" CHAPTER V THE POLIGNAC CONFERENCE AND THE I. THE POSITION IN SPANISH AMERICA IN 1823 Every day convinces me more and more, that in the present state of the World, in the present state of the [Spanish] Peninsula, and in the present state of the country, the American questions are out of all proportion more important to us than the European, and that, if we do not seize and turn them to our advantage in time, we shall rue the loss of an opportunity never, never to be recovered."-CANNING to Wellington, 8th November 1822. CANNING, with that imaginative insight which was so peculiarly his, had recognised the vast possibilities of Latin America in his first Ministry of half a generation back. He had induced the Portuguese Regent to retire from his native country to v Brazil; he had proclaimed Talavera as a victory for us because it had opened to us the commerce and the harbours of Spanish America. He had known that Castlereagh had forced all Powers to disavow aggressive designs on these Colonies at Aix la-Chapelle in 1818. He feared now that these designs were reviving. The French project of planting Bourbon princes on the thrones of Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile had long been known to everybody. And Castlereagh, in 1820, had addressed vigorous protests to France when he found she had secretly negotiated with Spain and with the Argentine Republic to establish the Bourbon Prince of Lucca as the ruler of Buenos Aires. It does not seem probable that, in this instance at least, force was actually contemplated by France. Canning saw that the question might be different in 1823, when she had already invaded the Old Spain, and he had evidence which, he thought, justified suspicion of French designs on the New. In any case, Canning had to win diplomatic prestige over Spanish America as a set-off to his diplomatic defeat in Europe. The question of Spanish America had three aspects in 1823. First there was the attitude of Russia, whose Czar was extending a long arm over the Pacific. There was next the policy to be pursued towards Spain herself, whose nerveless grasp was relaxing on her old-time possessions, and who seemed to be falling under the influence and arms of France. There was third the question of French designs in the West Indies and Latin America. The second or purely Spanish aspect was dealt with by Canning alone from a purely British point of view. In the matter of Russia and France, Canning attempted (and unsuccessfully) to co-operate with the United States in a joint policy. Canning solved the French problem by the Polignac Memorandum, Adams the Russian one by the Monroe Doctrine. 2. THE RUSSIAN ASPECT "The indignant Tsar, when just about TOм MOORE. Russia was at this time, through her possessions in Alaska, an American Power, and Alexander was the foremost champion of monarchy against revolution and of the Neo-Holy Alliance against liberty.) That being so-the issue of a ukase dealing with North-West America on the 28th September 1821 was more alarming than it would have been in the case of a sovereign of less power and less exalted pretensions.) It followed, significantly enough, on the high-flying proclamations of Troppau and Laibach. It forbade all except Russian subjects to fish, trade, or navigate within a hundred Italian miles of the west of the Behring Sea to the 51st degree of latitude on the west of North America, and from the Behring coast of Siberia to the 45th degree of latitude (i.e. to the cape south of Urup Isle). This ukase affected the rights of trade, discovery, and occupation both of English and United States subjects.1 (Castlereagh received this ukase with displeasure, and made a provisional protest in London at once, which he transmitted to Petersburg at the beginning of 1822, stating that England 1 In A.H.R., Oct. 1912, 309-45; Jan. 1913, 537-62, is much Russian correspondence on this ukase, but there seems no clear explanation of it, v. infra, pp. 491-3, and Webster, 452-3. 2 F.O. Russia, 181/48. Castlereagh to Bagot, Jan. 19/22. X would not admit either the exclusive sovereignty or the exclusive navigation of Russia in these waters or areas. Lord Stowell-the greatest of international lawyers-condemned Russia's pretensions as very insupportable.' Little was done to clear the matter up at Verona, and, though both the United States and England had shown signs of concerted resistance, nothing had actually been settled by the autumn of 1823. Canning viewed the matter with some humour, declaring that Alexander had proclaimed "as a mare clausum an ocean four thousand miles across," and treating the whole matter as ridiculous. He had heard rumours of Alexander's intermeddling farther south in the West Indies as well, but he did not credit them.1 He was right. Alexander was at this time fully occupied with European Spain and with Turkey and, though he favoured armed intervention in Spanish America in principle, he did nothing to put it into practice or to urge it on his Allies in 1823. Russia, Canning held, could be disregarded in this connection. He said she could not act alone. It was only in conjunction with France that she could threaten Spanish America. The view of the United States was not quite the same. To them the proclamations of a despot were naturally an object of suspicion. And, when pressed by Adams, Tuyll, the Russian Minister at Washington, replied by proclaiming the most extravagant doctrines of absolutism. The republican blood of Adams was deeply stirred. This Russian action, though it hardly affected Canning at all, was to have a serious influence upon the government of Washington. For the proclamation of absolutist principles by Russia necessitated a rejoinder on the virtues of republicanism by Adams. Russia, however, had no influence on the Polignac Memorandum, though she exercised a good deal upon the formation of the Monroe Doctrine. We may therefore leave this matter till later in the chapter. 