cisely the opposite, his outward circumstances and his entire inward state remaining the same. 3d. That every free volition is contingent, i. e., uncertain, until the event, since it is determined by nothing but the bare faculty of volition on the part of the agent.-Hamilton's Reid, pp. 599–624.

The true theory of moral certainty, on the other hand, is that the soul is a unit; that the will is not self-determined, but that man, when he wills, is self-determined; and that his volition is certainly determined by his own internal, rational, moral, emotional state at the time, viewed as a whole.

In opposition to the former theory, and in favor of the latter, we argue-1st. That the character of the agent does certainly determine the character of his free acts, and that the certainty of an act is not inconsistent with the liberty of the agent in his act.See below, question 12.

2d. The Christian doctrines of the divine foreknowledge, foreordination, providence, and regeneration. For the Scriptural evidence of these, see their respective chapters. They all show that the volitions of men are neither uncertain or indeterminate.

3d. We agree with the advocates of the opposite theory in maintaining that in every free act we are conscious that we had power to perform it, or not to perform it, as we chose. "But we maintain that we are none the less conscious that this intimate conviction that we had power not to perform an act is conditional. That is, we are conscious that the act might have been otherwise, had other views or feelings been present to our minds, or been allowed their due weight. A man can not prefer against his preference, or choose against his choice. A man may have one preference at one time, and another at another. He may have various conflicting feelings or principles in action at the same time, but he can not have coexisting opposite preferences."

4th. The theory of the "self-determining power of the will" regards the will, or the mere faculty of volition, as isolated from the other faculties of the soul, as an independent agent within an agent. Now, the soul is a unit. Consciousness and Scripture alike teach us that man is the free, responsible agent. By this dissociation of the volitional faculty from the moral dispositions and desires the volitions can have no moral character. By its dissociation from the reason the volitions can have no rational

character. Since they are not determined by the inward state of the man himself, they must be fortuitous, and beyond his control. He can not be free if his will is independent alike of his head and his heart, and he ought not to be held responsible.-See Bib. Rep., January, 1857, Art. V.

11. What are the essential conditions of moral responsibility?

See above, Chapter XIV., question 7.

12. Why is a man responsible for his outward actions; why for his volitions; why for his affections and desires; and prove that he is responsible for his affections?

A man is responsible for his outward acts, because they are determined by the will; he is responsible for his volitions, because they are determined by his own principles and feelings (desires); he is responsible for his principles and feelings, because of their inherent nature as good or bad, and because they are his own and constitute his character."-Bib. Rep., January, 1857, p. 130.

It is the teaching of Scripture and the universal judgment of men, that "a good man out of the good treasures of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," and that a "wicked man out of the evil treasures of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil." The act derives its moral character from the state of the heart from which it springs, and a man is responsible for the moral state of his heart, whether that state be innate, formed by regenerating grace or acquired by himself, because, 1st, of the obliging nature of moral right, and the ill desert of sin; 2d, because a man's affections and desires are himself loving or refusing that which is right. It is the judgment of all, that a profane or malignant man is to be reprobated, no matter how he became so.

13. What is the distinction between liberty and ability?

Liberty consists in the power of the agent to will as he pleases, in the fact that the volition is determined only by the character of the agent willing. Ability consists in the power of the agent to change his own subjective state, to make himself prefer

what he does not prefer, and to act in a given case in opposition to the coexistent desires and preferences of the agent's own heart.

Thus man is as truly free since the fall as before it, because he wills as his evil heart pleases. But he has lost all ability to obey the law of God, because his evil heart is not subject to that law, neither can he change it.

14. But may not an unregenerate man truly desire to obey the law of God; and, if so, why does not that desire control his will?

An unregenerate man often does heartily desire to avoid the penalty of God's law, and consequently, through fear of the consequences of his sin, may be said to desire to eradicate the prevalent principle of sin from his heart. He may even, as a matter of taste and judgment, desire to obey the law of God in certain particulars wherein that law does not directly oppose his dominant dispositions. But no unregenerate man can love holiness for its own sake, and earnestly desire to fulfill the whole law of God in the spirit as well as the letter; for if he did so, the law in his case would be fulfilled.

