that Canning and Liverpool failed to make themselves "'rightly understood' at Paris.1 3. CANNING'S DESPATCH OF THE 31ST MARCH 1823 "The hinge between war and peace is indeed a dangerous juncture to Ministers."-Burke. On By the middle of March, Canning's attempt to influence the constitutional party in Spain, and his appeal to the moderate party in France, had definitely failed. On the 13th he heard that the Spanish Government refused to make any modifications in the constitution. On the 15th the Duc d'Angoulême left Paris to command the French Army on the frontier. the 21st, Canning therefore accepted the inevitable and informed Marcellus that England would observe neutrality in the impending contest. On the 23rd he told him that he was going to publish the various documents on the question, a decision which horrified Chateaubriand, Wellington, and Metternich, and provoked protest in each case. Just before he did this he summed up his views in a despatch of 31st March, which was published only five days after it was communicated to the French Government.2 The importance of this despatch was enhanced by the fact that it was sent "for the purpose of being communicated to the French Minister." In diplomacy this is an unusual step to take. It was, indeed, practically an ultimatum, or a declaration that war with England would follow if France broke any of the three pledges which she was regarded as having given (a) not to establish a permanent military occupation of Spain; (b) not to appropriate any part of the Spanish Colonies; (c) not to violate the territorial integrity of Portugal. Chateaubriand and Villèle heard it on the 9th April, and 1 A.A.E., 616. Marcellus to Chateaubriand, Jan. 3, 7, Feb. 11, 14, Mar. 25/23. V.S.A., Berichte aus Frankreich, Bd. 351. Vincent to Metternich, Mar. 3/23. V.S.A., Berichte aus England. Esterházy to Metternich, Mar. 3/23. 2 I infer that Canning instructed Stuart, by private letter, not to present this despatch until the French crossed into Spain. Otherwise Stuart must have withheld the despatch on his own responsibility from Apr. 3 to 9, which is highly improbable. The despatch is in B.F.S.P., x. 64–70. made no direct reply to what was, in effect, a challenge. They could hardly do so, partly for reasons of dignity, partly because the renewal of their disclaimers at the moment would have been to admit that their previous assurances had been worthless. As regards (a) and (b), their previous pledges had been of a general character-" as recognising the sacred obligations of treaties," as not wishing to revive the Pacte de Famille or to harbour aggressive designs. In respect to (c), Portugal, their pledges had been specific in February and were renewed in August. For the moment, Canning seems to have assumed that silence implied that they harboured no designs on Spain and Spanish America. After recounting the failure of British attempts to mediate or to interpose their good offices between France and constitutional Spain, Canning indicated that he now regarded war as practically certain. He concluded with the following grave warning, which must be given in full, as almost every word has to be carefully weighed. "It remains only to describe the Conduct which it is His Majesty's desire and intention to observe, in a conflict between two Nations, to each of whom His Majesty is bound by the ties of Amity and Alliance. "The repeated disavowal, by His Most Christian Majesty's Government, of all views of ambition and aggrandisement, forbids the suspicion of any design on the part of France, to establish a permanent military occupation of Spain; or to force His Catholick Majesty into any measures, derogatory to the independence of his Crown, or to his existing relations with other Powers. "The repeated assurances which His Majesty has received, of the determination of France to respect the dominions of His Most Faithful Majesty, relieve His Majesty from any apprehension of being called upon to fulfil the obligations of that intimate defensive Connection, which has so long subsisted between the Crowns of Great Britain and Portugal. "With respect to the Provinces in America, which have thrown off their allegiance to the Crown of Spain, time and 1 F.O. Spain, 185/91. Canning to À Court, Aug. 20/23, mentions most positive assurance from Polignac re Portugal.' " " a the course of events appear to have substantially decided their separation from the Mother Country; although the formal recognition of those Provinces, as Independent States, by His Majesty, may be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satisfactory progress, in each State, towards a regular and settled form of Government. Spain has long been apprised of His Majesty's opinions upon this subject. Disclaiming in the most solemn manner any intention of appropriating to Himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, His Majesty is satisfied that no attempt will be made by France, to bring under her dominion any of those possessions, either by conquest, or by cession, from Spain. "This frank explanation upon the points on which perhaps alone the possibility of any collision of France with Great Britain can be apprehended in a War between France and Spain, your Excellency will represent to M. de Chateaubriand, as dictated by an earnest desire to be enabled to preserve, in that War, a strict and undeviating Neutrality: a Neutrality not liable to alteration towards either Party, so long as the Honour and just Interests of Great Britain are equally respected