all places, and at all times. essentially the same: the decision of a London or Middlesex jury to-morrow, will, I dare say, be perfectly consonant to the decision of a London or Middlesex jury that day twelvemonth, and that day twelve years; for how else could the principles of our criminal law in other cases have remained the same? There is no inconsistency in the verdicts passed by juries of different counties in theft or murder, when the cases are similar; and why then should we fear inconsistency in their verdict upon a libel? If the gentlemen on the other side cannot tell us, let them allow that the late encroachments of judges upon the rights of the jury, call aloud for parliamentary interposition.

I have attended with great diligence to what has been offered on both sides of the question in the course of this debate, and am sorry to say, that great part of it has been a total waste of our time; a new ignis fatuus has every moment been started on one side, and pursued on the other, till both have been equally perplexed and bewildered, both hurried, heated and fatigued, while but little progress has been made in the right track, so that the end of our course is almost as distant as ever. Much time has been spent in debating whether the power of the Attorney General to file informations is ancient or modern, though the fullest proof, on either side, would still leave the only question in which we have any concern undecided, "whether it be good?"

Much time has also been spent in laboured declamations, to prove that this power is always exercised to restrain liberty; I wish these gentlemen would shew what power of government is or can be directed to any other purpose. To re. strain liberty, is the very essence and end of all government, which became necessary

when a state of nature was improved into civil society, merely because it became necessary that natural liberty should be restrained. It is by the restraint of natural liberty that the weak are protected against the strong, that property is secured against the thief, and life against the assassin. There is, however, such a thing as civil liberty, which, I believe, our bellowers against the powers of government, are neither willing nor able to define; let me then acquaint them, that civil liberty subsists wherever natural liberty is no farther restrained, than is absolutely necessary to secure the advantages of civil society. Whatever restraint is necessary for this purpose, is compatible with the most perfect civil liberty, and the liberty which is compatible with these restraints, is that alone for which honesty and common sense can be advocates. As these restraints are more necessary in one country, and at one time than another, natural liberty may, and must be circumscribed within narrower bounds in one country, and at one time than another; yet civil liberty may be kept equally sacred and uninfringed. Thus it has happened, that all attempts to recover natural liberty from the restraints which are necessary to secure the advan tages of civil society, have either ended in the dissolution of all government, or in a more rigorous and extensive exertion of its powers. Liberty, carried beyond the bounds within which the interest of civil society requires it to be confined, is licentiousness, and the natural and necessary consequences of prevailing licentiousness in the members of any state or community, must be, either anarchy, or a government less lenient and gentle. If no power of government can be defended which re strains liberty, government itself is wholly indefensible; if any power of government restraining liberty for the common advan tage of a civil community can be defended, every power, the exertion of which is absolutely necessary for this purpose, may be defended, and the only enquiry concerning

the powers of government should be, whe ther the exertion of them is necessary for this great purpose, or not.

At this time, I am sure, there can be no pretence for relaxing the reins of government, or annihilating any of its power. When the spirit of your horse renders it difficult to govern him, or when by some cursed insect he is stung into madness, would you think it proper to remove his curb, or let the reins, which you had been

the case, which depends upon a point of law, and which, therefore, was not cognizable by a jury. I have always asserted, that a jury ought to enter into the whole merits of the case before them, to go into the general issue, and give a verdict accordingly; but never, that when a difficulty in law arises they are the proper judges: if I had not held the courts to be the depositaries and expounders of the law, how could I approve of special verdicts, which are so frequent and so constitutional? A special verdict, Sir, is nothing more than an appeal from the jury to the court, or rather an acknowledgment of the jury, that they are unqualified to determine the question before them and the case which was determined at Guildford, was involved in a question of law, of which they were, and ought to have acknowledged themselves unqualified to judge: I therefore acted consistently and constitutionally, when I advised my client to adopt the only method of defence that remained. But suppose that I had believed the measure, which I advised my client to take, to be unconstitutional, and an encroachment upon the province of juries, will the hon. gentleman blame my conduct as an advocate? has he never pleaded against his own private sentiments? has he never given advice in Westminster-hall which he would not give in this House? When I come hither, I lay aside the advocate and assume the senator. I advance nothing but my real opinion, nothing but what is dictated by my reason, and approved by my heart and since I am provoked to it, I now declare my genuine sentiments of our justiciary courts. I now declare that they are not blameless, that they have been guilty of misdemeanors, and that there are just grounds for the proposed enquiry. Nothing but preventing a fair examination, will prevent this from appearing with undeniable evidence; and upon the truth of this assertion, I stake my whole credit with this House. The hon. gentleman has been pleased to jus tify his attack upon my character, by supposing that I had rendered it not only lawful but necessary, as felony and murder render homicide lawful and necessary in the hangman, which would otherwise be murder. I shall not envy him the character he has been pleased to assume; but when he talks of retaliation, he should remember, that it can never take place as a law between a criminal and his prose

cutor. The criminal can derive no right to hang the prosecutor, from the prosecutor's endeavour to hang him, neither can he or his friends derive a right of defaming me, from discovery of their guilt, with a view to bring them to justice. Mr. Wallace:

