CHAPTER I

REVOLUTION AND THE NEO-HOLY ALLIANCE

(1820-22) 1

I. THE PRELUDE (1818-20)

Peuples, formez une Sainte Alliance !”—BÉRAnger.

Ar the beginning of 1820 Europe was still governed by Alexander, by Metternich, and by Castlereagh. They were a trio not unworthy of fame, for they had overthrown Napoleon. Alexander's armies had given him his first great defeat in 1812; Metternich's diplomacy had brought Austria against him in 1813; Castlereagh had rallied the wavering Coalition and ensured his downfall in 1814. In a sense these triumphs were unfortunate for their fame, for they could never again face so great an adversary or achieve such great renown. Yet at the Congresses of Vienna and of Aix-laChapelle all three played distinguished parts, and their union and friendship still remained to ensure the peace of the world in 1820. Yet for all three failure and shame were waiting. Castlereagh and Alexander were to die miserably, separated from their Allies, and with a sense of failure resting over their labours and dimming their fame. Metternich was to live on to an extreme old age, to experience defeat at the hands of Canning, and to fly, thirty years later, to England, leaving behind him nothing but the wreck of his life-work and of his renown. In 1820 the result of the labours of all three men still promised fair. Yet within a few months the prospects of a long European peace vanished. Castlereagh took a course that was to separate England from Europe; Alexander and

1 I give only a few references in this chapter to the authorities or events. The whole has been handled more ably and fully than I could manage by my friend, Professor Webster, in chapters i., vi., and vii. of The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh (1925).

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Metternich one that was to expose them to the hatred of all Liberals in the Old World and to the destruction of their system in the New. Events and ideas were to prove stronger than armies or despots, and the waves of revolution were already undermining the fabric of 1815.

On the basis of the European system all three were agreed; they differed only as to the superstructure. The system of alliances built up from the Treaty of Chaumont, as modified by the Treaty of 20th November 1815, was the chief bond. This committed the Four Allies for twenty years to the defence of the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Vienna, and also to concerted action against any attempt to restore the Napoleonic dynasty to France. To this obligation of the Quadruple Alliance, to this steel structure of European peace, all three subscribed. Article VI. of the Treaty of 20th November 1815 provided for the periodical reunion of ministers and sovereigns, and this clause, due to Castlereagh, ensured collective discussion on European events, and kept up the idea of a possible extension of obligations. The three men looked at the Treaties in a different way. Metternich said Englishmen viewed a treaty 'like a civil contract,' and that Russians regarded not its precise stipulations but took the spirit for their guide. Castlereagh, though not at all anxious to break with the Alliance, did not consider that England was bound by that obligation to do more than join in attacking France, if she violated the territorial settlement or restored Napoleon. In the case of revolution or disturbance in France they were bound indeed to meet and discuss together, but Castlereagh denied that he had promised to do more than that. Alexander, however, held that this bond could be extended to cover a general and active interference or suppression of revolution in any State wishing to attempt such experiments. Metternich was too much of an opportunist to stop as short as Castlereagh or to go as far as Alexander. It might be convenient at one time to extend the Quadruple Alliance to include the suppression of revolution, and very inconvenient to do so at another time. Metternich had no desire to see Cossacks restoring order in Germany, but he might want to see Austrians restoring it in Italy. What Metternich most wanted was a display of moral solidarity among rulers in order

that revolutionaries might be intimidated. But he was statesman enough to see that if he pushed Castlereagh too far in the direction of Alexander, the Quadruple Alliance would fall in pieces. Hence he tried to balance between the hard legal practicality of the one and the vague cosmopolitan mysticism of the other. His formula of moral solidarity was constructed to prevent the material intervention of Alexander and the possible defection of Castlereagh.

Alexander had a certain case for extending the obligations of the Alliance. His scheme, known as the Holy Alliance,' had been signed in 1815 by every monarch in Europe except one. And even the Prince Regent of England, who could not publicly concur with a document not countersigned by any minister, wrote privately approving of it. It was intended by the Kings to be a union of sovereigns alone, on the basis of Christian charity and love. Perhaps because they were not consulted, their Ministers were less reverent. A piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense,' said the downright Castlereagh, invented by a monarch whose mind was 'not entirely sound.' Metternich cynically declared that Madame de Krüdener and Alexander had summoned Christ to take part in their mystical conferences and had gone so far as to set a chair for Him at the table. Certainly neither Metternich nor Castlereagh attached any importance to it in. 1815. They did not regard it as an official act, nor consider, that it formed any part of the Peace Treaties as such.

