the British and their allies expected a few more victories would lay all France at their feet. But the tide of war turned. The British cause lost ground in France, and "American" neutrality developed great usefulness to England in her plan of attacking the French West Indies. She needed our provisions there. Making a virtue of necessity, she changed her hostile order, and Lord Grenville intimated to our Minister at London that he would gladly make a commercial treaty, such as some "evildisposed persons" in Congress were making a fuss about; saying in effect that he had modified the King's order partly out of sympathy for the good intentions of our Executive, and to help frustrate the designs of the aforesaid "evil-disposed per

The Jay Treaty was concluded 28th October, 1794, but not proclaimed and sent to the House, where measures for its execution required consideration, until 1st March, 1796. The Senate rejected its West India article, and the President, after considerable delay, reluctantly signed it, as the British kept on boarding our vessels, and impressing our seamen. The debate in the House was long and disagreeable. It required the Speaker's vote to settle different questions, and had the House but stood upon its constitutional rights, this wretched Treaty would never have been executed. It was a pitfall to be

avoided.

What Madison said of it. Mr. Madison took the Jay Treaty very much to heart. He had long argued to the House the importance of a commercial treaty with Great Britain, in the expectation that one could be made with fairness towards his country. While he made a very able speech in opposition to its adoption, the tide of sentiment was in its favor. The Treaty held out the hope of the British paying $5,000,000 for seized and confiscated vessels and cargoes, one consideration alone that was sufficient to control many votes. We extract as follows from Mr. Madison's speech:

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Thirdly. The commercial articles of the Treaty presented the third aspect under which he was to consider it. In the free intercourse stipulated between the United States and Great

1 Mr. Madison and his friends.

Britain, it would not be pretended that any advantage was gained by the former. A treaty was surely not necessary to induce Great Britain to receive our raw materials and to sell us her manufactures. On the other hand, consider what was given up by the United States.

"When the Government came into operation, it is well known that the American tonnage employed in the British trade bore the most inconsiderable proportion to the British tonnage. There being nothing on our side to counteract the influence of capital and other circumstances on the British side, that disproportion was the natural state of things. As some balance to the British advantages, and particularly that of her capital, our laws had made several regulations in favor of our shipping, among which was the important encouragement resulting from the difference of ten per cent. on the duties paid (on imports) by American and foreign vessels. Under this encouragement the American tonnage had increased in a very respectable proportion to the British tonnage. Nor has Great Britain ever deemed it prudent to attempt any countervailing measures for her shipping, well knowing that we could easily keep up the differences by further measures on our side.

"But by the Treaty, she has reserved to herself the right to take such countervailing measures against our existing regulations; and we have surrendered our rights to pursue further defensive measures against the influence of her capital. It is justly to be apprehended, therefore, that under such a restoration of the former state of things the American tonnage will relapse to its former disproportion to the British tonnage." The benefit of the Jay Treaty to British vessels in our trade is evident from statistics, as follows:

(5) BRITISH ARRIVALS OF TONNAGE AT AMERICAN PORTS.

The Weakness of Judge Jay. It was supposed Judge Jay was a man of nerve, as well as of learning, but in this he disappointed the country. Mr. Nicholas, of Va., in an able speech criticising the Treaty, said:

"It will not be understood that I suppose it was in Mr. Jay's power to make his own terms, but I complain of his treating at all on the terms he did. It is said that it was not in his power to extort what he wished, but I complain that he yielded to the extortion of Great Britain. What has he left her to ask, what has he not surrendered? While professing, as the Treaty does, that there were important points of our commerce left for future negotiation, why bind us to continue to Great Britain the fullest share of our commercial privileges? If the Treaty had been the most complete and satisfactory, would it not be necessary to leave something to enforce its execution? What weapons have we that can reach her? The Treaty makes war indispensable, as the only redress of injuries,1 and how will war from the United States reach Great Britain? It was certainly improper to give up all power of restricting her commerce until the same instrument contained the fullest satisfaction as to our own. It was improper to give up all the power of seizing on the debts of her subjects, for this, when the power of restricting her commerce was bartered for equal privileges, would be the only means of maintaining respect. . . . On the whole, having fully satisfied myself of the obligation to examine the operation of this Treaty, and to weigh well its effects before I give it my aid, I must determine that I scarcely see one interest of the United States promoted by it, while, on the other hand, it has established Great Britain in that dominant situation which she is too apt to make use of. All our powers are sacred trusts, and how it is possible for any gentleman who thinks the execution of this Treaty among them to give it his assent, is to me inconceivable."

