appears to have its use. Even those which are represented as having only exercised, amused, or perplexed the reasoning faculties of a few philosophers, it is yet valuable to preserve, as marking the powers and limits of human reason in its speculations upon the world around us; and the arguments themselves, even when not satisfactory as furnishing a full explanation of the subjects to which they relate, may yet often be satisfactory enough as mere replies to rising objections.

On the inevitable consequences, indeed, of human liberty, and on the imperfection of matter, we think Dr. Brown has rested a greater weight than those speculative dogmas are able to support; and his way of accounting for moral and natural evil, while he does not on all occasions sufficiently distinguish between them, can (we fear) give satisfaction to no one, and may give offence to some. Thus, after an appalling history of the discussions which this question has undergone, his own argument upon it would go the length of showing the necessity of creatures as weak and wicked as ourselves to complete the scheme of Providence; a position which (we think) does no honour to the cause of truth or of religion: for the Scriptures teach us that moral evil was not absolutely permitted, inasmuch as it is absolutely forbid den by God, and that natural evil was only appointed as its conse. quence or corrective; and

we

are persuaded, that all, who attempt to disentangle the intricacies of this difficult subject without a reference to the Fall, will only, like the Doctor, entangle themselves.

The theory which he has adopted is shortly this, that there is a regular gradation of beings from the highest intellectual to the lowest animal, all by necessity imperfect, because, as creatures, they must want some perfection inherent in the Creator, and, as they descend in the scale,

having less intellect and more sensual impulse. He seems to consider, that there are as many beings in each link of the chain as it will hold, and that a chasm would be occasioned by the removal of one of them; that man occupies one of those links; and hence a necessity arises for the existence of creatures, neither more nor less intellectual than man, lest the beautiful harmony of creation should be interrupted: but, if such animals as we are must exist, the permission of evil is a necessary consequence; for we are free agents, and free agents too with such imperfect powers that wrong conduct in some instances would appear to be nearly unavoidable. Such at least seems to us to be the import of the passages which follow.

"From inadequate comprehension, from the impulse of desire, from sudden every created intelligence may be exand unexpected perturbation of mind, posed to error, to false conceptions of good and evil, and to vicious choice." Brown, Vol. I. p. 313.

"Even the most exalted of creatures must be subject to some trial, or probation, till, by the right application of their powers, moral excellence is confirmed and placed beyond the danger of corruption. But this danger must increase in proportion to the limitation and imperfection peculiar to any order of beings. The more circumscribed the rational faculty is, and the narrower the range which it is able to take, the lower powers will operate with the greater force; and this force is, perhaps, in some respects, necessary. For, when the suggestions of intellect are too feeble and languid to prompt the mind to exertion, to excite strong desires of objects truly salutary, and equally strong aversions from those which are pernicious, the greater need exists of affections, and passions, which, as sails, may carry the Vol. I. pp. 314, 315. soul along its course of activity." Brown,

This course of reasoning, which traces the existence of sin to an imperfection in the original constitution of our nature, would prove the fall itself to be necessary; and

even (so strangely do contrary extremes occasionally agree) the opposite doctrine of Supralapsarianism itself might gain some colour of support from an attempt of this kind to vindicate the free agency of man.

We do not affirm, that every proposition, contained in our abstract, is to be exactly found in the pages of Dr. Brown. But such appears to be the outline and general complexion, and such some of the consequences chargeable upon his scheme: which he himself states with greater extravagance than has appeared in any thing which has been said above. Thus, in more than one place, he justifies the ad mission of evil into the works of Providence from its existence in the works of human artists.

"Absolute perfection, in selecting

the best and wisest constitution of the universe, suggested the admission of these partial and subordinate evils." Brown, Vol. I. P. 336.

"When a ship has been wrecked by the ignorance of the master, can we blame the ship-builder, who fitted it for all the purposes of navigation, and displayed admirable skill in its construction, because he did not render it incapable of perishing? Can we blame an architect, who has planned a most convenient and elegant house, or the mason who has built it, when it has been destroyed by fire, because neither of them secured it against this calamity? Nor can we, with more reason, lay it to the charge of the great Author of human nature, that the noble faculties, with which he has endowed it, and whose tendencies are to improvement and happiness, have been most unnaturally perverted and depraved." Ibid. pp. 320,

321.

