Reflecting coolly and carefully upon the fubject under confideration, the constitution of man, admirable in all its parts, appears here in a fine light. The final cause now unfolded of the fenfe of propriety, muft, to every discerning eye, appear delightful; and yet hitherto we have given but a partial view of it. The fenfe of propriety reaches another illuftrious end; which is, to co-operate with the sense of justice in inforcing the performance of focial duties. In fact, the fanctions vifibly contrived to compel a man to be just to himself, are equally ferviceable to compel him to be just to others. This will be evident from a fingle reflection, That an action, by being unjust, ceases not to be improper. An action never appears more eminently improper, than when it is unjust. It is obviously becoming and fuitable to human nature, that each man do his duty to others; and accordingly every tranfgreffion of duty with respect to others, is at the fame time a tranfgreffion of duty with refpect to felf. This is an undisguised truth without exaggeration; and it opens a new and delightful view in the moral land

scape.

fcape. The profpect is greatly enriched, by the multiplication of agreeable objects. It appears now, that nothing is overlooked, nothing left undone, that can poffibly contribute to the enforcing focial duty. For to all the fanctions that belong to it fingly, are fuperadded the fanctions of felf-duty. A familiar example fhall fuffice for illustration. An act of ingratitude confidered in itself, is to the author disagreeable as well as to every spectator: confidered by the author with relation to himself, it raises felf-contempt: confidered by him with relation to the world, it makes him afhamed. Again, confidered by others, it raises their contempt and indignation against the author. These feelings are all of them occafioned by the impropriety of the action. When the action is confidered as unjust, it occafions another set of feelings. In the author it produces remorse, and a dread of merited punishment; and in others, the benefactor chiefly, indignation and hatred directed upon the ungrateful perfon. Thus fhame and remorfe united in the ungrateful VOL. II. Ꭰ perfon,

person, and indignation united with hatred in the hearts of others, are the punishments provided by nature for injuftice. Stupid and infenfible must he be in extreme, who, in a contrivance fo exquifite, perceives not the hand of the Sovereign Architect.

С НА Р.

CHA P.

XI.

27

Of Dignity and Meanness.

T

HESE terms are applied to man in point of character, fentiment, and behaviour. We say, for example, of one man, that he hath a natural dignity in his air and manner; of another, that he makes a mean figure. There is a dignity in every action and sentiment of some perfons: the actions and fentiments of others are mean and vulgar. With refpect to the fine arts, fome performances are said to be manly and suitable to the dignity of human nature others are termed low, mean, trivial. Such expreffions are common, though they have not always a precise meaning. With respect to the art of criticism, it must be a real acquifition to ascertain what these terms truly import; which poffibly may enable us to rank every performance in the fine arts according to its dignity. Inquiring

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Inquiring first to what subjects the terms dignity and meanness are appropriated, we foon discover, that they are not applicable to any thing inanimate. The moft magnificent palace ever built, may be lofty, may be grand, but it has no relation to dignity. The most diminutive fhrub may be little, but it is not mean. These terms must belong to fenfitive beings, probably to man only; which will be evident when we advance in the inquiry.

Of all objects, human actions produce in a fpectator the greatest variety of feelings. They are in themfelves grand or little: with respect to the author, they are proper or improper with refpect to thofe affected by them, juft or unjuft. And I must now add, that they are alfo distinguished by dignity and meannefs. It may poffibly be thought, that with refpect to human actions, dignity coincides with grandeur, and meannefs with littleness. But the difference will be evident upon reflecting, that we never attribute dignity to any action but what is virtuous, nor meannefs to any but what in fome degree is faulty. But an ac