are not only frequently reduced to the ranks, but are equally subject to the punishment of the bastinado as the soldier. Nay, instances are not unfrequent of officers with the rank of Pacha who have been reduced to a subaltern grade.

If we attentively observe the religious physiognomy of the people, if we consult the Koran, which forms at once their moral, judicial, and political code, we shall discover that the operation of the cause which exercises so beneficial an influence on the morale of the Turkish army is to be attributed to the fundamental idea of the Prophet, -Unity; which, in fact, forms the key-stone of every branch of the Turkish Administration. Thus the Unity of the Godhead, by the simplest process of ratiocination, is extended to his shadow on earth, the Sultan,the fons et origo of all power, honour, and emolument. Accordingly, in the presence of him to whom the Sultan delegates his authority every gradation in the hierarchy of command, even to the next in grade, is reduced to one uniform level of equality. Hence the great familiarity which exists between the officers and soldiers of the Turkish army, in which we have repeatedly beheld officers smoking from the same pipe, and eating their pilaff off the same dish, as their men. The influence of such a system on the military spirit of an army must be obvious to all.

So perfectly neglected is the study of the military sciences by the officers of the Turkish service, that it is in vain to look for a General Staff, capable by its science and instruction of imparting to the different elements of an army all the intensity of which they are susceptible. Thus, when once fairly in the field, the duties of Quartermaster-General are devolved on Allah himself! The personal Staffs of the Seraskier and the divisionary Pachas are composed of chibougchis and caféghis, (pipe and coffee-bearers.)

With such imperfect elements, the operations of the army are directed rather by instinct than science,-by statistical and topographical traditions*, which supply, faute de mieux, the place of all strategical combinations based on actual knowledge of the physical configuration of the seat of war. Such is the influence of that fundamental idea of Unity that the Tartar, the bearer of the intelligence of a victory, frequently receives a much higher reward than the General who achieved it, and from this simple reason, that he conveyed pleasing intelligence to God's shadow on the earth-the Padischa-in whom all things are centred. On the other hand, if the bearer of untoward tidings, his head usually adorned the Seraglio gate. It is true qu'on a un peu changé tout cela. Nevertheless, although modified, the principle still exists†.

Such is the present condition of the regular army of Turkey, which,

whether we consider its organisation, its discipline, and its instruction, is totally inadequate to fulfil the conditions of its institution. Nevertheless, in the campaigns of 1828 and 1829 the Russian Government discovered in these raw and undisciplined levies elements of future strength, the developement of which, by unceasing intrigue on their part, no exertions have since that period been left untried to defeat. Turkey, in fact, possesses all the finest elements for the formation of an army, which, if skilfully handled, would rapidly realize the fondest hopes of the late Sultan. The Ottoman Empire is an impoverished but not an exhausted country; on the contrary, were her prodigious resources well husbanded, skilfully directed, her independence would be secure.

If the integrity of this empire be, therefore, a paramount object of political interest to Great Britain, it follows that one of the most immediate means of attaining such a desideratum will be by the powerful organization of her army.

We shall, therefore, hazard a few observations on the reorganization of the Turkish army, and reserve for future consideration the general defence of the Turkish Empire. The latter question is so vast in all its bearings, requires in their fullest developement faculties so high and so varied, that if we venture to approach it, it is with the hope that the few crude hints we may suggest may promote the ultimate elaboration of an experiment, in the success of which Great Britain has so large a stake.

ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE TURKISH ARMY.

A celebrated military writer of the present age has justly observed, that one of the most important points in the policy of a state is that which relates to its military institutions.

An excellent army, commanded by a General of even inferior capacity, will achieve great results. On the other hand, an ill-constituted force, if led by a great Captain, will often attain a similar success. But how much greater results would be attained if an army combined with the consummate skill and capacity of its Commander-in-Chief all the essential qualities of well-organised and disciplined troops.

Nine conditions are indispensable for the formation of a powerfully.

constituted army :

1.-A good recruiting system.

