in nature for it is acknowledged by all, that fenfation must go before memory and imagination; and hence it neceffary follows, that apprehenfion accompanied with belief and knowledge, muft go before fimple apprehenfion, at least in the matters we are now fpeaking of. So that here, instead of faying, that the belief or knowledge, is got by putting together and comparing the fimple apprehenfion, we ought rather to fay, that the fimple apprehenfion is performed by refolving and analyfing a natural and original judgment. And it is with the operations of the mind, in this cafe, as with natural bodies, which are indeed compounded of fimple principles or elements. Nature does not exhibit thefe elements feparate, to be compounded by us; the exhibits them mixed and compounded in concrete bo, dies, and it is only by art and chymical analyfis that they can be feparated.' Here Dr. Reid takes it for granted, that fenfation implies in it, both belief, and knowledge, and judgment.* 6 It appears to be an undeniable fact, that from thought or fenfation, all mankind conftantly and invariably, from the first dawning of reflection do infer a power or faculty of thinking, and a permanent being or mind to which that faculty belongs; and that we as invariably afcribe all the various kinds of fenfation and thought we are confcious of, to one individual mind itfelf. But by what rules of logic it is, that we make thefe inferences it is impoffible to flew. What fhall we fay then? either thofe inferences which we draw from our fenfations, namely, the existence of a mind, and of powers or faculties belonging to it are prejudices of philofophy or education, mere fictions of the mind, which a wife man should throw off as he does the belief of fairies; or they are judgments of nature, judgments not got by comparing ideas, and perceiving agreements and difagreements, but immediately infpired by our conftitution. The manner in which thefe judgments of nature are infpired, the author endeavours to exprefs by the word fuggeftion. He thinks that there are many natural fuggeftions, particularly that fenfation fuggefts the notion of prefent exiftence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does now exift; that memory fugests the notion of past exiftence, and the belief that what we remember did exift in time paft; and that our fenfations and thoughts do alfo fuggeft the notion of a mind, and the belief of its exiftence, and of its relation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is, that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, fuggefts to us the notion of a caufe, and compels our belief of its exiftence. And in like manner, as fhall be fhewn when we come to the fenfe of touch, certain fenfations of touch, by the conflitution of our nature, fuggeft to us extenfion, folidity, and motion, which are newife like to fenfations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them.‡ * See his inquiry into the human mind, on the principles of common fenfe, the fecond Edition, p. 35. See Reid's Inquiry, p. 48. The The perception of an object implies both a conception of its form, and a belief of its prefent Existence. I know, moreover, that this belief is not the effect of argumentation and reasoning, it is the immediate effect of my conftitution.* We agree with the author of the treatife on human nature in this, that our belief of the continuance of nature's laws, is not derived from reafon. It is an inftinctive prefcience of the operations of nature.'+ 66 But in the publication before us, and which has led us to a retrofpect of Dr. Reid's leading principles in the philofophy of the mind, he has given a very copious and distinct account of what he takes to be the nature, extent, dominion, and prerogatives of judgment. The definition commonly given of judgment by the more ancient writers in logic, was, that it is an act of the mind, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another. This, Dr. Reid thinks, as good a definition of it as can be given." The word judgment he thinks, may be borrowed from the practice of tribunals. As a judge after taking the proper evidence, paffes fentence, in a caufe, and that fentence is called his judgment; fo the mind, with regard to whatever is true or falfe, paffes fentence, or determines according to the evidence that appears. "Judgment he confiders as an act of the mind fpecifically different from fimple apprehenfion, or the bare conception of a thing for though, there can be no judgment without at conception of the things about which we judge; yet conception may be without any judgment.-Secondly, there are notions or ideas, that ought to be referred to the faculty of judgment as their fource; because if we had not that faculty, they could not enter into our minds. Among these we may reckon, according to our author, the notion of judgment itfelf; the notions of a propofition, of its fubject, predicate, and copula; of affirmation and negation, true and false, of knowledge, belief, difbelief, opinion, affent, evidence, the relations of things. Thirdly, Dr. Reid is af opinion, that in perfons come to the years of understanding, judgment neceffarily accom panies all fenfation, perception by the fenfes, consciousness and memory, but not conception. The man, fays he, who perceives an object, believes that it exifts, and is what he diftin&tly perceives it to be, nor is it in his power to avoid, fuch judgment. And the like may be faid of memory and confcioufnels. Whether judgment ought to be called a ne-/ ceffary concomitant of thofe operations, or rather a part or ingredient of them, he does not difpute, but thinks it certain *Reid's Inquiry, p. 290. Reid's Inquiry, p. 346. N 3 that that all of them are accompanied with a determination, tha fomething is true or falfe, and a confequent belief. If this determination be not judgment, it is an operation that has got no name, for it is not fimple apprenenfion, neither is it reafoning; it is a mental affirmation or negation, it may be expreffed by a propofition, affirmative or negative, and it is accompanied with the firmeft belief-He afterwards expreffes his idea of judgment, fummarily thus, That I may avoid difputes about the meaning of words, I with the reader to understand, that I give the name of judgment to every deter mination of the mind, concerning what is true and what is falfe." The judgments we form are either neceffary, as, that three times three make nine, or of things contingent, which muft always reft upon fome other operation of the mind, than pure conception, fuch as fenfe, memory, confcioufnefs.He thinks, that although abstract notions, after they have been formed, may be barely conceived without any exercife of judgment about them, yet that fome exercife of judgment is neceffary in their formation, and in general, that without fome degree