46 in the treaty. The Portuguese Government answered his objection by saying that they could not regulate the succession, unless England was prepared to guarantee it. Canning refused, saying that he did not know what we were asked to guarantee. We are really asked to make up Dom Pedro's mind for him "; he was not going to do that, nor to be involved in any interference in the internal affairs of Portugal. The only guarantee he would give was that, if Brazil attacked Portugal or her remaining Colonies, England would defend either or both.1 None the less, despite irritation on both sides of the water, the great and main object was achieved. For this Canning deserves the chief credit. He had prevented the original negotiation at London from failure by persuading the Brazilians not to insist on a preliminary claim of absolute independence. He had proceeded with the conference despite the secret intrigues of Portugal and the final defection of Austria. France and Russia, by secret threats at Lisbon, and France by intrigues at Rio, had attempted, but in vain, to nullify his work. His projet was the basis of the treaty, which he finally carried to success by a direct negotiation first at Lisbon and then at Rio. He achieved the important object of a peaceful separation of the two countries, endorsed by the consent, if not by the approval, of the Mother Country, and in the teeth of the opposition of Russia and of France. It must have given Canning the greatest pleasure in the whole affair when that arch-Ultra, King George IV., referred to it at the end of 1825 in an interview with Esterházy. George IV. proceeded to eulogise Canning, who was present, for avoiding congresses. When we see our way," said the King with sly humour, "and can employ our own influence, we can do anything. Who [turning to Prince Esterházy] could have done what we have just accomplished in Brazil ? Prince Esterházy expressed his entire assent, and went into a panegyric of the instructions given to Sir Charles Stuart. So George was denouncing congresses and Esterházy praising 1 F.O. Portugal, 179/32. Canning to À Court, Feb. 4/26, No. 7, enclosing memo. on guarantee of Feb. 3. It will be seen that Canning here engaged to defend the remaining Colonies of Portugal, though he did not admit that Portugal had a treaty-right to British defence of anything except the European Kingdom. Canning for having opposed them! Even this was not enough. After leaving the King's presence, Esterházy met Canning in an ante-room and said that " he now comprehended and knew how to appreciate my policy, that I had everything in my hands, and was destined to play la plus grande rôle en Europe." 1 The work was crowned by the ultimately successful negotiation of a commercial treaty and of a treaty on the Slave Trade with Brazil. The immediate results were of great benefit to Brazil, which was recognised by, and signed commercial treaties with, almost every State in Europe during the next two years. 5. SUMMARY Perpetually crossed by Portugal, by France, and by the Neo-Holy Alliance, Canning had achieved a triumph which was great and lasting. It was no less than to have planted monarchy for sixty years in Brazil. Metternich spoke truth when he said that monarchy would restrain extreme tendencies in the New World. Pedro himself had done a good deal to secure the success of this negotiation and had a real claim on the gratitude of his country. His unsuccessful war with Buenos Aires made them forget it and enforce his abdication in 1831; but the monarchy remained, first under a Regency, and then under his son. This institution rendered it the stablest of all Latin-American States, with an Upper Chamber admirably suited to the needs of the time, and a government more mild, more enlightened, and more just than that of any surrounding state. Without Canning it is probable that it would have had to choose between democratic anarchy and military dictatorship, the two recurrent and perpetual evils of South American politics. It was not his fault that there were defects in the structure; it was due to him, more than to anyone else, that the structure was preserved at all. Brazil did not proclaim a Monroe Doctrine of her own, and in 1826 and during 1832-4 her intervention exercised an 1 Canning to Granville, Dec. 12/25. Stap., G.C. & T., 450-2. 2 Stuart rashly negotiated two treaties on the subject, of which both had to be disavowed, v. Notes to Chapter IX., pp. 508-9. A new convention on the Slave Trade was signed Nov. 23/26, and subsequently ratified. The new commercial treaty ratifications were exchanged on Nov. 10/27. active influence upon Europe. Apart from that, Canning's hopes were not realised for ninety years. The first time that the Brazilian Navy co-operated with the English (an event which Canning had always contemplated as possible) was when their united cruisers met the Germans in the autumn of 1918. Since that date the presence of Brazil on the Council of the League of Nations has enabled her to exercise an effective influence in the world's affairs. |