7. THE RESULTS OF VERONA "In short, I scarce could count a minute TOM MOORE. But, for the moment, the question of Spain was actually less important than the moral effect produced, first by British and then by French action, upon the Congressional System. Other decisions, and by no means unimportant decisions, were taken at Verona as to the Slave Trade, South America, Greece, and Italy. Over these questions a semblance of unity was preserved. Over the Spanish question England had broken away altogether; France, though reluctantly concurring at the Congress, revoked her assent immediately afterwards. To Metternich this breach was very fatal to the Congress System. Its essence was that Europe should present an entirely united front to cow the revolutionaries in all parts of Europe, and the scene had been carefully staged at Verona for the purpose. There were present two emperors, three kings, three reigning grand dukes, one cardinal representing the Pope, one viceroy, three foreign secretaries, twenty ambassadors, and twelve ministers. Cajoleries had not been spared to the hesitating envoys of France and of England. Metternich succeeded in winning over Montmorency; Alexander flattered Chateaubriand and spoke to him as friend to friend' with a picturesque eloquence akin to his own. He invited Wellington to dine with him alone, as if he were a brother sovereign. Metternich induced Napoleon's widow, Marie Louise—already with child by her paramour-to play cards with the conqueror of her husband. Madame Lieven amused the lighter moments of the Duke. All the dignitaries appeared in state at the old Roman amphitheatre, where the first players of Europe amused those other actors, the kings.' It was truly the last muster, the last splendid pageant of those forces which had ruled the world since 1815. But the harmony of the scene remained purely theatrical, and neither words nor flatteries could prevent the divergent interests from being revealed to the world. By the end of 1822 it was clear that they would no longer march in unison. Chateaubriand, in eloquent retrospect, pronounced that Verona would recall to men not Metternich but Shakespeare, not the speeches of the Congress but the love tale of Romeo and Juliet. All that was left were "sentiments that are extinguished, chimeras outworn, although once nursed, like those of the dwellers of Herculaneum, at the bosom of Hope." On the 14th April 1823, Canning, in less rhetorical phrases, quoted the de la Garde despatch of the 25th December to prove that England's attitude had broken up the Congress by confining within due bounds the predominating Areopagitic spirit' which was threatening to govern the world. "The success of a [' wholly European '] policy . . . would have been completely secured, if England had thought she could concur in them." Perhaps the French separatist action would, in any case, have wrecked the 'European' policy. But its combination with Canning's instruction to Wellington of 27th September made failure certain. The gaps in the fabric could not be concealed from the world, and it was doubtful whether any new congress could succeed. The sense of failure rested heavy upon this one, and, ever after this, Metternich and Alexander feared that the summoning of a congress might only expose their divisions to the world. Congresses had hitherto been a meeting of almost supernatural beings, whose secret and solemn decisions carried with them a sense of awe and mystery. It was at Verona that the archangels' were damaged.' Wellington's attitude had been negative and one of protest; Villèle's attitude was positive and one of independence. On Christmas Day the European aspect of the Spanish question gave way to a more purely French one. And as soon as it became purely a matter for France, England, her old enemy, became awake to the gravity of the situation. A war between France and Spain, a war by one Bourbon to restore another, suggested a revival of the Pacte de Famille,1 and might be followed by attempts to reconquer Spanish America for Ferdinand. Here England's most vital interests were touched, and thus France came face to face with her. 1 The Family Compact' was based on three separate Treaties between France and Spain of 1733, 1743, and 1761. Their essence was combination against England by the Bourbon kinsmen of Paris and Madrid. A clause of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1814 forbade any such union in future. This clause, though secret, was published by Canning during the crisis of CHAPTER IV THE FRENCH INVASION AND THE FALL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SPAIN I. THE LAST BRITISH EFFORT FOR PEACE (JANUARY TO FEBRUARY 1823) "France said to Spain Your revolution disquiets me'; and Spain replied to France-' Your army of observation disquiets me.' There were but two remedies to this state of things: war or concession."