What then is the reason, that makes it wrong to cast any blame on the shipwright or mason in the cases supposed? Because they did the best they could with such materials as they had. But the Almighty created his own materials; and this difference destroys the parallel. But we cannot remark, on every passage in this part of the work, where we think the reasoning inconclusive. We will only trace for

our readers the methodical order in which the scheme of it is drawn out, which will serve to show that the basis itself is defective. Dr. Brown first divides all evil into three kinds; metaphysical, moral, and natural. The first, metaphysical evil, or that which consists in the deficiency of absolute perfection, is essential to created sube stances; the second is an irremediable, though not unavoidable, consequence of free agency; and the third is in great measure a consequence of the second. Then he sets himself systematically to prove, that man is a free agent; a point, which might at least have been assumed in this argument, because, as he states in p. 309, "mankind will always feel themselves to be free agents;" and then shows, that which men possess, are essential to free agents, with exactly the powers the scheme of creation, which must either suffer a gap and blemish with much diminution to the mass of created good, or moral evil, which results from the exercise of those powers, permitted. Not to urge, that in all this there is no allusion to our nature having undergone a total change from that which our Creator saw to be good; nor consequently to the gracious plan of Divine Wisdom, which is to convert sinful agents into saints and children of God; there is nothing in it, which appears to us to approach a solution of the question in debate, except an elegant quotation from Leibnitz.

"Leibnitz, treating this subject, in his Theodicée, uses an apt and elegant comparison. Let us suppose,' says he,

that the stream of a river carries along, at the same time, several vessels, differing only in their ladings. If they are all moved only by the current, the heaviest will move more slowly than the others, because the former, having a greater mass of matter to be conveyed, oppose a greater vis inertia to the power of the river, while the lighter vessels are carried with more celerity,' Now, he adds, let us compare the action of the stream of water on the vessels to the

action of God producing and preserving, in his creatures, whatever may be called positive, and imparting to them power, activity, and virtue; and the slowness of the heaty vessels to the imperfection and defect natural to all creatures; and we shall find nothing more apposite than this comparison. The river is the cause of the motion, but not of the retardation of the ships. God is

the cause of all excellence in the na

tures and actions of his creatures; but their limitation is the necessary cause of defects." Brown, Vol. I. pp. 284, 285.

passage

Here the existence of evil is attributable to men; and the allusion so far helps the inquiry. The rest seems open to the censure of Mr. Sumner, in the last quoted from him. For, after all, the question is not, whether the permission of natural and moral evil necessarily resulted from the plan on which the world was founded; but, whether it would not be better, on the whole, to discontinue a plan which involves those consequences; and whether the adoption of such a plan be no impeachment to the wisdom of the Almighty, or the continuance of it to his goodness: and it would surely be more ingenuous to plead our ignorance of the whole plan of Divine Providence, as an answer that ought to silence such cavils, than to tax natural ingenuity to furnish solutions of a problem, to the comprehension of which natural reason is incompetent.

Then follows a disquisition to prove, that the evils chargeable on the present scene are exaggerated; an argument which, while it reduces the sum of evil to be accounted for, does not affect the question, how far it is compatible with infinite wisdom and goodness to permit evil at all. Several striking observations occur in the following chapter; which illustrate the wisdom and goodness, employed in rendering existing evil conducive to superior good, according to that fine sentiment of Shakspeare,

There is some soul of goodness in things

evil,

Would men observingly distil it out.

This employment of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator is a delightful theme for those who love to show his works and glorify his holy Name. But in relation to the present argument, it must be acknowledged that it exbibits those attributes as triumphing over difficulties, but not removing them: and consequently, as great and prevailing, but not as infinite, unless a future state be added to the account. Dr. Brown, however, has only made one allusion to it in this discussion, and that in terms (Vol. I. pp. 45, 46.) which neither demonstrate its reality, nor assign the cause, that which demand a future state to cormade the existence of those evils rect them, necessary to the present; which is therefore treated, not as a state of correction and recovery, requiring remedies, but as a state of simple probation, requiring trials. A reference, indeed, does occur to the Fall of Adam and to the sentence consequent upon that fall.

