strictly and closely to the family compact; and if the Spanish minister should be recalled, to come away himself without delay. This letter was an ostensible one, which M. de Guisne had private orders to shew to our ministry previous to communicating the terms of the accommodation.

preventer held on by the confidential ex- | tra-official negociation; and terms of accommodation were on the 22d treated of, between a great minister and the French agent. This conversation indeed was not perfectly confidential; for although it purported to be a free communication of expedients for accommodation, this great man did not inform the French agent, that Mr. Harris was recalled. If this circumstance should be denied, I beg to recall to that great man's memory, the very strong 1 terms of reproach which were used by this French agent, when on the 4th of January (by lord Rochford's acquainting prince Masserano of the recall) this agent came to the knowledge of the fact.

1

F

These dispatches arrived on the 14th of January. Prince Masserano, notwithstanding every deference to, and the most profound respect and reverence for, his Christian majesty, yet finds himself in a predicament of resisting those directions of the king of France: first, as they were contrary to, or at least incongruous with, the prior instructions which he had received from his own court: next, as he might have reason to apprehend that, notwithstanding the full powers which France had to conclude this matter, these full

The dispatches of the king of Spain, which were sent off in consequence of the grand council I have mentioned, arrived at Paris the 2d of January; and the duke de Choiseul being then dismissed, these dispatches came directly into the French king's own hands. He saw that the ultimatum contained in them was of a nature that would not be received or complied with by the court of London, and that it could lead only to an open rupture. He therefore did not forward these dispatches; but, retaining them, wrote back to the king of Spain, stating to him the necessity of peace, from the impossibility of France entering at present into war, in aid and assistance to him. In answer to which, the king of Spain referred himself wholly to the king of France; put his honour into his hands; and gave him full powers to conclude for him: desiring him to act exactly as if it was his own case, only to remember that he had the charge of the Catholic king's honour, which was dearer to him than all his dominions, and even than life itself.

His Christian majesty being thus vested with full powers from Spain, and matters being thus prepared in England, he forms the terms of the conclusion; and sends them hither to his minister, to be communicated to the Spanish minister: but sends, at the same time, to M. de Guisne a letter, ordering him to adhere

court, when they came to be informed of the recall of Mr. Harris: and lastly, that as the negotiation between him and the British Secretary of State was broken off, and Mr. Harris actually recalled, he could not negociate upon any terms.

These difficulties lasted from this time to

the 18th. On that day (the 18th) our ministry determined to give him satisfaction by remanding Mr. Harris back to Madrid. For which purpose, on that day, four or five messengers were sent different ways in order to meet him. Lord Rochford's letter of that date gives as a reason for this, that his Majesty, from the information he had received, had reason to believe that prince Masserano had orders to make fresh proposals. Surely this was but a poor reason for making so essential an alteration in the system of our business, merely on a suggestion that prince Masserano (who, for four months together, had been making propositions always inadequate, and mostly inadmissible) had now fresh orders to make some other propositions. But the information which our court had, gave them sufficient intelligence what those propositions were; and if they had been pleased to lay that information before this House, this House would have seen from whence it came: but that part of information as to this business is not laid before us.

As to the other difficulties of prince Masserano, they are said to have been adjusted by the French minister's giving him in writing, assurance of his Christian majesty's having full powers to conclude this business; and also a justification or indem.

Now, Sir, is the business of this accommodation signed, not by Spanish orders, but under French directions; signed at a time when the powers given for concluding this matter stand actually revoked; when it is not known whether this conclusion will be adopted and confirmed by the king of Spain; at a time when the Spanish ambassador stands recalled, and does no more go to court. Is this a stage of the business, either for this House to go into an approbation of it, or to go up to his Majesty with thanks for it, as a matter concluded? And if it should not be accepted by Spain, would even ministry itself wish to make so ridiculous a figure as they must do, in having induced parlia ment to approve a measure the very contrary of what it may turn out in the event? It will be here observed, that this business has been conducted in two different lines of negociation; the one diplomatic, responsible, upon paper; the other ministerial, irresponsible, on parole: the one conducted officially on the part of his Majesty's secretary of state, by a one uniform, unremitted demand (such as it was), urged with spirit, and broken off with spirit: the other, by a great man, in an extra-official way, picking up a broken thread of negociation, and holding on a kind of spliced and knotted treaty, by accommodation with a French agent. Although the king of France is not admitted, on either side, as the mediator avowed; although the minister of this country did publicly disavow all mediation; yet it does appear, that the court of France was permitted to interpose: and having, as it were, put both England and Spain in arrest, did finally dictate the terms of their accommodation.

We are told that this negociation was, as all demands of honour should be, simple and peremptory; that it consisted but of two words invariably adhered to, disavow and restore.' Let us therefore consider it on these two points.

