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46699 9 pin The CAD E T, ductive of the many good consequences our Author modestly enumerates. But how.can this be done in detachments? fince by the Rofter some tegiments, may give an Officere and some not ; fome may send more men, and others fewer. ** We agree with our Author in his sentiments (chap, ix,) of the advantages that would redound from each regiment's having fo many field-picees to attend it to be managed by the regimental officers and soldiers. Toward the end of the last war, each battalionzi by the Duke's orders, had artillery, and some of the battalion-men were instructed in the management of the great guns.

90 i 13 : 21:29y. 313. In chapter X. are fonie good hints with regard to the instie fution of a regimental Gunsmith; and to lighter accoutre

ments * ! and in chapters xix and xij, the duties of a Corporal and Serjeant are pretty fully described. For these our Author has been mostly obliged to M. Bombelle's Service de 7 Infanterie. The xiiith chapter begins with an accurate defcription of the academy founded by the Empress-Queen at Neustadt, under the superintendence of Counts Daun and Theirheim. We should be forry to see fuch a school established in Britain: that Athenian was wise, who reproved the joy his countrymen expresled, for the finishing a fort at the pyreum, by telling them, that what they then were so glad of,

would, in the end, be turned to their destruction. The reay mainder of this chapter is very important, and ought be

read by, at leatt, all young Officers; for much we fear, that the description given by the late Marshal Saxe, of the manner in which the French Officers pass their time in country, quar. ter3, is but too applicable to our own with the addition of drunkenness: a vice to which the French Officers are no ways addicted

" It is a very false and dangerous notion, that the profeffion of arms, has nothing to do with books. The foldier has much time on his hands, and if he does not read, it is either wasted away in idle (auntering, or disipated in debauchery. Study, therefore, ought, in a particular manner, to be recommended to our military Gentlemen. Books have sometimes formed, and always have improved, the General. One who peruses the great actions of a Xenophon, or a Cæsar, and catches the spirit of those illustrious writers, can hardly ever prove a daftard. One that reads the stratagems of a Polyænus and

* In time of war, our soldiers carry each near 90 pounds weight! which, surely, is too much for a march of any length.


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Frontinus, will earn to form in his mind, all possible contingencies, and will never be at a loss forexpedients. Our Author is aware of this; and, from Santa Cruz, and Buonamici, recommends the Muses to the foldier. They, indeed, humanize ferocity, and make that to flow from principle which was formerly brute impulse. We are forry, how

ever, to find, that our Author thinks the knowlege of the Greek tongue unnecessary to an Officer. Had he been as well acquainted with that language, as he is with the French, he would have talked in another strain : it was the language of free-born Heroes, and, therefore, should seem better suited to the genius of a British Officer.

But to proceed; there are some good things in his chapters entitled, Of Captains, of Majors; of Lieutenant-Colonels, of Colonels, of General Officers.--We wonder he did not affign a chapter also to that necessary Officer an Adjutant.What he cites from Monf. de Espagnac, upon Honour and Courage, (chap, 20, 21.) cannot be read with too much attention: and if his instructions for Officers commanding detachments on a march, (chap. 22.) had been punctually prac

tised on a late occasion, Britain had saved much expence of blood, and her soldiers had not fled before an inferior, and favage enemy.

Nor are his precautions with regard to Convoys, Amburcades, Out-Guards, Garrison-Towns, and the method of Fortifying a Church, Village, &c. lefs important. These are marked with inverted Commas: (his own observations, too, are distinguished in that manner) but our Author honestly owns, that he is indebted for what he has delivered on these

subjects, 'to Santa Cruz, and the Ingenieur de Campagne. 3 KAW The last chapter, on Castrametation, is chiefly ex

tracted from Le Blond's Arithmetique, and Geometrie de la Home

ofitier; and concludes with the Meafurement of a Camp for g0110

a Battalion, as practifed'in 1755, by Lord Rothes, in Ireland: where this book was first published... 100

Upon the whole, it appears to us, that tho' this gentleman 37 Si

is a modeft, he is not the lefs an intelligent, writer; and that 3 there is no doubt but his work will be found useful to every rank of military men.

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,: bis N Appeal to the Sense of the People, on the present

Posture of Affairs. Wherein the Nature of the late Treaties are enquired into, and the Conduct of the M-ry, with regard to M-n+ca, Sc. is confidered; with fome Remarks upon the Light in which these, and other public Affairs, have been lately represented. 8vo.' 1's. Hookham.

As the free discution of public affairs is the privilege, we had like to have said the prerogative of every free nation, so there - bever was a period, perhaps, vihen it was exercifed in a more smple manner, than at present in England. After a deep deep, and dead filence, for a considerable interval, the groans of the preís are heard from every quarter, and the pamphlet-shops filled with the products of its labours : every measure, and every miscarriage is publicly arraigned, by persons pleading, or pretending to plead, the Cause of their Country; and what must contribute

greatly to the discovery and establishment of Truth, the friends and followers of the Adminiftration, condefcend, at length, to

reply... Of this we had one proof in our last, and the piece now before us, presents us with another : the only well infrụ&țed, but well qualified Author of which is not cause ; his file being easy and natural ; his manner, for neral, temperate ; his method well adapted to his purpose; his expedients ingenious and acute, and his fabject matter of lo confolatory a nature, that one cannot help' wishing every word he writes to be true,

What he undertakes, is to sew the whole scheme of que operations, so far as a private man may comprehend it; and that, from the whole fo laid together, all the objections which have been raited to the detached parts, (and which could not have been is raised, were they ngt induftriously separated, shewn out of their

natural order, and confounded with other things, wholly foreign to them) will vanith of themselves.

