likely to prejudice their interests? 71. We come now to Müller's second argument. "In the next place," he says, in p. 113, "it was scarcely possible to sever a portion only from that jurisdiction, (i.e. homicide,) because whatever could be detached from it had already been transferred to other courts, namely those of the Ephetæ; at the same time, it is very likely that certain actions for impiety (ảσéßeta), which also came under the cognizance of the Areopagus, and were of a more limited and definite nature, were left to its decision." We fully agree with Müller, "that it was scarcely possible to sever a portion only from the homicidal jurisdiction," and for that very reason it appears doubly probable that this jurisdiction was not attacked at all, but preserved to the Court in its full extent; because, as we have seen, it was the part least injurious to, and most impregnable against, the rapid advances of democracy. 72. At the same time, it seems very unlikely that actions for impiety, which belonged to the senatorial authority of the Areopagus, were still left to its decision. Thirlwall's opinion is in direct opposition to this idea. "There was nothing," he says, in the same chapter, "which Pericles and his friends had more cause to fear (as the event proved) than a charge of impiety, which now came under the cognizance of the Areopagus, but at a later period in the life of Pericles, seems to have been no longer subject to it." An opinion which may at least be accounted as valuable per se, as that of Müller. ment, p. 113. 73. The third argument, which is rather hastily despatched Third Argu. by Müller, but which forms the yery basis and stronghold of Meier and Boeckh's theory, is taken from the following passage of Lysias, De Cæde Eratosth. c. 30:-To Sikaσтnpi Tậ δικαστηρίῳ ἐξ ̓Αρείου πάγου, ᾧ καὶ πάτριόν ἐστι καὶ ἐφ ̓ ὑμῶν ἀποδέδοται τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας δικάζειν, διαῤῥήδην εἴρηται τοῦτον μὴ καταγινώσκειν φόνου. Judging from a prima facie view of this passage, one would certainly understand with Müller "that in the time of the Judges to whom Lysias's oration was addressed, the Areopagus was reinstated in its hereditary right of decision in cases of homicide, and that it was still in possession of the privilege." The words ep' vμôv can certainly bear no other meaning than "in your time." But neither Müller nor Boeckh tells us that these very two words, on which the whole argument rests, are an emendation of Taylor's for the MS. reading ép vμîv, and adopted without remark by Bekker. 74. We shall not stop to inquire whether the words ἐφ ̓ ὑμῖν ἀποδέδοται will bear the interpretation given them by Forchhammer (p. 24): “Areopago,— cui et patrium est, et vobis traditum, (i. e. a quo ad vos translatum est,) de cæde judicare-expressis verbis imperatum est," &c. The reader should examine the passages he quotes in illustration of this meaning of ἀποδέδοται and ἐφ' ὑμῖν, and judge for himself. But even assuming the emendation ép' vμov, "in your Disproved p. 495, note). theory. time," to be correct, it certainly does not prove, as Meier and Boeckh suppose, that Ephialtes took away the cognizance of homicide from the Areopagus, and that it was only restored to them after the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants. 75. Mr. Grote argues this point with very conclusive effect:— "This restoration of functions to the Areopagus, refers naturally to the restored democracy after the violent interruption occasioned by the Thirty. Considering how many persons the Thirty caused to be put to death arbitrarily, and how complete a subversion of all laws they introduced, the Areopagus could not have held its sittings, nor tried cases of wilful murder under them. 76. Were the supposition of Boeckh true, and the Areopagus lost its jurisdiction in cases of homicide also, for the fiftyfive years that elapsed between the decree of Ephialtes and the expulsion of the Thirty, it must have had no functions at all during that long interval, and for all practical purposes might have been considered as non-existent. Had that been the case, the citizens would have lost all respect for it, as an obsolete power; (but Lysias (Cæd. Erat. c. ii. p. 126) expressly tells us that they did respect it, just before the establishment of the Thirty;) nor would it have been revived after their expulsion. Whereas, if we suppose that it preserved its authority as a tribunal for murder during the above-mentioned period, without those extended privileges which had made it so obnoxious, we shall readily understand how the ancient traditional respect for it was kept alive, and how it came to be revived after the fall of the Thirty, as a venerable part of the old Democracy." Müller's own 77. Müller then proceeds to use his own theory about the objects of the Eumenides, as an argument on the same side. "Lastly," he says, "(and this is evidence quite as conclusive and convincing as any historical datum,) it is palpably the design of Eschylus to support the Areopagus in its authority in actions for bloodshed. Consequently, it must have been in this quarter that its rights were attacked." 78. To maintain this Chronologi- inference he finds it necessary to alter the chronology, and tells us that Ephialtes' motion was not carried until after the repre cal difficulty. |