It disavows indeed that this particular

under any especial orders for it; but at the same time says, that the Spanish governor was justifiable, and does justify him, in having undertaken this expedition, by virtue of the powers of his commission, his general instructions, and the established laws of America. Such disavowal, accompanied with a claim of right to justify the governor, in having commenced hostilities under the circumstances and principles referred to, is an insult instead of a disavowal. The claim of any such right, on any such principles, is contrary to every treaty by which we stand in league and amity with the court of Spain; is directly contrary to that good faith with which his Majesty and his ancestors have ever executed those treaties. By those treaties, the sovereigns at peace with each other, must be responsible that those who act under their delegated powers shall observe that peace: and it is expressly stipulated, that they shall not commence hostilities without reference to their sovereigns, and without receiving their especial commands thereupon. If any of his Britannic majesty's governors in America had committed any act of hostility of this kind, that act would have been criminal, as not justifiable nor to be justified by their powers of government; and as being directly contrary to their instructions. Those charters in which delegated powers of government are granted, have all uniformly a clause restraining those who live and act under those powers, from doing any act of hostility against any prince or state, or their subjects, who are in league and amity with the crown of Great Britain, under pain of being put out of his Majesty's protection. Those who act with powers of government immediately under his Majesty's commission, hold those powers restricted by special instructions to the same point. His Majesty's commanders, in the very case now in event, act under special instructions not to proceed to acts of hostility; but, warning off any persons whom they may find on the island, they are ordered to refer the matter to his Majesty, for his special directions therein. The Spanish governor rejects all terms of reference, commences hostilities, and stands justified by his court. That treaty which, in the course of its negociation, recognizes this justification, leads to matters of the utmost importance and danger. This is a point which will require the distinct consideration of this

House; and I hope, in a few days, to move them thereto.

As to the restitution, it is, in the first place, less than prince Masserano first offered. He offered the restitution of Falkland's island. Our ministers have accept ed the restitution of Fort and Port Egmont only. It is, in the second place, a restitution of less than they demanded. They demanded the restitution of every thing, precisely in the same circumstances in which they stood before the act of hostility. Before the act of hostility, his Majesty had exerted a right of possession to the whole island; and affixed the sovereignty of the crown of Great Britain to it. Neither the possession nor sovereignty of the island is restored. The port and fort only, by exclusive, defined words, are restored the sovereignty lies buried in disgrace the exertion of our right is extinguished and we are come now to the question of right-the points of vacancy and occupancy, possession and sovereignty being abandoned. This kind of exclusive restitution comes from the same mould, and is of the same spirit, as the cession of Annapolis Royal in Acadia; which was supposed to exclude the country in which it stood, and to which it affixed the mark of sovereignty. This restitution purports the same, and will have the same effect as that, which did on this very point mix in with the causes of future war; and this will certainly lead to the same unhappy end.

I have now gone through my observations, and have, I think, fully proved, that this business ends in an inconclusive Spanish convention, dictated by French arbitration; in which the disavowal becomes an additional injury; and the restitution a snare, which lays a train for future war: and therefore I must give my voice for the motion which proposes to leave out all that part of the Address that goes to the giving of any approbation to the late negociation, until the matters, on which it stands, shall be more fully discussed; until it be known, what shall be the event of it in fact; and until it shall be manifest in its effect, that it will justify that satisfaction which we are taught to feel, and are called upon to express.

At length the House divided upon the question: 271 were for the Address, and 157 against it.

The following is a List of the 157 Gentlemen, and the two Tellers, who [VOL. XVI.]

voted against the Convention with
Spain.

Allen, Ben.
Anderson, Cha.
Aubrey, John
Astley, sir Edw.
Aufrere, George
Baker, Wm.
Barré, Isaac
Barrow, Cha.
Bayley, Nathan
Beauclerk, Aubrey
Beckford, Peter
Bentinck, lord Edw.
Bertie, Peregrine
Bethel, Hugh
Bernard, sir Rob.
Bouverie, hon. Edw.
Brett, sir Piercy
Bullock, Joseph
Burgoyne, John
Burke, Edmund
Burke, William
Byug, George
Calcraft, John
Carnac, John
Cavendish, lord Geo.
Cavendish, lord Fred.
Cavendish, lord John
Cavendish, Henry
Chomley, Nathan.
Clarke, G. B.
Clayton, sir Rob.
Clive, lord
Clive, George
Codrington, sir Wm.
Colebrooke, sir Geo.
Conolly, Tho.
Cornwall, C. W.
Coxe, R. Hippisley
Crosby, alderman
Damer, hon. John
Curwen, Henry
Damer, hon. George
Damer, John

Davers, sir Charles
Dawkins, Henry
Dempster, George
Donegal, earl of
Dowdeswell, rt. h. W.
Drake, Wm. jun.
Drake, Wm. sen.

Dummer, Tho.
Dunize, John
Dunning, John
Durrant, Tho.
Featherstonebaugh,

sir Mat.
Finch, Savile
Fitzmaurice, Tho.
Fletcher, Henry
Foley, Tho. sen.
Foley, Edw.
Forrester, Geo.
Frankland, sir Tho.
Frankland, Wm.
[4T]

Fuller, Rich. Glynn, John

Graves, Wm.

