11. Prove from Scripture that it includes the brute creation. Ps. civ., 21-29; cxlvii., 9; Matt. vi., 26; x., 29.

12. Prove from Scripture that it extends to the general affairs of men.

1 Chron. xvi., 31; Ps. xlvii., 7 ; lxvi., 7; Prov. xxi., 1; Job xii., 23; Isa. x., 12-15; Dan. ii., 21; iv., 25.

13. Show from Scripture that the circumstances of individuals are controlled by God.

1 Sam. ii., 6; Ps. xviii., 30; Prov. xvi., 9; Isa. xlv., 5; Luke i., 53; James iv., 13–15.

14. Prove that events considered by us fortuitous are subject to the control of God.

1st. A fortuitous event is one whose proximate causes, because either of their complexity or their subtlety, escape our observation. Every such event, however, as the falling of a leaf, is linked with the general system of things, both by its antecedents and its consequences.

2d. Scripture affirms the fact.-Ex. xxi., 13; Ps. lxxv., 6, 7; Job v., 6; Prov. xvi., 33.

15. Prove that a general necessarily involves a particular providence.

Every department of existence in the universe is so intimately related to all the rest, that every change taking effect in one necessarily affects the others. All events, moreover, occur in successions of causes and effects, each link in turn being the effect of what preceeds and the cause of what follows. In the present order of things it would be impossible to secure certain general ends, without necessarily determining all those particular events upon which those general ends depend; and thus, as no event is isolated, since even the least event springs from and contributes to the general system, every event must be presided over to that end. The notion of a general providence, a particular one excluded, is as absurd as that of a chain without links.

16. Prove that the providential government of God extends to the free acts of men.

1st. The free actions of men are potent causes influencing the general system of things precisely as all other classes of causes in the world, and consequently, on the principle indicated in the answer to the preceding question, they also must be subject to God, or every form of providence whatever would be impossible for him.

2d. It is affirmed in Scripture.-Ex. xii., 36; 1 Sam. xxiv., 9-15; Ps. xxxiii., 14, 15; Prov. xvi., 1; xix., 21; xx., 24; xxi, 1; Jer. x., 23; Phil. ii., 13.

17. Show from Scripture that God's providence is exercised over the sinful acts of men.

2 Sam. xvi., 10; xxiv. 1; Ps. lxxvi., 10; Rom. xi., 32; Acts iv., 27, 28.

18. What general principles, as to the nature of God's providential government, is it important to bear in mind?

1st. The fact that God does control all the actions, internal and external, necessary and free, good and bad, of all his creatures.

2d. That whatever may be the mode in which God exercises this providential control, or the nature of the influence he exerts upon any of his creatures, it can not be inconsistent either (1.) with his own infinite perfections, or (2.) with that constitution and those attributes with which he has himself endowed the creature upon whom he acts. His influence, therefore, must always be worthy of himself, and in each case congruous to the nature of the creature.

3d. It follows from the ascertained limits of human thought that we can never clearly understand the mode in which, in the ultimate act, the infinite spirit of God acts upon the finite spirit of man. The interaction of God's agency in providence and grace with man's dependent agency constitutes that limit of thought which is emerging at every step, which we may define, but neither avoid nor transcend.

19. What is the nature of God's agency in the material world?

All that we know upon this subject may be defined as follows: 1st. The properties of material elements are inherent in

their subjects, and consequently they act efficiently as second

causes.

2d. God has so adjusted these elements in their proportions and relations that they act and interact according to certain general laws, which he has established as an order of nature.

3d. In his ordinary providence God does not change or coerce, but rather preserves these properties in their integrity, and this order of nature.

4th. God, however, both in the original constitution of the material elements, in the adjustment of them in their mutual relations, and in his concurrent providential control of them in action, certainly determines all results, individual and general, regular and exceptional.

20. What is meant by a "material cause," and what by a "law of nature”?

The material world consists simply of a greater or less number of elements, each endowed with its own specific property or capacity of acting, and of being acted upon by all other elements respectively in a certain way. One of these bodies alone produces no effect, and therefore is no cause; but two or more of them brought together act upon each other mutually, according to their properties and to their relative circumstances. A material cause, therefore, is to be found in the relative properties of two or more bodies, so adjusted as to act upon each other, and the effect is the mutual change in each which results from this interaction, e. g., we have for cause the mutual chemical attraction of the oxygen of the air, and the hydrogen and carbon of the wood at a high temperature, and for effect we have the smoke and the ashes, or the elements of air and wood in new combinations after combustion.