Sir; it has long ago been justly and shrewdly observed, that there being more than one reputed remedy for a disease, is a certain sign that all of them are ineffectual: if any one had been certain in its effect, a second would never have been nained. From the hon. gentleman's mode of defence, a consequence may be drawn not more favourable to his reasons: if he had been satisfied with his endeavour to shew that his conduct was consistent, he would not have endeavoured to justify it upon a supposition that it was otherwise; there is a proverb about two stools, which I might apply upon this occasion with great propriety: the gentleman asks with an air of triumph how he can approve special verdicts, if he supposes juries to be competent in all cases? I readily answer that I cannot tell: they seem to me to be wholly incompatible; but the misfortune is, that to reconcile them is his business and not mine. If I was disposed to assist him in this dilemma, I would recommend it to him to allege, that a special verdict is an appeal by the jury, and not from a jury; and that the law does not preclude a jury from taking advice of the court when they themselves think it neces⚫ sary, though it renders their determination final when they do not. But, alas! this, though it may give colour to the supposition, that a jury may with propriety bring in a verdict special, though they have in all cases a right to find generally for either party; it will not at all tend to shew that when the jury at Guildford had taken upon them to judge of the question, without referring to the court by a special verdict, he had a right to appeal from their judg ment, consistent with his own declarations concerning their office and power. It is surely one thing for a jury to refer to the court for advice, and another to appeal from their judgment, in a point which they determined without supposing that they needed any. If the jury are judges of law as well as fact in one case, they are judges of law as well as fact in all, except when they voluntarily wave their right by finding their verdict special: I insist upon it, that the jury was as competent in Horne's

case, as in any of the cases in which he would have allowed them to go into the genuine issue; and that in the trial at Guildford, there was no point of law more intricate or obscure than the point of law which has produced the out-cry against the judges. The judges, in both cases, acted right, upon my principles, but upon his principles, the measure which he recommended them to take, was wrong.

The learned serjeant being now deprived of one of his stools, let us see how he will keep his half seat on the other; he says, that in Westminster-hall, he is an advocate, and that in this House he is a senator. There is a story, I think, of a certain bishop, who on some occasion had acted in a military character, and having contracted the custom of swearing, was reproved for it: his reply is said to have been, like that of the serjeant, that he swore not as a bishop but as a. colonel:' but,' said his monitor, when the devil fetches away the colonel what will become of the bishop?' There is, I think, great difference between making the best of a bad cause for a man who is not allowed to plead for himself, and giving advice contrary to general liberty and the constitution, after a cause has been justly and legally determined.

Either the question at Guildford was justly and legally determined, or it was not; he that says it was not, must adopt the principle which will justify the judges in the case of Almon; he that says it was, must condemn the serjeant's appeal, in the case of Horne; supposing the measure to be unconstitutional, the serjeant's character must suffer as a man, not less because he did wrong in Westminster-hall, than if he had done wrong in this House. I have no notion of dividing a man from himself: he that acts contrary to his conviction, and would injure the rights of his fellow-subject, and the constitution of his country in any place, is unworthy the character of an honest man, whether at the time he is called an advocate or a senator; whether he is in Westminster-hall or St. Stephen's chapel, honesty is the same in all places; and, from wheresoever a man leaves it behind him, he will be followed by disgrace. Mr. Dunning then got up and stated the matter at Guildford. He said, that the jury acquitted the defendant of a libel, but found him guilty of defamatory words. That Mr. Serjeant Glynn's appeal from the jury, arose from a point of law, the question, Whether constituents when as

sembled to instruct their representatives, have not a right to utter their sentiments freely, and censure as they think proper? With respect to which question, the jury was not competent. But he said nothing tending to shew, that a jury could be allowed competent in the case of Almon, consistently with the principle upon which they were denied to be competent in this. Mr. Rigby:

Sir; I have sat with great patience; and I confess, with great comfort, during the debates of the learned gentlemen of the long robe, which have taken up so much of our time; my comfort arises from finding, that I am not much a loser by the want of their learning and knowledge, for there is not the least agreement of opinion among them, which can only arise from their being equally liable to error and mistake with such ignorant and unlearned men as myself. I have a great comfort too, in reflecting, that no authority is established to which it would become me implicitly to submit, but that I may claim my right of private judgment without presumption, and exercise it without danger. Let me then observe, for the benefit of my unlettered brethren in this House, that one point has been universally admitted; it appears to be an established and uncontroverted principle, that the practice of the Attorney General, in filing informations ex-officio, is at least of so long standing, as to be immemorial, that it is founded in the law, and is a part of the constitution as it now stands. We are now going upon a question, whether in this particular the constitution should be amended; and I would only recommend it to gentlemen, to reflect before they determine in consequence of the curious proposal that has been made us to new model the power of the Attorney General, that undenied by any one single opinion, it is determined to be, as it is now exercised, legal, fundamental, and of unquestionable authority.

After this speech the question was clamorously called for; but when the Speaker rose to read it, Mr. Pownall desired to be heard: the Speaker having again sat down,

Mr. Pownall observed, to goimmediately to the question, would be to admit, what the honourable gentleman who spoke last had advanced, that the power of the Attorney General was, undenied by a single voice, legal, fundamental, and of unques