it, are even prevented from entertaining thoughts of doing so.

As another proof of the peculiar solidity of the power of the crown, in England, may be mentioned the facility, and safety to itself and to the state, with which it has at all times been able to deprive any particular subjects of their different offices, however overgrown and even dangerous their private power might seem to be. A very remarkable instance of this kind occurred when the great duke of Marlborough was suddenly removed from all his employments: the following is the account given by dean Swift in his " History of the "four last Years of the Reign of Queen Anne."

"As the queen found herself under a neces

sity either, on the one side, to sacrifice those

friends, who had ventured their lives in "rescuing her out of the power of some, whose "former treatment she had little reason to be

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fond of,-to put an end to the progress she had made towards a peace, and dissolve her parliament; or, on the other side, by removing one person from so great a trust, to

get clear of all her difficulties at once; her "majesty determined upon the latter expe

dient, as the shorter and safer course; and,

during the recess at Christmas, sent the duke "a letter, to tell him she had no farther occa"sion for his service.

There has not perhaps in the present age "been a clearer instance to show the insta

bility of greatness which is not founded on "virtue and it may be an instruction to princes who are well in the hearts of their "people, that the overgrown power of any "particular person, although supported by "exorbitant wealth, can, by a little resolution, "be reduced in a moment, without any dangerous consequences. This lord, who was, beyond all comparison, the greatest subject "in Christendom, found his power, credit, and influence, crumble away on a sudden; and except a few friends and followers, the rest dropped off in course, &c." (B. I. near the end).

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The ease with which such a man as the duke was suddenly removed, dean Swift has explained by the necessary advantages of princes who possess the affection of their people, and the natural weakness of power which is not founded on virtue. However, these are very unsatisfactory explanations. The history of Europe in former times, pre$

sents a continual series of examples to the contrary. We see in it numberless instances of princes incessantly engaged in resisting in the field the competition of the subjects invested with the eminent dignities of the realm, who were not by any means superior to them in point of virtue,—or, at other times, living in a continual state of vassalage under some powerful man whom they durst not resist, and whose power, credit, and influence they would have found it far from possible to reduce in a moment, or crumble on a sudden, by the sending of a single letter, even though assisted by a little resolution, to use dean Swift's expressions, and without any dangerous consequences.

Nay, certain kings, such as Henry the Third of France, in regard to the duke of Guise, and James the Second of Scotland, in regard to the two earls of Douglas successively, had at last, recourse to plot and assassination; and expedients of a similar sudden violent kind are the settled methods adopted by the eastern monarchs; nor is it very sure that they can always easily do otherwise.

Even in the present monarchies of Europe, notwithstanding the awful force by which they are outwardly supported, a discarded minister

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is the cause of more or less anxiety to the verning authority; especially if, through the length of time he has been in office, he happens to have acquired a considerable degree of influence. He is generally sent and confined to one of his estates in the country, which the crown names to him he is not allowed to appear at court, nor even in the metropolis; much less is he suffered to appeal to the people in loud complaints, to make public speeches to the great men in the state, and intrigue among them, and, in short, to vent his resentment by those bitter, and sometimes desperate methods, which, in the constitution of this country, prove in a great measure harmless.

But a dissolution of the parliament, that is, the dismission of the whole body of the great men in the nation, assembled in a legislative capacity, is a circumstance in the English government, in a much higher degree remarkable and deserving our notice than the depriving any single individual, however powerful, of his public employments. When we consider in what an easy and complete manner such a dissolution is effected in England, we must become convinced that the power of the crown bears upon foundations of very uncommon,

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though perhaps hidden, strength; especially, if we attend to the several facts that take place in other countries.

In France, for example, we find the crown, notwithstanding the immense outward force by which it is surrounded, to use the utmost caution in its proceedings towards the parliament of Paris; an assembly only of a judiciary nature, without any legislative authority or avowed claim, and which, in short, is very far from having the same weight in the kingdom of France as the English parliament has in England. The king never repairs to that assembly, to signify his intentions, or hold a lit de justice, without the most overawing circumstances of military apparatus and preparation, constantly choosing to make his appearance among them rather as a general than as a king.

And when the late king, having taken a serious alarm at the proceedings of this parliament, at length resolved upon their dismission, he fenced himself, as it were, with his army; and military messengers (were sent with every circumstance of secrecy and dispatch, who, at an early part of the day, and at the same hour, surprised each member in his own house, causing them severally to retire to distant