-CANNING in the Commons, 30th April 1824. WELLINGTON returned from Verona in the belief that peace would be maintained. He overrated his influence alike over Metternich, over Alexander, and over French politicians. Between 1815 and 1818 he had not only directed the military policy of the Allies in France, but he had, in fact, settled nearly all the financial difficulties, and had often overruled all the Allied Ambassadors together over purely diplomatic questions. The experience was unfortunate, for Wellington had previously been modest enough when dealing with politicians. He now got the idea that he could direct diplomacy as well as he could direct war. He still thought at Verona that his wishes and his utterances would be as weighty as they had once been at Paris. He was mistaken, but he did not recognise his mistake. He thought that his attitude at Verona had prevented common action by the Allies in Spain, and that his utterances at Paris would prevent separate action by France. He therefore pressed Villèle and Montmorency hard, and offered the mediation of England for the settlement of French difficulties with Spain (17th December). The reception was not favourable, and the Duke left Paris on the 20th. A formal refusal of mediation by the French Government, together with an acceptance of the good offices of England in the Spanish question, followed the Duke to London on the 26th. His view was, however, still optimistic as to the preservation of peace, an impression which Canning did not share. And at this point begins the coolness between the two men, which afterwards terminated in such bitter strife. France, though she had rejected the mediation of England, had not refused to avail herself of her good offices.' To soothe the vanity of Spain, Wellington, in his capacity as a Spanish grandee, was asked to send Lord Fitzroy Somerset to assist Sir William À Court at Madrid, by pressing on the Spanish Government his suggestions for conciliating France. Canning said that these were, in effect, the suggestions of the British Government. "But we do not, like France, demand anything of this sort as the price of our forbearance to break with Spain." 1 "1 Though couched in vague terms, their general meaning was clear. Everyone, including most Spaniards, admitted the defects of the Constitution of 1812. There was no second Chamber; ministers could not sit in the Cortes, and the members of one Cortes were not to sit in the next one. The remedy was to strengthen the King's prerogative and to provide elements of stability by making a second Chamber. Any chance of success these negotiations might have had was ruined by the fact that letters of recall were demanded on the 9th January 1823 by the representative of Prussia at Madrid, and on the 10th by those of Austria and Russia, and all in most violent and offensive language.' By the middle of the month the Neo-Allied representatives had left, though the Frenchman still remained. This was most unfortunate, for it interfered with a measure promoted by Canning in order to conciliate Spain. England had recently taken a very strong line by sending out a naval squadron to the West Indies, with instructions to protect British shipping by force against pirates in Spanish America. On the 10th December 1822 Canning announced this step to all diplomats; but on the 7th January 1823 he suspended all such instructions, offered to negotiate a commercial convention with Spain, and suspended all operations against them. This wise and moderate overture did not reach Spain until the Neo-Holy representatives had left. By that time, however, it was too late. On the 10th 1 W.N.D., ii. 9, to Fitzroy Somerset, Jan. 6/23. ? It reached Madrid on the 22nd, and the last of the Neo-Holies left on Jan. 16/23. F.O. Spain, 185/91. Canning to A Court, Jan. 7/23, No. 2. A commercial convention was signed on Mar. 12. The policy as to this January, smarting with resentment at the Neo-Holy Alliance, the Spanish Government instructed their Ambassador at Paris to refuse all concessions to France. On the 13th, repenting of their haste, they solicited the good offices' of England in their dispute with France. But the Spanish despatch of the 10th had done its work at Paris, and on the 18th Chateaubriand instructed de la Garde to demand his passports, adding, on the 20th, that the Spanish instruction of the 13th made no difference in this respect. Though the clouds were gathering darkly round Madrid, Canning did not abandon all hope. Besides official despatches he wrote five intimate personal letters to Chateaubriand before the 28th January, of which the burden was peace, peace, peace.' Chateaubriand replied gracefully, telling de la Garde in private to put no trust in the English.' Villèle was meanwhile assuring Canning, as a secret,' that he was really pacific and would fall in with British intentions.1 Canning was not the dupe of either confidence, and the events of the 28th January showed that he was right. On that day the King of France delivered his speech from the throne on the opening of Parliament. 2. THE FRENCH KING'S SPEECH (28TH JANUARY) AND THE BRITISH PROTEST "The infatuation. . . at Madrid," said Louis XVIII., "left little hope of maintaining peace." The French Minister had been recalled. "A hundred thousand French are ready to march " under a son of France to the aid of a brother Bourbon. So far the speech was directed against Spain, though it contained a suggestion of the renewal of the Family Compact.' But one passage caused the greatest sensation in England. For it reasserted, in their most offensive form, those doctrines of Legitimacy of which England had already had enough in the circulars of Troppau and Laibach. "Let Ferdinand be free to give to his people the institutions they cannot hold but convention may be defined both as an attempt to settle disputes of the past, and as a move towards closer relations for the future. 1 F.O. Spain, 185/91. Canning to À Court, Jan. 10/23, enclosing Sir C. Stuart to Canning of Jan. 2/23. Canning commented with much suspicion on Villèle and his secret.' 1823 |