15. What are the Pelagian and the Arminian theories as to the ability of the sinner to obey the commands of God?

The Pelagian doctrine is that it is the essence of liberty that the sinner is as free to cease from sin as to continue it. That man consequently is as able now to obey God's law perfectly as Adam was before he fell, and hence that regeneration is the sinner's act of simply ceasing to do evil, and commencing to do well. The Arminian view is that man, by nature and of himself, is utterly unable to change his own depraved heart, or to obey the law of God, or savingly to receive the gospel, yet that God, for Christ's sake, gives to every man sufficient grace, if improved, to enable him to do all that he is responsible for doing. Without grace no man has ability to obey, with grace every man has ability either to obey or disobey.--Apol. Conf. Remonstr., p. 162., b.

16. What distinction is intended by the theological terms natural and moral ability?

By natural ability was intended the possession, on the part of every responsible moral agent, whether holy or unholy, of all the natural faculties, as reason, conscience, free will, requisite to enable him to obey God's law. If any of these were absent, the agent would not be responsible.-Edwards on the Will, Part I., sec. 4.

By moral ability was intended that inherent moral condition of these faculties, that righteous disposition of heart requisite to the performance of duty.

Although these terms have been often used by orthodox writers in a sense which to them expressed the truth, yet they have often been abused, and are not desirable. It is evidently an abuse of the word to say that sinners are naturally able, but morally unable to obey the law; for that can be no ability which leaves the sinner, as the Scriptures declare, utterly unable either to think, feel or act aright. Besides the word natural, in the phrase "natural ability," is used in an unusual sense, as opposite to moral, while in the usual sense of that word it is declared in Scripture that man is by nature, i. e., naturally, a child of wrath.

17. State the common doctrine of the church as to the inability of the sinner to obey the law of God, or to accept the gospel, and state how far it is natural and how far moral?

All men possess those faculties of their nature essential to constitute them rational, and moral, and free agents, and therefore all that is necessary to render them responsible for their obedience to God's law. But the moral state of these faculties is such, because of the perverted dispositions of their hearts, that they are utterly unable either to will or to do what the law requires. This inability is "natural" since it is innate and constitutional. It is "moral" since it does not consist either in disease, or in any physical defect in the soul, nor merely in the inordinate action of the bodily affections, but in the corrupt character of the governing dispositions of the heart. This inability is total, and, as far as human strength goes, irremediable.-Confession of Faith, Chap. IX., sec. 3. Article X. of Church of England, and Article XVIII. of Augsburg Conf.

18. Prove the fact of this inability from Scripture.

Jer. xiii., 23; John vi. 44, 65; xv., 5; Rom. ix., 16; 1 Cor. ii., 14

19. How may the fact of this inability be proved from our consciousness and experience?

Consciousness teaches us that while the dispositions and desires determine the volitions, no volition can change the character of the governing dispositions and desires of our hearts themselves. Our experience teaches us that while many men have, for outside considerations of self-interest, desired to serve God, and therefore have endeavored to change their inherent evil dispositions, they have always entirely failed in such effort. A specific evil habit may be abandoned, but the disposition to sin remains, and always breaks forth with renewed violence under some other form

20. How may it be proved from what the Scriptures say concerning human depravity, and the necessity of a divine influence in order to salvation?

The Scriptures declare that by nature all men, without exception, are dead in sin. That the affections are depraved. That the wicked man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil. Christ died for us while we were without strength. Sinners are the servants of sin. Men are said to be subject to Satan, led about by him at his will.

The change accomplished in regeneration is said to be, not a mere change of purpose, but a "new birth," a "new creation," a begetting anew," a "giving a new heart," the result is the "workmanship of God." Christ gives repentance to Israel. All Christian graces are the fruits of the Spirit. The work in us is accomplished by the "exceeding greatness of the mighty power of God."-Eph. i., 18-20; John iii., 3-8; Rom. viii., 2; Gal. v., 17.

21. How can the fact of man's inability be reconciled with his responsibility?

It is objected that "a man can not be justly responsible for doing that which he is unable to do." This maxim is selfevidently true when the inability arises either from the absence of the natural faculties proper to the agent, or from the want of opportunity to use them. Neither an idiot, nor a man devoid of the rudiments of a moral sense, nor a man whose volitions were not determined by the genuine disposition of his own heart, would be responsible.