perpetually in oppofition to others; and difpofes him more to relish bad than good qualities, even in a bofom-friend. How different that difpofition of mind, where every virtue in a companion or neighbour, is, by refinement of tafte, fet in its ftrongest light and defects or blemishes, natural to all, are fuppreffed, or kept out of view! In the next place, delicacy of taste tends not lefs to invigorate the focial affections, than to moderate thofe that are selfish. To be convinced of this tendency, we need only reflect, that delicacy of taste neceffarily heightens our fenfibility of pain and pleasure, and of course our sympathy, which is the capital branch of every social paffion. Sympathy in particular invites a communication of joys and forrows, hopes and fears. Such exercife, foothing and fatisfactory in itself, is productive neceffarily of mutual good-will and affection. One other advantage of criticism is referved to the last place, being of all the most important, that it is a great fupport to morality. I infift on it with entire fatisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his duty than that of cultivating a taste in the fine arts. A juft relish of what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamental, in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening, is a fine preparation for difcerning what is beautiful, juft, elegant, or magnanimous, in character, and behaviour. To the man who has acquired a taste fo acute and accomplished, every action, wrong or improper, must be highly difguftful. If, in any inftance, the overbearing power of paffion fway him from his duty, he returns to it upon the first reflection, with redoubled refolution never to be fwayed a fecond time. He has now an additional Imotive to virtue, a conviction derived from experience, that happiness depends on regularity and order, order, and that a difregard to juftice or propriety never fails to be punished with shame and remorfe *. Rude ages exhibit the triumph of authority over reafon. Philofophers anciently were divided into fects they were either Epicureans, Platonifts, Stoics, Pythagoreans, or Sceptics. Men relied no farther upon their own judgment than to chufe a leader, whom they implicitly followed. In later times, happily, reason hath obtained the afcendant. Men now affert their native privilege of thinking for themselves, and difdain to be ranked in any fect, whatever be the fcience. I must except criticism, which, by what fatality I know not, continues to be not lefs flavifh in its princi-ples, nor lefs fubmiffive to authority, than it was originally.. Boffu, a celebrated French critic, gives many rules; but can difcover no better foundation for any of them, than the practice: merely of Homer and Virgil, fupported by the authority of Ariftotle. Strange, that in fo long a work, the concordance or difcordance of these rules with human nature, fhould never once have entered his thoughts! It could not furely be his opinion, that these poets, however eminent for genius, were intitled to give laws to mankind, and that nothing now remains but blind obedience to their arbitrary will. If in writing they followed no rule, why fhould they be imitated? If they ftudied nature, and were obfequious to B. 5. rational Genius is allied to a warm and inflammable conftitution, delicacy of tafte to calmnefs and fedatenefs. Hence it is common to find genius in one who is a prey to every paflion; which can fearce happen with refpect to dellicacy of tafte. Upon a man poffeffed of this bleffing, the moral duties, as well as the fine arts, make a deep impreffion, fo as to counterbalance every irregular defire. And even fuppofing a trong temptation, it can take no fast hold of a calm and fedate temper. rational principles, why fhould these be concealed from us? on With respect to the prefent undertaking, it is not the author's intention to give a regular treatise upon each of the fine arts in particular; but only, in general, to apply to them fome remarks and obfervations drawn from human nature, the true fource of criticism. The fine arts are calculated for our entertainment, or for making agreeable impreffions; and by that circumftance, are diftinguished from the ufeful arts. In order then to be a critic in the fine arts, it is neceffary, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agreeable, and what naturally difagreeable. A compleat treatise that fubject would be a field by far too extenfive to be thoroughly cultivated by any one hand. The author pretends only to have entered upon the subject so far as neceffary for fupporting his critical remarks. And he assumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more diftinctly than hitherto has been done, that the genuine rules of criticism are all of them derived from the human heart. The fenfitive part of our nature is a delightful fpeculation. What the author hath difcovered or collected upon that fubject, he chufes to impart in the gay and agreeable form of criticism; because he imagines, that this form will be more relifhed, and perhaps be not lefs inftructive, than a regular and laboured difquifition. His plan is, to afcend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments, instead of beginning with the former, handled abftra&tly, and defcending to the latter. But though criticifm be thus his only declared aim, he will not difown, that all along he had it in view, to explain the nature of man, confidered as a fenfitive being, capable of pleasure and pain. And though he flatters Hatters himself with having made fome progress in that important fcience, he is however too fenfible of its extent and difficulty, to undertake it profeffedly, or to avow it as the chief purpose of the prefent work. To cenfure works, not men, is the just prerogative of criticism; and accordingly all personal cenfure is here avoided, unlefs where neceffary to illustrate some general propofition. No praife is claimed on that account; because cenfuring with a view merely to find fault, is an entertainment that humanity never relishes. Writers, one would imagine, fhould, above all others, be referved upon that article, when they lie fo open to retaliation. The author of this treatise far from being confident of meriting no cenfure, entertains not even the flightest hope of fuch perfection. Amufement was at firft the fole aim of his inquiries. Proceeding from one particular to another, the fubject grew under his hand; and he was far advanced before the thought ftruck him, that his private meditations might be publicly useful. In public, however, he would not appear in a flovenly drefs; and therefore he pretends not otherwife to apologise for his errors, than by obferving, that, in a new fubject, not lefs nice than extenfive, errors are in fome measure unavoidable. Neither pretends he to justify his tafte in every particular. That point must be extremely clear, which admits not variety of opinion; and in fome matters fufceptible of great refinement, time is perhaps the only infallible touch-ftone of tafte. To this he ap peals, and to this he chearfully fubmits. ་ N. B. THE ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM, meaning the whole, is a title too affuming for this work. A number of these elements or principles are here evolved: but as the author is far from imagining, that |