that a further congress would not solve the difficulty.1 For he thought that the British public would only cast further obloquy on British Ministers for attending secret conclaves with foreign despots. But his differences with the Castlereagh policy were rather of shade and of emphasis than in fundamentals, and of method and exception rather than of principle. Castlereagh desired just as much as he to extend British influence and to check foreign aggression, but Castlereagh was bound by his past and by his friendships, while Canning was not. Castlereagh despised popularity, Canning did not think it wise to do so. Therein lies the true difference between the two men.

In Canning's view it was essential that future foreign policy should be both intelligible and popular. Herein it was that he differed from Castlereagh, from Wellington, from Metternich, from Alexander, and from all those men whose iron resolution had overthrown Napoleon.) Those men did not see that what is successful in war is not always successful in peace time. For in war one must be ruthless and firm, not popular or diplomatic. (Canning knew that such methods were out of date in a period of peace. England's foreign policy could not be successful unless it was generally supported by the nation. They had now [31st May 1827] all the advantages of a free press, and he valued a free press as highly as any man," and he took care not to forget its influence. His methods and machinery were alike new, and amounted to revolution.

But it must not be thought that this revolution was effected with ease. As will have been seen, there was much in his policy that was too intellectual and too refined for the people, or even for Parliament or for his colleagues, to understand. Like Gladstone, he combined the gift of popular appeal with 'the microscopic subtlety of a thirteenth-century schoolman,'

1 Planta, the permanent Under-Secretary, expressed views on Greece strikingly different from those of Castlereagh in 1821, and he was then in very close touch with Canning, v. an article by Mr C. N. Crawley in Cambridge Historical Journal, No. 2, pp. 209-13. It is perhaps legitimate to infer that Canning objected to the summoning of the Congress of Verona, which Castlereagh certainly did not. Stap., P.L., ii. 36, says he objected strongly to the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach, and adds: "Had he been in office three months before the meeting at Verona no English Minister would probably have assisted at it." Stapleton is not always accurate, but I am inclined to think that there is something in this.

and it was the latter quality which was conspicuous in 1822. Like Gladstone, too, and not altogether undeservedly, he had a reputation for impulsiveness and recklessness. With the King and most of his colleagues against him, with a sullen diplomatic staff, with a doubtful parliamentary following, and a suspicious parliamentary opposition, he might well hesitate to take office. One quality, however, he had. In after days, Gladstone, who thought him too clever' for the House of Commons, pronounced that he possessed' great parliamentary courage.' And it was not in Parliament alone that courage was needed. In Europe and in America revolution raised its menacing head. Monarchy armed its hand for resistance at Vienna, at Berlin, at St Petersburg, at Paris. England, said Canning in 1821, was treading "a plank which lay across a roaring stream. Attempts might be made to bear us down on one side or the other." In 1822 the waters were still rising on every side, and Canning had now to tread the plank alone.

PART II

FRANCE, THE NEO-HOLY ALLIANCE, AND BRITISH NON-INTERVENTION

CHAPTER III

FRANCE AND THE CONGRESS OF VERONA

CHAPTER IV

THE FRENCH INVASION AND THE FALL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SPAIN