by both." This despatch contains, in itself, a compendium of Canning's whole future policy as regards Spain, Portugal, France, and Spanish America. It hints at the possibility of war if Portugal is attacked, and at the recognition of the Spanish Colonies if France continues to occupy Spain. It stops short of war, indeed, but it makes clear that the breach between France and England is a wide one, and may become wider still. It may be a perfect neutrality' that is here proclaimed, but it is one that, in three defined cases, may end in armed intervention. Strong words here are plainly meant as the prelude to strong action. Its effect was enhanced because it was directed to be read in full to Chateaubriand, a step which is a strong one for any minister to take. It is interesting, however, 1 A supplementary despatch draws attention to the abrogation of the Pacte de Famille in the separate article of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of July 5/14—the article being afterwards published by Canning. A Court, on Jan. 27, had stated to Canning that a despatch of Chateaubriand to Madrid spoke of restoring the ancient intimate connection between France and Spain. to note that Metternich, when he read it, intimated approval and stated that, if France contemplated any of the three measures, "Austria would join Great Britain in her efforts to counteract them." 1 It was seldom that Metternich approved of Canning's policy, and still more seldom that he offered to support it. Other evidence permits us to doubt if he now really did either. 4. THE FRENCH INVASION AND CANNING'S REPLY "And I did pluck allegiance from men's hearts, “HENRY IV." On the 6th April the French forces crossed the Bidassoa, and war began. On the 14th, Canning came to the Bar of the House of Commons with his papers in his hand-papers which, together with his speech, revealed the whole course of the negotiations. His speech did little more than repeat the arguments of his state papers. But it made a great sensation. that a minister should say the same thing in public as in private, and that the 31st March despatch should be published only five days after it had been communicated. Canning's dissection of Chateaubriand's contention that his policy was 'toute Européenne et toute française,' 2 was merciless in its logic, for it revealed that not only was it exclusively French, but that French action had dissolved the European Areopagus. He denounced the doctrine of the French King's speech, saying that "no member of the House thought of it with more disgust and abhorrence than he did," and that “not a day nor an hour was lost in protesting against it." He alluded to himself jestingly as a Liberal, yea, a Radical Minister,' but recommended the Opposition not to call European sovereigns 'wretches' and barbarians,' not to think of war as a light thing, as it might be in the mouth of "an irresponsible writer -with the safety of a country on his lips and none of the responsibility on his shoulders." Then, varying an expression 1 F.O. Austria, 120/56. Wellesley to Canning, May 5/23. 2 Marcellus, at any rate, did not believe in it. He wrote privately to Chateaubriand that he used the phrase, pour contenter les fantasques'; Marcellus, Politique de la Restauration, [1853], p. 76. in one of his despatches, he said: "The country which menaces war ought always to be ready to carry these menaces into execution." He made no such menace, but said England had decided for a neutrality, and for an honest neutrality. Indifference we can never feel towards the affairs of Spain : and I earnestly hope and trust that she may come triumphantly out of the struggle." 1 It was the last phrase of this speech which astounded the diplomats of Europe. Brougham welcomed the new minister as uttering sentiments "which did him the highest honour, which will surprise and delight the country, and which will crown him with the ardent applause of the country: most heartily do I and all my friends pray for the success of the Spanish people in this war. . . . The Spaniards are to be punished because they wish to be free. I hope in God, however, they will succeed against their enemies. . . . Should the war end (as I sincerely hope it may) in the discomfiture of the Bourbons. . . they will perish amidst the delight of every man in Europe." When Canning spoke again on the 30th in a more moderate tone, saying "so long as it is honourable to remain pacific it is rash to become belligerent," Brougham went even further in his praise of Canning for denouncing the ' atrocious aggression of France.' These tributes and these exaggerations were an embarrassment to Canning, for they seemed to suggest a connection between his diplomacy and the extravagance of Brougham. The Ministry secured a great triumph, for on the 30th April, by a majority of 372 to 20, the Commons approved the policy of neutrality. "I wish," wrote Canning to his friend Bagot, you could have seen the ultrageous faces-ultra in either extreme-the first time I met them after the 30th April." Canning saw the ultrageous face' of Marcellus at the Opera on the 4th May. The latter reported Canning as saying: 2 "The Ministry owes to him [Canning] its preservation and its triumph by means of the system he had adopted for three months [i.e. since the news of the French King's speech on the 30th January], and into which he has brought Lord Liverpool. He has decided the crisis in favour of the Ministry and has 1 Italics my own. 1 A.A.E., 616. Marcellus to Chateaubriand, May 4/23. |