Germaine, lord Geo,

Gregory, Rob.

Grenville, Henry

Grenville, James Grey, Booth

Griffin, sir John G. Grove, Wm. C. Guise, sir Wm. Grosvenor, Tho.

Halsey, Tho.

Hamilton, lord A.

Hamilton, Wm. G. Hanbury, John Hotham, Bt. Hunt, Geo. Hussey, Wm. Irnham, lord Jennings, Philip Keck, Anth. James Keppel, hon. Aug. Keppel, hon. Wm. Leigh, Peter Loug, sir James Ludlow, earl Luther, John

Mackworth, Herbert

Manners, Jobn

Marsham, Cha.

Martin, Joseph

Mauger, Joshua Mawbey, sir Joseph Meredith, sir Wm.

Molesworth, sir John

Montagu, Frederick Mostyn, sir Roger Musgrave, Geo. Noel, Tho. Norris, John Oliver, Richard Owen, Hugh Page, Francis Palk, Robert Palmer, sir John Parker, John Penuant, Richard Pennyman, sir James Penruddock, Cha. Phipps, Const. Plumer, William Popham, Edward Popham, Alexander Powlet, George Pownall, Thomas Pratt, Robert Price, Chace Radcliffe, John Rolle, Denys Rous, sir John Rushout, John St. Aubyn, sir John St. Leger, Authony

his Majesty's ships employed there, is depriving us of such lights as seemed highly proper for us on this occasion.

4. Because, from the Declaration and Correspondence laid before us, we are of epinion that the ministers merit the censure of this House, rather than any degree of commendation, on account of several improper acts, and equally improper omissions from the beginning to the close of this transaction. For it is asserted by the Spanish minister, and stands uncontradicted by ours, that several discussions had passed between the ministers of the two courts, upon the subject of Falkland's Islands, which might give the British ministers reason to foresee the attack upon that settlement that was afterwards made by the forces of Spain. Captain Hunt also arriving from thence so early as the 3d of June last, did advertise the ministers of repeated warnings and menaces made by Spanish governors and commanders of ships of war; yet so obstinately negligent and supine were his Majesty's ministers, and so far from the vigilance and activity required by the trust and duty of their offices, that they did not even so much as make a single representation to the court of Madrid, which, if they had done, the injury itself might have been prevented, or at least so speedily repaired, as to render unnecessary the enormous expences to which this nation has been compelled, by waiting until the blow had been actually struck, and the news of so signal an insult to the crown of Great Britain had arrived in Europe. To this wilful, and therefore culpable neglect of representation to the court of Spain, was added another neglect; a neglect of such timely preparation for putting this nation in such a state of defence as the menacing appearances on the part of Spain, and the critical condition of Europe required. These preparations, had they been undertaken early, would have been executed with more effect and less expence; would have been far less distressing to our trade, and to our seamen; would have authorised us in the beginning to have demanded, and would in all probability have induced Spain to consent to an immediate, perfect, and equitable settlement of all the points in discussion between the two crowns; but all preparation having been neglected, the national safety was left depending rather upon accidental alterations in the internal circumstances of our neighbours, than in the proper and

natural strength of the kingdom; and this negligence was highly aggravated by the refusal of administration to consent to an address proposed by a noble lord, in this House, last sessions, for a moderate and gradual augmentation of our naval forces. "5. Because the negociation, entered into much too late, was, from the com. mencement, conducted upon principles as disadvantageous to the wisdom of our public counsels, as it was finally concluded in a manner disgraceful to the honour of the crown of Great Britain; for it appears, that the court of Madrid did disavow the act of hostility as proceeding from particular instructions, but justified it under her general instructions to her governors; under the oath by them taken, and under the established laws of America. This general order was never disavowed nor explained; nor was any disavowal or explanation thereof ever demanded by our ministers; and we apprehend that this justification of an act of violence under general orders, established laws, and oaths of office, to be far more dangerous and injurious to this kingdom, than the particular enterprise which has been disavowed, as it evidently supposes that the governors of the Spanish American provinces, are not only authorised, but required without any particular instructions to raise great forces by sea and land, and to invade his Majesty's possessions in that part of the world, in the midst of profound peace.

66

6. Because this power, so unprecedented and alarming, under which the Spanish governor was justified by his court, rendered it the duty of our ministers to insist upon some censure or punishment upon that governor, in order to demonstrate the sincerity of the court of Madrid, and of her desire to preserve peace by putting at least some check upon those exorbitant powers asserted by the court of Spain to be given to her governors. But although our ministers were authorised not only by the acknowledged principles of the law of nations to call for such censure or punishment, but also by the express provision of the seventeenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, yet they have thought fit to observe a profound silence on this necessary article of public reparation. If it were thought that any circumstances appeared in the particular case of the governor to make an abatement or pardon of the punishment adviseable, that abatement or pardon ought to have been the effect of his Majesty's cle