2.-A good formation.

3.-A well-organised system of national reserves.

4.-Officers and men well instructed in all the various duties of garrison and the field.

5.-A well-established system of discipline.

6.-A well-combined system of punishment and reward, on which so materially depends the morale of an army.

7.-The special arms (Artillery and Engineers), carefully instructed in all the branches of their service.

8.-An armament, if possible, superior in quality to that of the enemy, and applied equally to all arms, both offensive and defensive; and a good system of administration.

9.-A General Staff capable of imparting to these elements all the intensity of which they are susceptible, and the organisation of which is in accordance with the scientific instruction of its officers.

Neither subtlety of argument or laboured dissertation are necessary to prove that none of these conditions are to be neglected with impunity. The narrowed circle of the Turkish frontier, the immense territorial losses that have successively followed the disastrous termination of all her wars for upwards of more than a century, afford but too melancholy a proof of the bitter humiliation and disgrace that a state prepares for itself which heedlessly allows her military institutions to fall into decay. All the energies that marked the character of the late Sultan were directed towards the attainment of that cherished object of his ambition; but his most unwearied efforts succeeded, as it has been shown, in creating a half-organised force, perfectly incapable of confronting with effect the sustained fire and combined movements of a regular European army.

The high martial spirit and severe discipline, the fiery energy of national character, which once rendered the Crescent so formidable to Christendom, are gone. The pale flame of an expiring fanaticism alone remains, and supports by a reduced momentum a comparative degeneracy.

In fact, in its present state, the Turkish army presents to the eye of the professional observer the picture of a melancholy want of substance and well-organised cohesion in all its parts, together with, but in too many instances, a sad lack of that unhesitating obedience to superior authority which forms the sinews of war, and without which courage is useless and enterprise hopeless. The responsible individuals have neither had a sufficient training to inspire confidence, nor do they possess an adequate knowledge of their various duties. To supply these defects there requires a master mind capable of thinking for all, and at the same time of taking into view the minutest details of the service, as well as its most comprehensive arrangements.

To whatever branch of the Turkish army we may direct our investigations, in all the same mingled mass of chaotic confusion will be found to exist. The "personnel" alone is good. The men of the Turkish army possess in an eminent degree the highest qualifications of the soldier, the capability of bearing fatigue, sobriety, -docility, and hardiness, both as to enduring courage and physical constitution. Amid the varied races that form the chequered population of the Ottoman Empire, some tribes are to be found who, by the constant exercise of their intellectual and physical faculties, are admirably adapted for the service of light troops; qualities, however, which are not the result of military organisation, but of the political and social condition in which they are placed.

But, even with the best elements, the formation of an army, according to the present scientific European system, is not the work of a day, and requires materials which Turkey does not possess of her own. These materials, for a time, she must be reconciled to draw from those countries where the military sciences are in their fullest developement.

In the organisation of the Turkish army the work that is to be done is evident enough, but the means of execution present the greatest difficulties. Whatever may be the degree of professional ability of the foreign officers charged with its formation, their task will be a most difficult one, requiring at once the exercise of unwearied zeal, great skill, and consummate sagacity.

They will have in the first place to struggle with the difficulties which the prejudices of a haughty and bigoted people, inveterate in their dislike to the foreigner or infidel, present. Secondly, with the undeviating opposition of all those interested in maintaining the frightful abuses which pervade every branch of the Turkish service. And, thirdly, with those arising from their own ignorance of the language of the country, and of the actual military system of Turkey in all its details. For existing, as the Ottomans are doing, under a perfectly distinct phasis of civilisation, the system to be framed for their army, while it keeps steadily in view the grand principles that must always preside over every system of military organisation, must be essentially based upon many of the peculiarities of manners, customs, religious prejudices, &c., &c., inherent to the people*.

Thus the first duty of the foreign officers will be to instruct themselves, to master in all its minutest details the existing military system of the Turkish Empire, and, by patient investigation and mature deliberation, to establish what in every branch of the service may require the hand of skilful modification or of absolute change.