He then gives his own conception of the first part of our fcheme, in the following terms:

To bind down the arms of France on the Continent, by a I chain of judicious alliances.

to noso Secondly, To cut off the resources of our enemy, by, destroying their trade and seizing their feamen.

Thirdly, To secure ourselves from an invasion, by a powerful & fquadron in our own ports; and, at the fame time, to black

up the French navy in their ports, to prevent more effectually 5 their designs either on Ireland or America. finns

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Fourthly, To send føch a force into America as might.conclufively turn the ballance in that part of the world in our fa

* These, I conceive, were the grounds upon which our Admi. niftration intended to form the whole fabric of their designs ; • and if, as I suppose, very little can rationally be objected to the, the fuperstructure will appear well built ; and of the whole taken together, will make one entire well imagined erpiece.'snt to fubna sn bus con ho - Descending then to particulars, he further fhews the grounds and reasons of our late treaties, and that they were not more the

refalt of necessity than of wisdom and policy, justifies the capes tures of the French trade, as a blow directed at the heart of the French affairs; and, having put the loss accruing to the enemy thereby, into the scale against Minorca, pronounces, that the former out-weighs the latter. He also justifies the care taken, and preference shewn to the defence of Britain and Ireland against an invasion, to the relief of Minorca ; and argues, that of four choices which might have been made with regard to the last of

those services, we took the best ; namely, to let Minorca con2 fide in the known ftrength of St. Philip's Fort, and the expe

rienced courage and fidelity of the Commander, until a fleet bcould be got ready which, without destroying the other parts 0% of the plan, might baffle that of the French, defeat their feet, We and relieve the place. What he says, further on, concerning

the miscarriage of Mr. Byng's expedition, the present inflamed ? Itate of thai controversy, requires to be given in his own words : which are as follow.

*If we knew, as a simple view of the plan might have made us know, that Fort St. Philip's was a place hardly fecond to any in Europe for strength, and fortified by every advantage of Na

and every contrivance of Art; if we knew the natöre of 102

the country of Minorca, which laid the befiègers under innumerable difficulties: if we were convinced of the honour

and capacity of the Governor, what error was committed in not

ftripping our own coast, to send Mr. Byng’s fleet before the zina

middle of March, for for foon was he appointed to the Com- !

mand, when the French fleet did not fail till the 12th of April, afterwand

before the

18th, nor opened the trenches, to be

on with infinite difficulty, before the 25th? • It is agreed upon all hands, that Mr. Byng, notwithstanding his delay here till the 9th of April, might have reached Minorca on ever vet accused of delay, which was calculated to relieve a

of May with great eales now what scheme was

most immense strength, attacked under so many disadvantages, ten days after the trenches were opened

before tive ecen upplungs as the fact was, that the relief did not ár

fourteen days after this time, and that this was foreseen, which no human prudence could foresee, who could blame a relief as delayed, which subjected a place of such firf


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sate strength, and at best of secondary consideration, to a fiege of twenty-four days to secure the very Being of a nation, and

the most valuable objects of the war But in reality the place 62990

of its relief: anaonger than this furthelt unforeseen period no earlier than this period, is it a very extraordinary presumption to reckon upon such a place's holding out only half the time it was actually maintained? And longer the fleet, even under this Commander, could not have been delayed: But that the fleet performed no effectual service ; that the place was not relieved, and that the Admiral did not aet conformably to his country's expectations, is but too true. But what had this to do with the original Design ? certainly nothing.

• But why, fay they, should this man at all been employed ? • Let me in my turn ak, why he should not have been employ.

ed? Who of all those Gentlemen who are now grown fo wise by the event of things, then objected to him? Why should

not he have been employed, who was bred from his infancy to • maritime affairs, had a skill undisputed, a courage unqueftion

ed, and an honour untainted, till that fatal day? who had his own reputation, the example of an heroic father, and the honour of a noble family, before his eyes to excite him to his du

ty, in a command which he himself had sollicited! Had his • Collicitation been rejected ; had this command been given to an. • other, and had he unhappily failed, as this man has, the tide • of declamation had run more violently the other way, and • these promising circumstances, which seemed to mark him out . for playing a noble part on a theatre, where his father had • acted lo gloriously, had been founded every where to the difgrace of a Ministry which had the blindness to neglect such an apparent designation. But objections of the weakest kind are admitted against expeditions which want success, fuch is that of Mr. Byng's not having had a fufficient force: But it muft never be allowed, that we ought not to reckon on Mr. Edgecombe's squadron as next to certains for we must always reckon that an Officer will do his duty, as Mr. Edgcombe did bis ; and that, therefore, he would, in all probability, quit Mahon as early as possible, to join the squadron he must have expected, and did expect, to fail to its relief : But if ten of the ablest, best appointed ships, that ever failed out of Britain, with this reinforcement, are not able to engage

e with assurance of success, twelve French, foul, and but indifferently equipped,

I do not know what men can depend upon. Himno Having also, in his way, affured us, that by adhering teadily

to the plan, the enemy will be fo wafted by degrees, that we may look forward with Confidence, to make France yield up Minorca, with the rest of her encroachments; he proceeds to thew, that the same consistency of measures has been observed with relation to our American concerns, tho” as injuriously, and violently complained of, as to those relating to Mahon; and he promulges the



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