of judgment, we can form no accurate and diftinct notions of things, For what cur author affirms on this fubject, he limits to diftinct conception, and fome degree of judgment. There are notions of the objects of fenfe, which are grofs and indiftinct, and there are others that are diftin&t and scientific. The former, Dr. Reid thinks may be got from the fenfes alone, but that the latter cannot be ob tained without fome degree of judgment. There are two ways in which we get the notion of relations, by means of judgment. The firft is, by comparing the related objects, when we have before had the conception of both. By this comparifon, according to Dr. Reid, we perceive the relation either immediately, or by a procefs of reasoning. That my foot is longer than my finger, I perceive immediately, and that three is the half of fix. This immediate perception, is immediate and intuitive judgment. That the angles at the bafe of an ifofceles triangle are equal, is perceived by a procefs of reasoning, in which it will be acknowledged there is judgment. Another way, in which we get the notion of relations, according to Dr. Reid, is, when by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or judge that it must, from its nature have a certain relation to fomething else, which before perhaps we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain relation between them. Thus when we attend. to colour, figure, weight, we cannot help judging thefe to be qualities which cannot exift without a fubject; fubject; that is, fomething which is coloured, figured, heavy. Dr. Reid, who ufhered his doctrines into the world by his inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common fenfe, explains the meaning of the terms common fenfe, and fhews that fenfe, in its moft common and there. fore its moft proper meaning, fignifies judgment. "We af cribe," fays he, to reafon two offices or two degrees. The firft is to judge of things felf-evident; the fecond, is to draw conclufions that are not felf-evident, from those that are." The first of these is the province of common fenfe, which therefore, according to Dr. Reid, coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch, or one degree of reason.... Mr. Lock having declared it to be the refult of his reafoning on the subject of knowledge, that "knowledge feemed to him, to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or difagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas," and that "in this alone it confifts." Dr. Reid confiders this, as a very important point, not only on its own account, but on account of its neceffary connection with Mr. Lock's fyftem, which is fuch, as that both must ftand or fall together: for if there is any part, fays he, of human knowledge which does not confift in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of ideas, it must follow, that there are objects of thought and of contemplation which are not ideas. That neceffary or abftra&t truths are perceived by the agreement or difagreement of ideas, Dr. Reid feems not unwilling to allow, rather than pofitively and explicitely to affirm. But, he obferves, that there is another great clafs of truths, which are not abftract and neceffary, and therefore, cannot be perceived by the agreements and difagreements of ideas. Thefe are, all the truths we know concerning the real existence of things; the truth of our own existence; of the existence of other things, inanimate, animal and rational, and of their various attributes and relations. These truths may be called contingent truths. Our author, here excepts only the existence and attributes of the fupreme Being, which is the only neceffary existence he knows regard ing existence. And he concludes, that fince knowledge can be attained of things which are not' ideas, knowledge is a perception of agreements and difagreements, not of ideas, but of things that are not ideas. One of the most important diftinctions of our judgments, fays Dr. Reid, is, that fome of them are intuitive, others grounded on argument. He puts the queftion whether there N 4 be be no mark or criterion, whereby first principles or intuitive judgments that are really fuch, may be diftinguished from thofe that affume the character without a juft title; on these matters he offers the following propofitions, declaring his. readiness to change his opinion upon conviction. First, he holds it to be certain and even demonftrable, that all knowledge got by reafoning must be built upon first principles. Secondly, that fome firft principles yield conclufions that are certain, others, fuch as are probable, in various degrees, from the higheft probability to the loweft. Thirdly, that it would contribute greatly to the stability of human knowledge, and confequently to the improvement of it, if the first principles upon which the various operations of it are grounded, were pointed out and afcertained. Fourthly, that nature hath not left us deftitute of means whereby the candid and honeft part of mankind, may be brought to unanimity when they differ about first principles. For in the first place, in fuch controverfies, every man is a competent judge; and in the fecond we may obferve, that opinions which contradict firft principles are diftinguifhed from other errors by this; that they are not only falfe but abfurd; and thirdly, it may be obferved, that although it be contrary to the nature of first principles, to admit of direct or apodictical proof; yet there are certain ways of reafoning even about them, by which thofe that are juft and folid may be confirmed, and thofe that are falfe may be detected. For example, it is a good argument ad hominem, if it can be fhewn that a firft principle which a man rejects, ftands upon the same footing with others which he admits. Thus the faculties of confcioufnefs, of memory, of external fenfe, and of reafon, are all equally the gifts of nature: and no good reason can be affigned for receiving the teftimony of one of them which is not of equal force with regard to the others.-Our author goes on to enumerate the firft principles, or intuitive judgments, from which we may reafon concerning contingent truths. Thefe be refolves.immediately into the conftitution of our nature, places them on a footing with natural inftincts, and confiders the evidence of fuch principles as refembling light, which, at the fame time, that it difcovers ALL VISIBLE OBJECTS, difcovers alfo ITSELF. Concerning most of the principles of neceffary truths, there has been no difpute. Dr. Reid makes fome remarks on thefe, of which the truth has been called in question. Thefe remarks, are in the fame fpirit with the leading principles of Dr. Reid's philofophy, of which we have given a general account collected from the whole of his writings, as our bounds do not permit us to enter into an accurate and |