The essential basis of an army is a good formation. At the present day, the principles of tactics are every where the same, although the various modes of execution still form a subject of controversy among tacticians. The most important point will be to frame, for the Turkish army, a system of tactical instruction, simple in conception, uniform in its operation, a system that shall comprise only such evolutions as are required in the field, carefully excluding all the shewy and useless evolutions of the parade and review ground. One that will gradually lead both officers and men from the earliest rudiments of drill to the maximum of tactical science, to the knowledge of the mechanism of each arm, to their skilful combination-according to the peculiarities inherent to each, and to the adaptation of their action to every variety of ground. Provided this result be obtained, the system, whether British, Prussian, or French, upon which it is to be based, is but a secondary consideration; probably the best would be that which approximates the nearest to the present drill of the Turkish army.

After the formation of troops, their discipline is the object of the most vital importance. It is by habits of obedience alone that men are trained to those of command. In fact, if discipline be not established with wisdom and executed with unshaken firmness, the troops will degenerate into a ferocious rabble more dangerous to the State than an enemy itself. It is a military axiom that, the efficiency of a corps depends upon its system of interior economy. However perfect may be its tactical instruction, it will soon fall into disorder if this essential point be neglected. The interior economy of a British regiment is admirable, but it may be fairly questioned if our system could be carried out in a Turkish corps, from the want of the requisite elements of execution. Nevertheless, the establishment of a good and uniform system of interior economy in the various branches of the Turkish army is a measure of paramount importance, and upon which the success of its effective organisation will materially depend. It is needless to dwell here on the importance of attending to the happiness and well-being of the individual soldier, the necessity of obtaining an intimate knowledge of his spirit, his habits, his wants, and his prejudices, in fact, of every thing that concerns him, forming as it does the most indispensable part of the philosophy of war.

All armies are susceptible of enthusiastic excitement. But the moral influences for its developement must of course be skilfully adapted to the national character of the soldiery to whom they are applied. Freedom, Glory, Patriotism, and Religious fanaticism, have each, in their turn, achieved the most mighty results. But, in the present state of decadency into which all the institutions of the Porte-both political and military-have fallen, it would be in vain to calculate on the moral influence of either of the three first causes, while the fierce but less sustained action of the latter, the philosophical spirit of the age in which we live, would reject as a legitimate instrument of action. Until such times, therefore, as the improved political institutions of the country shall have generated higher and more ennobling principles of action, the "morale" of the Turkish army must be raised by fostering in its ranks, by judicious institutions, love for the profession of arms. The attachment of the Turkish troops to their standards must be inspired by the united influence of religion and of honour. The first step towards the attainment of this object must be the immediate abolition of the monstrous system of promotion that at present exist, a system based upon mere caprice, that invests with military commands requiring, in their fullest development, the highest faculties of our species, men dragged from the lowest dregs of society. The condition of the soldier must be raised in the scale of society; he must be invested with the consideration and respect due to the noble profession of arms, and stimulated to action by a well-combined system of emulation and reward. Nor must the external appearance of the soldier be overlooked as an element of success; the martial pomp of military costume, while it contra-distinguishes the soldier from the ranks of society, appeals powerfully to his amour propre, and fosters that esprit de corps which it is so essential to generate in the ranks of the Ottoman army. But above all, the study of the military sciences must be encouraged and their successful cultivation liberally rewarded.

For the organisation of the Turkish army I have already dwelt upon the necessity of a master mind, capable at once of embracing, not only the most complicated arrangements, but, likewise, its minutest details.

Unlike his warlike predecessors, the reigning Sovereign of Turkey is more familiar with the slothful luxury of the Harem than with the rude toils of the camp, even did not his youth and utter inexperience unfit him for a task that requires an accurate knowledge of all the springs which the complicated machine of an army presents. Again, throughout the vast range of his extensive dominions it may be questioned if there exist a single man of sufficient head and execution to whom, with any chance of success, he could delegate so important a mission.