But Alexander's view that the spirit was more important than the letter of treaties was pressed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. He came forward with new and very extensive proposals for extending the reign of peace and love by guaranteeing sovereigns against revolution. Castlereagh told the Russian Ministers to leave out the parts where the Apocalypse showed itself.' Alexander then suggested a guarantee, not only of territory but also of institutions, by an international army, and claimed that the other Powers had already subscribed to these doctrines by signing the 'Holy Alliance.' The British Minister said that, as the British Constitution forbade her monarch to sign such a compact without a ministerial countersignature, England could not be bound by any obligation which the Holy Alliance' contained. Moreover, as he

stated in a memorandum to the Conference, the idea of an Alliance solidaire or of general guarantee was not contemplated in the Treaties, nor was it one which England could accept. Such acceptance might give "an almost irresistible claim [to Russia] to march through the territories of all the confederate States to the most distant points of Europe to fulfil her guarantee." England could make, and had made, "no engagements beyond the immediate objects which were made matter of regulation in the Treaties themselves." Metternich's task of evasion was more difficult. He held the view that the Holy Alliance' was not a registered Act Vand therefore not binding. It was the Quadruple Alliance, he said, that was our political religion,' and the 'Holy Alliance' was merely a moral part' of it. There was a good deal of difference, he thought, between religious and moral ideas. Finally, the three agreed on a vague formula which, while declaring the object of the union of the Powers to be peace on the basis of the Treaties, referred also to the intention of the Powers to maintain the intimate union, strengthened by the ties of Christian brotherhood, contracted by the sovereigns. This meant little to Metternich and Castlereagh, but very much to Alexander.

A more practical step was the addition of France, now regenerated and forgiven, to the European Concert by creating a new Alliance known as the Quintuple. The Quadruple Alliance provided for action against France in the case of an attempt by her to violate the territorial limits of Vienna or to restore Napoleon. To that France herself could not be a party. But under Article VI. of the Treaty of 20th November 1815 she could be, and was, admitted to the periodic congresses or unions, and this admission served to restore her self-respect and to enable her to resume her place in the European family. It did not, however, destroy or affect the obligations of the Quadruple Alliance.

The differences of opinion had, however, revealed considerable dangers. Castlereagh was by no means satisfied with the

I infer that

The Treaty of Vienna,

1 Metternich does not explain what the difference was. dogmas were binding, and that morality was not. at any rate, has clauses which have diplomatic meanings, but the Holy Alliance' speaks of charity, brotherhood, and Christian love, terms not definable in diplomatic dictionaries.

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formula which had saved the face of Alexander; the British Cabinet even doubted whether the periodic reunions of the Powers should be continued; and the British Parliament was becoming steadily more hostile to the entangling Alliance' with the military despots of the Continent. It was strange to hear Alexander speaking of a reign of universal peace and love, while maintaining a Russian army of a million men,1 and describing it as a European force.' Diplomacy may despise dreamers, but it cannot afford to despise formidably armed Grave as were the doubts of Metternich, and graver as were those of Castlereagh, they hoped that their judicious use of a formula would prevent Alexander's injudicious use of an army.

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The result of Aix-la-Chapelle was that the cracks' were papered over' for the time. In 1819 Metternich set himself to erect his masterpiece by the organisation of the new Confederation of Germany. By this system, embodied in the Carlsbad Resolutions and confirmed in a Congress at Vienna, Metternich secured Austria's predominance, and in effect her control, over all Germany. The Emperor, the Five Kings, the Grand Dukes, and the Free Cities were bound by a Federal Bond in chains at the feet of Metternich. Constitutions, where they existed, were discouraged or ' scotched'; measures of police supervision and press censorship penetrated throughout Germany, to control, to intimidate, or to suppress the utterances of professors, the outpourings of journalists, the organisation of students' unions or of gymnastic associations -everything which could criticise, or modify, or attack the existing order of Legitimate Monarchs. The right of interference in the internal affairs of German States, thus conceded to Metternich, enabled him to stifle opposition to his views. The finishing touch to the structure was put in 1820, just as revolution broke out in the Mediterranean lands. It is but fair to Metternich to say that his machinery stood the strain, and that in Germany alone was profound tranquillity maintained during 1820. From this work Castlereagh stood aside, though he did not dissent, and Alexander ventured only on a half-hearted remonstrance. In 1819 no real divergence of view had yet appeared over Germany or over Italy. In both 1 Wellington thought half that number would have been sufficient.