Refined manners and polite behaviour, must not be deemed altogether artificial. Men accustomed to the sweets of fociety, who cultivate humanity, find an elegant pleasure in preferring others and making them happy, of which the proud or selfish fcarce have a conception.

Ridicule, which chiefly arifes from pride, a felfifh paffion, is at beft but a grofs pleasure. A people, it is true, must have emerged out of barbarity before they can have a tafte for ridicule. But is is too rough an entertainment for those who are highly polifhed and refined. Ridicule is banifhed France, and is lofing ground daily in England.

Other modifications of pleafant paffions will be occafionally mentioned hereafter. Particularly the modifications of high and low are handled in the chapter of grandeur and fublimity; and the modifications of dignified and mean, in the chapter of dignity and meannefs.

PART. III. Interrupted existence of emotions and paffions. Their growth and decay.

FERE emotions of the fame nature with co

Wbur and igure, to continue in their pre

sent state till varied by fome operating caufe, the condition of man would be deplorable. It is ordered wifely, that emotions should more refemble another attribute of matter, viz. motion, which requires the conftant exertion of an operating cause, and ceafes when the caufe is withdrawn. An emotion may fubfift while its caufe is prefent; and when its cause is removed, may fubfift by means of an idea, though in a fainter degree. But the moment another thought breaks in and occupies the mind, fo as to exclude not only this caufe, but alfo its idea, the emotion is gone: it is no longer felt..

Ch. II. If it return with its cause or idea, it again vanisheth with them when other thoughts crowd in. This obfervation is applicable to emotions and paffions of every kind. And these accordingly are connected with perceptions and ideas, fo intimately as not to have any independent exiftence. A ftrong paffion, it is true, hath a mighty influence to detain its object in the mind; but not fo as to detain it for ever. A fucceffion of perceptions or ideas is unavoidable*: the object of the paffion may be often recalled; but however interesting, it muft by intervals yield to other objects. For this reafon, a paffion rarely continues long with an equal degree of vigour. It is felt ftrong and moderate, in a pretty quick fucceffion. The fame obje& makes not always the fame impreffion; because the mind, being of a limited capacity, cannot, at the fame inftant, give great attention to a plurality of objects. The ftrength of a paffion depends on the impreffion made by its caufe; and a caufe makes. its strongest impreffion, when happening to be the fingle interesting object, it attracts our whole attention t. Its impreffion is flighter when our attention is divided betwixt it and other objects; and at that time the paffion is flighter in proportion,

When emotions and paffions are felt thus by intervals and have not a continued exiftence, it may be thought a nice problem, to afcertain their identity, and to determine when they are the fame when different. In a ftrict philofophic view, every fingle impreffion made even by the fame object, is diftinguishable from what have gone before, and from what fucceed. Neither is an emotion raised by an idea the fame with what is raised by a fight of the object. But fuch accuracy is not found in

common

* See this point explained afterwards, chap. 9.

See the appendix, containing definitions and explanation of terms, fect. 33.

common apprehenfion, nor is neceffary in common language. The emotions raifed by a fine landscape in its fucceffive appearances, are not diftinguished from each other, nor even from those raised by fucceffive ideas of the object: all of them are held to be the fame. A paffion alfo is always reckoned the fame, fo long as it is fixed upon the fame object. Thus love and hatred may continue the fame for life. Nay, fo loose are we in this way of thinking, that many paffions are reckoned the fame even after a change of object. This is the cafe of all paffions that proceed from fome peculiar propenfity. Envy, for example, is confidered to be the fame paffion, not only while it is directed upon the fame perfon, but even where it comprehends many perPride and malice are in the fame condition. So much was neceffary to be faid upon the identity of a paffion and emotion, in order to prepare for examining their growth and decay.

fons at once.

The growth and decay of paffions and emotions, is a fubject too extenfive to be exhausted in an undertaking like the prefent. I pretend only to give a curfory view of it, so far as neceffary for the purposes of criticifm. Some emotions are produced in their utmost perfection, and have a very short endurance. This is the cafe of furprife, of wonder, and fometimes of terror. Emotions raised by infenfible objects, fuch as trees, rivers, buildings, pictures, arrive at perfection almost instantaneously, and have a long endurance: a fecond view produceth nearly the fame pleasure with the firft. Love, hatred, and fome other paffions, increase gradually to a certain pitch, and thereafter decay gradually. Envy, malice, pride, fcarce ever decay. Again, fome paffions, fuch as gratitude and revenge, are often exhausted by a fingle act of gratification. Other paffions, fuch as pride, malice, envy, love, hatred,

are

are not fo exhaufted; but having a long continuance, demand frequent gratification.

In order to explain these differences, it would be an endless work to examine every emotion and paffion in particular. We must be fatisfied at present with some general views. And with refpect to emotions, which are quiefcent and not productive of defire, their growth and decay are easily explained. An emotion caufed by an external object, cannot naturally take longer time to arrive at perfection, than is neceffary for a leisurely furvey. Such emotion alfo muft continue long stationary,. without any fenfible decay; a fecond or third view of the object being nearly as agreeable as the first. This is the cafe of an emotion produced by a fine profpect, an impetuous river, or a towering hill. While a man remains the fame, fuch objects ought to have the fame effect upon him. Familiarity, however, hath an influence here, as it hath every where. Frequency of view, after fhort intervals efpecially, weans the mind gradually from the object, which at last loses all relish. The nobleft object in the material world, a clear and ferene sky, is quite difregarded, unless perhaps after a course of bad weather. An emotion raised by human virtues, qualities, or actions, may grow imperceptibly by reiterated views of the object, till it become fo vigorous as to generate defire. In this condition it must be handled as a paffion.

As to paffion, I obferve firft, that when nature requires a paffion to be fudden, it is commonly produced in perfection. This is frequently the cafe of fear and of anger. Wonder and furprife are always produced in perfection. Reiterated impreffions made by their caufe, exhauft thefe paffions in place of inflaming them. This will be explained afterward*.

* Chap. 6.

In the next place, when a paffion hath for its foundation an original propenfity peculiar to fome men, it generally comes foon to perfection. The propenfity, upon representing a proper object, is immediately enlivened into a paffion. This is the cafe of pride, of envy, and of malice.

In the third place, love and hatred have often a flow growth. The good qualities or kind offices of a perfon, raife in me pleasant emotions; which, by reiterated views, are fwelled into a paffion involving defire of that person's happiness. This defire being often put in exercife, works gradually a change internally; and at laft produceth in me a fettled habit of affection for that perfon, now my friend. Affection thus produced, operates precifely like an original propenfity. To enliven it into a paffion, no more is required but the real or ideal prefence of the object. The habit of averfion or hatred is brought on in the fame manner. And here I must observe by the way, that love and hatred fignify commonly affection, not paffion. The bulk indeed of our paffions, are these affections inflamed into a paffion by different circumftances.. The affection of love I bear to my fon, is inflamed into the paffion of fear, when he is in danger; becomes hope, when he hath a profpect of good fortune; becomes admiration, when he performs a laudable action; and fhame, when he commits any wrong. Averfion, again, becomes fear when there is a profpect of good fortune to my enemy; becomes hope when he is in danger; becomes joy when he is in diftrefs; and forrow when a laudable action is performed by him.

Fourthly, the growth of fome paffions depends often on occafional circumstances. Obftacles to gratification never fail to augment and inflame a paffion. A conftant endeavour to remove the obtacle, preferves the object of the paffion ever in