"The sentence, pronounced on Adam after bis Fall, was, In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unte the ground. This condemnation is not to

be considered merely in the light of a penal judgment, but also in that of au

inevitable consequence of the condition in which the first human pair were placed by their transgression." Brown, Vol. II. pp. 91, 92.

But the defence of God's attributes is not made to depend upon that fall, or on the sentence consequent upon it, but on the necessity of a future state to rectify existing imperfections; which imperfections, however, for any thing that is here said to the contrary, may be as unavoidable in the next world as in this.

"As all our faculties are progressive, their cultivation must require unceasing pains and privations; and the predo minance of the higher good to be obtained by undergoing these, must furnish the principal motive for enduring this discipline. As new enjoyments result from advancing improvement

instruction can never cease, while perfection is not attained, which never can be the case in a present life. This consideration, together with that of man's capacities, leads his view directly to a future scene, in which every defect of the present will be completely remedied, and the Divine government displayed in its unclouded glory. We are, hence, also convinced that the present is a state of probation from which evil, both natural and moral, is inseparable." Brown, Vol. II. pp. 90, 91.

The solution, therefore, from considerations independent of Revelation, which is given at great length, Occupying nearly the whole second book of this Essay, strikes us as altogether unsatisfactory; and this indeed is partly admitted by Dr. Brown himself.

"Notwithstanding all that has been said in refutation of the objections against the wisdom and goodness of the Deity, some difficulties still remain which can be removed only by Revelation. The main difficulty seems to lie in pointing out the cause of the universal corruption of human nature. It is, indeed, true, as has been already fully evinced, that no created being can be perfect, and that intelligence and liberty imply the possibility of the grossest deprivation. These, however, equally imply the possibility of completely attain ing their ends, and of moral and intelligent creatures exhibiting that perfection of which limited creatures are susceptible. We observe the inferior creation, in this lower world, fulfilling the ends of their being, and enjoying the happiness for which they were designed. Man, of all terrestrial creatures, has perverted his powers, and is deprived of his felicity What account is to be given of this strange appearance, so repugnant to what we should be naturally led to expect." Ibid. pp. 103, 104.

To the propriety of this question we fully accede. We do not believe, indeed, that other animals enjoy all the happiness, originally designed for them; for it is clear, that, if men had retained their integrity, those animals would have been at least exempted from the suffering which they sustain from their cruelty and injustice.

But,

to omit the case of other creatures, the question, how to account for the evils of the human species, is so far from being answered by any thing that has been yet said, that we regard all the past discussion respecting it as in a great degree a waste of labour.

"For it still remains to be inquired how this bad education, this vicious example, these strong temptations, consisting chiefly in a perverse turn of mind, and these early habits of depravity, have acquired such universal influence? How has it happened that none of the human species have overcome these obstructions to virtue, and that vice has obtained such uncontrolled

dominion over all." Ibid. p. 109.

But then follows a sentence, the truth of which we cannot in any degree sanction.

"That virtue is productive of hap piness, and the more it is cultivated, even in that defective degree which human nature now realizes, the more secure and comfortable mankind become, is incontrovertible; nay, virtue felicitous tendency." Ibid. pp. 109, 110. is obligatory solely on account of this

We positively deny this last statement, and maintain, that virtue derives all its obligation not from its felicitous tendency, but solely from the will of God, while its felicitous tendency demonstrates not its own obligation, but the wisdom and goodness of Him who ordained it, The erroneous doctrine, thus incidentally introduced, is the more surprising, because it is perfectly gratuitous and does not help forward in any degree the intended solution of the mysteries that regard the existence of evil.

ed at last in a satisfactory manner, That solution, indeed, is furnishby tracing all our evils of every name, except metaphysical evil, to the fall of man.

"Mankind have been generally impressed with the conviction that their present state is not what it ought to be, and that their original condition was more conformable to the elevated fa

culties and capacity of virtue with

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