British Preponderance Preconcerted. In a thorough manner Mr. Giles, of Va., took up and considered each of the many articles of the Treaty. Of the 10th he said:

1 This was well exemplified in a few years afterward. Entire freedom from this Treaty came with the war of 1812.

"This article also had assumed the resemblance of reciprocity; but no reciprocity in fact," — the British having much money and large investments in America, while the people here had only slight interests in England.

Of the 12th article he remarked:

"The 12th is the first of the commercial articles. This is suspended. It was intended to regulate the trade between the United States and the British West Indies; so far, therefore, as it permitted that trade to be carried on, it was intended as a concession to the United States; the rigid restrictions accompanying the concession, however, rendered it so paltry that the Senate rejected the concession, although the Envoy had accepted it. But in what situation has the rejection left the United States? They are now engaged in a commercial treaty with Great Britain, in which they have surrendered almost every commercial advantage they had to bestow, and are still wholly excluded from the West India trade. He had always understood that the West India trade was the great object of commercial negotiation with Great Britain, but now that is formally relinquished. It may be said, that further negotiations upon this subject are promised; but what inducement will Great Britain have to relax her colonial regulations, provided this Treaty should be carried into effect? She had already without this relaxation placed the commerce between the two countries precisely upon the footing she wished; and the United States have yielded every commercial advantage which might have been exchanged for that relaxation."

The British had it fixed by this article that American vessels "not being above the burthen of seventy tons" (or fifty of our present measurement) might trade to the West Indies and return,

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landing their cargoes in the United States only." The limitation of size in our vessels was intended as a handicap for the protection of British ships, which were generally three or more times the tonnage named, and therefore able to carry cheaper than craft so much smaller. Under this restriction the little trade and transportation that we might secure would not hurt the British shipping interest, while, possibly, it might silence the complaints of our own. Again we were to "prohibit and

restrain the carrying any molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton in American vessels, either from His Majesty's islands or from the United States to any part of the world except the United States." This article was to be in force, not simply twelve years, like the other commercial articles, but during the war against the French, and for two years beyond the signing of articles of peace a period of twenty-two years. Verily, the Jay Treaty deserved denunciation.1

"The 13th article contained regulations for the East India trade. This has been held up as an apology for the commercial defects of the Treaty, and as securing to the United States a right which before was a courtesy (on the part of the Governor of India). He believed this was a better security than a treaty right, being founded on the interest of the parties. But the prohibition of the exportation of East India articles to Europe in American bottoms is a restriction that does not now exist.

...

"The 15th article is highly objectionable it authorizes Great Britain to equalize duties, etc. There is no real equivalent in it. We take one third of the surplus manufactures of Great Britain. On this ground the discrimination in favor of American over British bottoms has been built, and the growth of American shipping has very considerably increased in consequence of this policy. Our experience, therefore, is bartered away without even the probable calculation of countervailing advantage. ... It is remarkable, from the whole complexion of the Treaty, that the advantages gained by Great Britain consist in restrictions imposed upon the United States, as if her object was to restrain the United States in the exercise of their rights of sovereignty."

"The twenty-third article was that in which he expected to have found some provisions for the protection of American seamen against British impressments; instead of this humane and salutary provision, he found that the officers and crews of those

1 As to consequences of the rejection of Article XII., Macgregor says: "In respect to American trade with the West Indies, the ports of the latter were open to United States' vessels on the payment of differential duties, from 1795 to 1807."