THE GENERAL RIGHTS OF MANKIND.

By the general Rights of Mankind, I mean the rights which belong to the species collectively-the original stock, as I may say, which they have since distributed among themselves.

These are

I. A right to the fruits or vegetable produce of the earth.

The insensible parts of the creation are incapable of injury; and it is nugatory to inquire into the right, where the use can be attended with no injury. But it may be worth observing, for the sake of an inference which will appear below, that, as God had created us with a want and desire of food, and provided things suited by their nature to sustain and satisfy us, we may fairly presume that he intended we should apply these things to that purpose.

II. A right to the flesh of animals.

This is a very different claim from the former. Some excuse seems necessary for the pain and loss which we occasion to brutes, by restraining them of their liberty, mutilating their bodies, and, at last, putting an end to their lives (which we suppose to be the whole of their existence) for our pleasure or conveniency.

The reasons alleged in vindication of this practice are the following:-That the several species of brutes being created to prey upon one another, affords a kind of analogy to prove that the human species were intended to feed upon them; that, if let alone, they would overrun the earth, and exclude mankind from the occupation of it; that they are requited for what they suffer at our hands, by our care and protection.

Upon which reasons I would observe, that the analogy contended for is extremely lame, since brutes have no power to support life by any other means, and since we have; for the whole human species might subsist entirely upon fruit, pulse, herbs, and roots, as many tribes of Hindoos actually do. The two other reasons may be valid reasons, as far as they go; for, no doubt, if man had been supported entirely by vegetable food, a great part of those animals which die to furnish his table would never have lived; but they by no means justify our right over the lives of brutes to the extent in which we exercise it. What danger is there, for instance, of fish interfering with us, in the occupation of their element? or what do we contribute to their support or preservation?

It seems to me, that it would be difficult to defend this right by any arguments which the light and order of nature afford, and

that we are beholden for it to the permission recorded in Scripture, Gen. ix. 1, 2, 3. 'And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth. And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. Every moving thing shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things.'1 To Adam and his posterity had been granted, at the creation, 'every green herb for meat,' and nothing more. In the last clause of the passage now produced, the old grant is recited, and extended to the flesh of animals: 'even as the green herb have I given you all things.' But this was not till after the flood; the inhabitants of the antediluvian world had, therefore, no such permission, that we know of. Whether they actually refrained from the flesh of animals, is another question. Abel, we read, was a keeper of sheep; and for what purpose he kept them, except for food, is difficult to say-unless it were sacrifices. Might not, however, some of the stricter sects among the antediluvians be scrupulous as to this point? and might not Noah and his family be of this description? for it is not probable that God would publish a permission, to authorise a practice which had never been disputed.

Wanton, and, what is worse, studied cruelty to brutes, is certainly wrong, as coming within none of these reasons.

From reason then, or revelation, or from both together, it appears to be God Almighty's intention, that the productions of the earth should be applied to the sustentation of human life. Consequently, all waste and misapplication of these productions is contrary to the Divine intention and will; and therefore wrong, for the same reason that any other crime is so. Such as, what is related of William the Conqueror, the converting of twenty manors into a forest for hunting, or, which is not much better, suffering them to continue in that state; or the letting of large tracts of land lie barren, because the owner cannot cultivate them, nor will part with them to those who can; or destroying, or suffering to perish, great part of an article of human provision, in order to enhance the price of the remainder (which is said to have been, till lately, the case with fish caught upon the English coast); or diminishing the breed of animals, by a wanton or improvident consumption of the young, as of the spawn of shell-fish, or the fry

1['Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green herb have I given you all things.'-Gen. ix. 3.]

of salmon, by the use of unlawful nets, or at improper seasons. To this head may also be referred, what is the same evil in a smaller way, the expending of human food on superfluous dogs or horses; and, lastly, the reducing of the quantity, in order to alter the quality, and to alter it generally for the worse; as the distillation of spirits from bread-corn, the boiling down of solid meat for sauces, essences, &c.

This seems to be the lesson which our Saviour, after his manner, inculcates when he bids his disciples 'gather up the fragments, that nothing be lost." And it opens indeed a new field of duty. Schemes of wealth or profit, prompt the active part of mankind to cast about how they may convert their property to the most advantage; and their own advantage and that of the public commonly concur. But it has not as yet entered into the minds of mankind to reflect that it is a duty to add what we can to the common stock of provision, by extracting out of our estates the most they will yield; or that it is any sin to neglect this.

From the same intention of God Almighty, we also deduce another conclusion—namely, that nothing ought to be made exclusive property which can be conveniently enjoyed in common.'

