trusted for repressing them, or even to their determined resolution not to abridge those prerogatives. Yet, if we attentively consider the constant situation of affairs in that republic, we shall find, that though we should suppose those persons to have been ever so truly attached to the cause of the people, it would not really have been possible for them to procure to the people, an entire security. The right enjoyed by the senate, of suddenly naming a dictator with a power unrestrained by any law, or of investing the consuls with an authority of much the same kind, and the power it at times assumed of making formidable examples of arbitrary justice, were resources of which the republic could not, perhaps, with safety have been totally deprived: and though these expedients frequently were used to destroy the just liberty of the people, yet they were also very often the means of preserving the commonwealth.

Upon the same principle we should possibly find that the ostracism, that arbitrary method of banishing citizens, was a necessary resource in the republic of Athens. A Venetian noble would perhaps also confess, that, however terrible the state inquisition, established in his republic, may be even to the nobles themselves,

yet it would not be prudent entirely to abolish it. And we do not know but a minister of state in France, though ever so virtuous and moderate a man, would say the same with regard to secret imprisonments, the lettres de cachet, and other arbitrary deviations from the settled course of law, which often take place in that kingdom, and in the other monarchies of Europe. No doubt, if he was the man we suppose, he would confess that the expedients mentioned have in numberless instances been basely prostituted to gratify the wantonness and private revenge of ministers, or of those who had any interest with them; but still perhaps he would continue to give it as his opinion, that the crown, notwithstanding its. apparently immense strength, could not avoid recurring at times to expedients of this kind; much less could it publicly and absolutely renounce them for ever.

It is therefore a most advantageous circumstance in the English government, that its security renders all such expedients unnecessary, and that the representatives of the people have not only been constantly willing to promote the public liberty, but that the general situation of affairs has also enabled them to carry their precautions so far as they have done.

And indeed, when we consider what prerogatives the crown, in England, has implicitly renounced; that, in consequence of the independence conferred on the judges, and of the method of trial by jury, it is deprived of all means of influencing the settled course of the law both in civil and criminal matters ;that it has renounced all power of seizing the property of individuals, and even of restraining in any manner whatsoever, and for the shortest time, the liberty of their persons ;we do not know which we ought most to admire, whether the public virtue of those who have deprived the supreme executive power of all those dangerous prerogatives, or the nature of that same power, which has enabled it to give them up without ruin to itself,whether the happy frame of the English government, which makes those in whom the people trust, continue so faithful to the discharge of their duty, or the solidity of that same government, which can afford to leave to the people so extensive extensive a degree of

freedom.

Again, the liberty of the press, that great advantage enjoyed by the English nation, does not exist in any of the other monarchies of Europe, however well established their

power may at first seem to be; and it might even be demonstrated that it cannot exist in them. The most watchful eye, we see, is constantly kept in those monarchies upon every kind of publication; and a jealous attention is paid even to the loose and idle speeches of individuals. Much unnecessary trouble (we may be apt at first to think) is taken upon this subject; but yet if we consider how uniform is the conduct of all those governments, how constant and unremitted are their cares in those respects, we shall become convinced, without looking farther, that there must be some sort of necessity for their precautions.

In republican states, for reasons which are at bottom the same as in the before-mentioned governments, the people are also kept under the greatest restraints by those who are at the head of the state. In the Roman commonwealth, for instance, the liberty of writing was curbed by the severest laws with regard to the freedom of speech, things were but little better, as we may conclude from several facts; and many instances may even be produced of the dread with which the private citizens, upon certain occasions, communicated their political opinions to the consuls, or to

the senate. In the Venetian republic, the press is most strictly watched: nay, to forbear to speak in any matter whatsoever of the conduct of the government is the fundamental maxim which they inculcate on the minds of the people throughout their dominions.

With respect therefore to this point, it may again be looked upon as a most advantageous circumstance in the English government, that those who have been at the head of the people have not only been constantly disposed to procure the public liberty, but also that they have found it possible for them to do so; and that the remarkable strength and steadiness of the government have admitted of that extensive freedom of speaking and writing which the people of England enjoy. A most advantageous privilege this! which, affording to every man a mean of laying his complaints before the public, procures him almost a certainty of redress against any act of oppression that he may have been exposed to: and which leaving moreover, to every subject a right to give his opinion on all public matters, and, by thus influencing the sentiments of the nation, to influence those of the legislature itself (which is sooner or later obliged to pay a deference to them), procures to him a sort of legislative