But in order that such causes should act uniformly, these material elements must be adjusted uniformly in their mutual relations. This God has done with infinite wisdom with respect to the relation of these elements, "1st, as to their properties; 2d, as to their quantity; 3d, as to space; 4th, as to time."

A "law of nature" is nothing more than a general or uniform fact; it is only a general expression for the way in which material elements act in their mutual relations as providentially adjusted. Instead of producing the harmonious results in nature,

which are often superficially attributed to them, "they are themselves the result of nicely balanced and skilfull adjustments."M'Cosh, Divine Gov., Book II., chap. i.

21. What do the Scriptures teach as to God's providential agency in the good acts of men?

The Scriptures attribute all that is good in man to the free grace of God, operating both providentially and spiritually, and influencing alike the body and the soul, and the outward relations of the individual.—Phil. ii., 13; iv., 13; 2 Cor. xii., 9, 10; Eph. ii., 10; Gal. V., 22-25.

It is to be remembered, however, that while a material cause may be analysed into the mutual interaction of two or more bodies, a human soul acts spontaneously, i. e., originates action. The soul also, in all its voluntary acts, is determined by its own prevailing dispositions and desires.

When all the good actions of men, therefore, are attributed to God, it is not meant, 1st, that he causes them, or, 2d, that he determines man to cause them, irrespectively of man's free will; but it is meant that God so acts upon man from within spiritually, and from without by moral influences, as to induce the free disposition. He works in us first to will, and then to do his good pleasure.

22. What is taught in the Scriptures concerning his agency with respect to the sins of men?

There is involved in this question the insoluble mystery, 1st, of God's permission of moral evil, and, 2d, of the nature of God's action upon the dependent spirits of men.

Turrettin sets forth the testimony of Scripture upon this subject thus:

1st. As to the beginning of the sin, (1.) God freely permits it. But this permission is neither moral, i. e., while permitting it physically, he never approves it; nor merely negative, i. e., he does not simply concur in the result, but he positively determines that bad men shall be permitted for wise and holy ends to act according to their bad natures.-Acts xiv., 16; Ps. lxxxi., 12. (2.) He deserts those who sin, either by withdrawing grace abused, or by withholding additional grace. This desertion may be either

a partial, to prove man's heart (2 Chron. xxxii., 31), or b for correction, or c penal (Jer. vii., 29; Rom. i., 24-26). (3.) God so orders providential circumstances that the inherent wickedness of men takes the particular course of action he has determined to permit (Acts ii., 23; iii., 18). (4.) God delivers men to Satan, a as a tempter (2 Thess. ii., 9-11), b as a torturer (1 Cor. v., 5). 2d. As to the progress of the sin, God restrains it as to its intensity and its duration, and as to its influence upon others. This he effects both by internal influences upon the heart, and by the control of external circumstances.-Ps. lxxvi., 10.

3d. As to the end or result of the sin, God uniformly overrules it and directs it for good.-Gen. 1., 20; Job i., 12; ii., 6-10; Acts iii., 13; iv., 27, 28.

23. What is the old doctrine of concursus, and the distinction between "previous" and "simultaneous" concursus?

This was an attempt to construct a philosophical explanation of the truth upon this subject taught in Scripture, rather than a simple statement of that truth, or a legitimate deduction from it. It was a product of the schoolmen, held by the disciples of Thomas Aquinas, and the orthodox party among the Romanists generally, and by almost all the early Protestant divines.

Previous concursus is that act of God wherein, by flowing into causes and their principles, he excites his creatures to act, and determines them to perform one action rather than another.

Simultaneous concursus is the influence of God upon the creature, continued and considered as carried over into their act. As he determined them to perform the act, so he concurs with them in the production of the act.

These theologians distinguished between the action viewed physically as an entity, and its moral quality. The action was from God; the moral quality, if evil, was from man. As when a man strikes an untuned harp, the sound is from him, the discord is from the disorder of the instrument.

Concerning this

theory we have to say, that while we fully believe that man lives and moves and has his being in God, and that God works in man to will and to do of his good pleasure; that he has eternally foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, and now providentially con