It is the general intention of God Almighty, that the produce of the earth be applied to the use of man. This appears from the constitution of nature, or, if you will, from his express declaration; and this is all that appears at first. Under this general donation, one man has the same right as another. You pluck an apple from a tree, or take a lamb from a flock, for your immediate use and nourishment, and I do the same; and we both plead for what we do-the general intention of the Supreme Proprietor. So far all is right; but you cannot claim the whole tree, or the whole flock, and exclude me from any share of them, and plead this general intention for what you do. The plea will not serve you; you must shew something more. You must shew, by probable arguments at least, that it is God's intention that these things should be parcelled out to individuals; and that the established distribution, under which you claim, should be upholden. Shew me this, and I am satisfied. But until this be shewn, the general intention, which has been made appear, and which is all that does appear, must prevail; and, under that, my title is as good as yours. Now there is no argument to induce such a presumption, but one—that the thing cannot be enjoyed at all, or enjoyed with the same, or with nearly the same advantage, while it continues in common, as when appropriated. This is true, where there is not enough for all, or where the article in question requires care or labour in the

1['Gather up the fragments that remain, that nothing be lost.'-John vi. 12.]

production or preservation; but where no such reason obtains, and the thing is in its nature capable of being enjoyed by as many as will, it seems an arbitrary usurpation upon the rights of mankind to confine the use of it to any.

If a medicinal spring were discovered in a piece of ground which was private property, copious enough for every purpose to which it could be applied, I would award a compensation to the owner of the field, and a liberal profit to the author of the discovery, especially if he had bestowed pains or expense upon the search; but I question whether any human laws would be justified, or would justify the owner, in prohibiting mankind from the use of the water, or setting such a price upon it as would almost amount to a prohibition.

If there be fisheries which are inexhaustible-as the cod-fishery upon the Banks of Newfoundland, and the herring-fishery in the British seas, are said to be then all those conventions by which one or two nations claim to themselves, and guaranty to each other, the exclusive enjoyment of these fisheries, are so many encroachments upon the general rights of mankind.

Upon the same principle may be determined a question which makes a great figure in books of natural law, utrum mare sit liberum ?—that is, as I understand it, whether the exclusive right of navigating particular seas, or a control over the navigation of these seas, can be claimed, consistently with the law of nature, by any nation? What is necessary for each nation's safety, we allow; as their own bays, creeks, and harbours, the sea contiguous tothat is, within cannon-shot, or three leagues of their coast; and upon this principle of safety (if upon any principle) must be defended the claim of the Venetian State to the Adriatic, of Denmark to the Baltic Sea, and of Great Britain to the seas which invest the island. But when Spain asserts a right to the Pacific Ocean, or Portugal to the Indian Seas, or when any nation extends its pretensions much beyond the limits of its own territories, they erect a claim which interferes with the benevolent designs of Providence, and which no human authority can justify.

III. Another right, which may be called a general right, as it is incidental to every man who is in a situation to claim it, is the right of extreme necessity; by which is meant, a right to use or destroy another's property, when it is necessary for our own preservation to do so; as a right to take, without or against the owner's leave, the first food, clothes, or shelter we meet with, when we are in danger of perishing through want of them; a right to throw goods overboard, to save the ship; or to pull down a house, in order to stop the progress of a fire; and a few other instances of the same kind. Of which right the foundation seems to be this

-that when property was first instituted, the institution was not intended to operate to the destruction of any; therefore, when such consequences would follow, all regard to it is superseded: or rather, perhaps, these are the few cases where the particular consequence exceeds the general consequence; where the remote mischief resulting from the violation of the general rule, is overbalanced by the immediate advantage.

Restitution, however, is due, when in our power; because the laws of property are to be adhered to, so far as consists with safety; and because restitution, which is one of those laws, supposes the danger to be over. But what is to be restored? Not the full value of the property destroyed, but what it was worth at the time of destroying it, which, considering the danger it was in of perishing, might be very little.

[The Rights of men have been considered in various points of view. Our author, in speaking of the general rights of mankind, alludes only to the privileges of the collective human race as the lords of this lower world. This is a very different thing from the rights of each individual man, living in the society of other men, and observing the laws and compacts established for the common good. These individual rights are of two classes: 1st. Those commonly called natural and inalienable rights, which cannot in ordinary circumstances be surrendered on the pretext of social advantage. Liberty of conscience may be taken as an example of this class. They relate in general to liberty, or to that amount of freedom of action reckoned essential to human nature, and in whose absence man loses all the characteristic dignity of his being.

The second class of rights are those pointed out by Paley as the correlatives of Obligations. Wherever the law requires A to perform any action for the benefit of B, it gives B a right to the benefit in question. In consequence of this right, B can come forward and demand the performance of A's obligation; and failing compliance, may move the machinery of the law to bring about enforcement or apply a penalty.

Thus the obligations established by law in human society may be classified either as obligations or as rights. And in practice it has been found more convenient to adopt the last as the basis of classification, not only because it indicates the positive advantages conferred by society rather than the restraints, but because in the enforcement of obligation the party receiving the benefit is the one on whose account the law is made.

The classification of Rights in the Roman law was according to Persons, Things, and Actions. The rights of things mainly concerned property. Actions meant actions at law or legal proceedings, and the term in substance implied rights of contract, which