1 F.O. France, 146/56. Canning to Stuart, July 23/23, secret and separate. He had heard that Alexander was trying to induce President Bover of Haiti to cede the Isles des Vaches, but does not think it necessarily true. Russian agents were also reported in Colombia. Vide notes to this chapter, pp. 491-3. て 3. THE ATTITUDE OF SPAIN "Crowned above queens, a withered beldame now KIPLING. In 1822 the Spanish-American question demanded a speedy solution. Castlereagh had not only recognised the Spanish Colonial flags in June 1822, but in other ways had brought things so far that a British recognition of the independence of Colombia at last seemed imminent. The Colombians had captured Quito and a large number of Royalists in May, and Brazil revolted from Portugal in September. The island of Cuba presented another difficulty, for it was infested with pirates who preyed on British shipping. Spain refused all compensation to British mercantile owners, and proved totally unable to repress the piratical depredations. During the Congress of Verona, therefore, Canning took a decisive step. He considered the choice lay between recognition of some of the Spanish Colonies and "some vindication against Spain herself of the injuries we have suffered either from her hostility or from her helplessness." The third course" continued acquiescence in such injuries without vindication and without redress"-could not be considered nor defended in Parliament.1 Meanwhile fresh reports of piratical attacks arrived during the whole of November. So he decided to apply a local remedy' by effectively policing the West Indies with a British squadron. On the 1st December, Canning sent a despatch to Paris informing Villèle that a new British naval armament had been sent to the West Indies, and that they had orders, if the consent of the Spanish Governor was refused, to land in Cuba and attack the pirates in their hiding-places. They were also to demand redress from Spain for the various injuries. Canning ended by a solemn and, under the circumstances, very necessary disclaimer by England that, though she meant to land in Cuba, she had no aggressive designs.2 1 W.N.D., i. 468. Canning to Wellington, Oct. 29. F.O. France, 146/50, No. 14. Canning to Sir C. Stuart, Dec. 1/22. The instruction to the naval armament is of Nov. 23/22. Canning to Bathurst, Hist. MSS. Commn., Bathurst papers, [1923], PP. 534-7. Canning's Cabinet Memo., Nov. 15/22, is in Stap., Corr., i. 48-63. Her This vigorous action brought Spain to her senses. Constitutional Government first offered to give England commercial advantages in Spanish America in return for support against France. Canning rejected this offer, but on the 7th January 1823 he suspended the operations against the pirates, as the Spaniards were in difficulties with France and now offered full compensation to England. Canning accepted the offer and negotiated a convention for the settlement of outstanding difficulties. He had drawn up a list of consuls for the chief towns in Spanish America in December 1822, and he now likewise suspended this measure with the view of giving the Constitutional Ministers in Spain as much moral support as possible, and as, in addition, they were negotiating with Buenos Aires on the basis of her independence. Further, any immediate recognition would destroy the chance of the restoration of monarchy in any Spanish. colony. It was not till October 1823 that he took any further measures which could in any way affect Spain, and that was after the French had liberated Ferdinand, who had overthrown the Spanish Constitution and might be threatening Spanish America. On the 10th October he took two important steps. He actually accredited consuls to the chief towns of Spanish America; and he despatched Special Commissions of Inquiry to Colombia and to Mexico to report on the question of their recognition by Great Britain. The step of accrediting consuls was intended to be a purely commercial measure, without political significance, but the despatch of Commissions of Inquiry indicated that England was seeking for information in order to decide on the question of recognition. These steps showed that British policy towards Spain and her Colonies was considered by Canning to be a question which she was not going to submit to a congress, with its possibilities of intervention or of menace. It did not seem impossible that Russia might combine her efforts with France to trouble the lands, as well as the waters, of the New World. (The United States feared the Czar, England the French Bourbon, so the elements of unity were at hand. 1 The instructions to Mexico were drawn in July, but Canning apparently heard of the fall of Cadiz on Oct. 10, and then altered them. |