paffion that is also disagreeable*, raises by its external figns a repulfive emotion, repelling the spectator from the object. Thus the emotions raised by external figns of envy and rage, are repulfive. But this is not the case of painful paffions that are agreeable. Their external figns, it is true, are difagreeable, and raise in the spectator a painful emotion. But this painful emotion is not repulfive. On the contrary, it is attractive; and produceth in the fpectator good-will to the man who is moved by the paffion, and a defire to relieve or comfort him. This cannot be better exemplified than by distress painted on the countenance, which inftantaneously inspires the fpectator with pity, and impels him to afford relief. The cause of this difference among the painful emotions raised by external figns of paffion, may be readily gathered from what is laid down chapter Emotions and paffions, part 7.

It is now time to look back to the queftion proposed in the beginning, How we come to understand external figns, fo as

See paffions explained as agreeable or disagreeable, chap. 2. part 2.

readily

readily to afcribe each fign to its proper paffion? We have feen that this branch of knowledge, cannot be derived originally from fight, nor from experience. Is it then implanted in us by nature? The following confiderations will help us to answer this question in the affirmative. In the first place, the external figns of paffion must be natural; for they are invariably the fame in every country, and among the different tribes of men. Pride, for example, is always expreffed by an erect pofture, reverence by prostration, and forrow by a dejected look. Secondly, we are not even indebted to experience for the knowledge that thefe expreffions are natural and univerfal. We are fo framed as to have an innate conviction of the fact. Let a man change his habitation to the other fide of the globe; he will, from the accuftomed figns, infer the paffion of fear among his new neighbours, with as little hesitation as he did at home. And upon fecond thoughts, the queftion may be answered without any preliminaries. If the branch of knowledge we have been inquiring about be

not

not derived from fight nor from experience, there is no remaining fource from whence it can be derived but from nature.

We may then venture to pronounce, with fome degree of confidence, that man is provided by nature with a sense or faculty which lays open to him every paffion by means of its external expreffions. And I imagine that we cannot entertain any reasonable doubt of this fact, when we reflect, that even infants are not ignorant of the meaning of external figns. An infant is remarkably affected with the paffions of its nurfe expreffed on her countenance : a fmile chears it, and a frown makes it afraid. Fear thus generated in the infant, must, like every other paffion, have an object. What is the object of this paffion? Surely not the frown confidered abstractly, for a child never abstracts. The nurse, who frowns is evidently the object. Fear, at the fame time, cannot arise but from apprehending danger. But what danger can a child apprehend, if it be not fenfible that the perfon who frowns is angry? We must therefore admit, that a child can read anger

in its nurfe's face; and it must be fenfible of this intuitively, for it has no other means of knowledge. I have no occafion to affirm, that these particulars are clearly apprehended by the child. and distinct perceptions, perience are requifite.

To produce clear reflection and exBut that even an

infant, when afraid, must have fome notion of its being in danger, is extremely e vident.

e

That we should be confcious intuitively of a paffion from its external expreffions, is conformable to the analogy of nature. The knowledge of this language is of too great importance to be left upon experience. To reft it upon a foundation fo uncertain and precarious, would prove a great obftacle to the formation of focieties. Wifely therefore is it ordered, and agreeably to the fyftem of Providence, that we should have Nature for our instructor.

Manifold and admirable are the purpofes to which the external figns of paffion are made fubfervient by the author of our nature. What are occafionally mentioned above,

VOL. II.

S

any

above, make but a part. Several final caufes remain to be unfolded; and to this task I apply myself with alacrity. In the first place, the figns of internal agitation that are displayed externally to every spectator, tend to fix the fignification of many terms. The only effectual means to ascertain the meaning of doubtful word, is an appeal to the thing it represents. Hence the ambiguity of words expreffive of things that are not objects of external sense; for in that case an appeal is denied. Paffion, strictly speaking, is not an object of external fenfe but its external figns are; and by means of thefe figns, paffions may be appealed to, with tolerable accuracy. Thus the words that denote our paffions, next to those that denote external objects, have the most distinct meaning. Words fignifying internal action and the more delicate feelings, are lefs diftinct. This defect with refpect to internal action, is what chiefly occafions the intricacy of logic. The terms of that science are far from being sufficiently ascertained, even after the care and la

bour