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in nature : for it is acknowledged by all, that sensation must go before memory and imagination; and hence it necessary follow's, that apprehension accompanied with belief and knowledge, must go betore timple apprehension, at least in the matters we are now speaking of. So that here, instead of saying, that the belief or knowledge, is got by putting together and comparing the fimple apprehention, we ought rather to say, that the timple apprehennon is performed by refolving and analysing a natural and original judgment. And it is with the operations of the inind, in this cate, as with natural bodies, which are indeed compounded of simple principles or elements. Nature does not exhibit these elements separate, to be compounded by us ; the exhibits them mixed and compounded in concrete bodies, and it is only by art and chymical analysis that they can be separated.'
Here Dr. Reid takes it for granted, that sensation implies in it, both belief, and knowledge, and judgment.*
• It appears to be an undeniable fact, that from thought or sene fation, all mankind constantly and invariably, from the firit dawning of reflection do infer a power or faculty of thinking, and a permanent being or mind to which that faculty belongs; and that we as invariably ascribe all the various kinds of iensation and thought we are conscious of, to one individual mind itself. But by what rules of logic it is, that we make these inferences it is impossible to flew. What shall we say then either those inferences which we draw froin our sensations, namely, the existence of a mind, and of powers or faculties belonging to it are prejudices of philofophy or education, mere fictions of the mind, which wife man should throw off as he does the belief of fairies; or they are judgments of nature, judgments not got by comparing Kleas, and perceiving agreements and disagreements, but immediately inspired by our constitutiont.
• The inanner in which these judgments of nature are inspired, the author endeavours to express by the word suggestion. He thinks that there are many natural suggestions, particularly that sensation suggests the notion of prefent existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does now exist; that memory sugests the notion, of pait existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our sensations and thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind, and the belief of its exiitence, and of its retation to our thoughts. By a like natural principle it is, that a beginning of existence, or any change in nature, suggests to us the notion of a cause, and compels our belief of its exiitence. And in-like manner, as Niall be sewn when we come to the sense of touch, certain sen., lations of touch, by the constitution of our nature, suggest to us extension, folidity, and motion, which are ncwife like to sensations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them.
* See his inquiry into the human mind, on the principles of common sense, the second Edition, p. 35, * See Reid's Inquiry, p. 48.
See Reid's Inquiry, p. 50.
* The perception of an object implies both a conception of its form, and a belief of its present Existence. I know, moreover, that this belief is not the effect of argumentation and reasoning, it is the immediate effect of my conftitution.*
We agree with the author of the treatise on human nature in this, that our belief of the continuance of nature's laws, is not derived from reason. It is an instinctive pretuience of the operations of nature.' along
But in the publication before us, and which has led us to a retrospect of Dr. Reid's leading principles in the philosophy of the mind, he has given a very copious and distinct account of what he takes to be the nature, extent, dominion, and prerogatives of judgment. The definition commonly given of judgment by the more ancient writers in logic, was, that it is an act of the mind, wherchy one thing is affirmed or denied of another. This, Dr. Reid thinks, as good a definition of it as can be given." The word judginent he thinks, may be borrowed from the practice of tribunals. As a judge after taking the proper evidence, países sentence, in a caule, and that sentence is called his judgment; so the mind, with regard to whatever is true or falle, passes fentence, or determines according to the evidence that appears.
Judgment he considers as an act of the mind specifically different from simple apprehension, or the bare conception of a thing: for though, there can be no judgment without a conception of the things about which we judge; yet conception may be without any judgment.--Secondly, there are notions or ideas, that ought to be referred to the faculty of judgment as their source; because if we had not that faculty, they could not enter into our minds. Among these we may reckon, according to our author, the notion of judgment itself; the notions of a proposition, of its subject, predicate, and copula ; of affirmation and negation, true and false, of knowledge, belief, disbelief, opinion, affent, evidence, the relations of things.
Thirdly, Dr. Reid is af opinion, that in persons come to the years of understanding, judginent necessarily accompanies all sensation, perception by the senses, consciousness and memory, but not conceptioni : The man, says be, who perceives an object, believes that it exists, and is what he diftinétly perceives it to be, nor is it in his power to avoid such judgment. And the like may be said of memory and consciousneis. Whether judgment ought to be called a ne-: ceffary concomitant of thofe operations, or rather a part or ; ingredient of them, he does not dispute, but thinks it certain
that all of them are accompanied with a determination, tha fomething is true or false, and a consequent belief. If this determination be not judgment, it is an operation that has got no name, for it is not fimple apprenention, neither is it reasoning; it is a mental affirmation or negation, it may be expressed by a proposition, affirmative or negative, and it is accompanied with the firmeft beliet-He afterwards expresses his idea of judgment, fummarily thus, “ That I may avoid disputes about the meaning of words, I with the reader to understand, that I give the name of judgment to every determination of the mind, concerning what is true and what is false.”
The judgments we form are either necessary, as, that three times three make nine, or of things contingent, which must always reft upon some other operation of the mind, than pure conception, such as fense, memory, consciousness.-He thinks, that although abstract notions, after they have been formed, may be barely conceived without any exercise of judgment about them, yet that some exercise of judgment is necessary in their formation, and in general, that without some degree of judgment, we can form no accurate and dis tinet notions of things, For what cur author affirms on this subject, he limits. to distinct conception, and some degree of judgment. There are notions of the objects of sense, which are gross and indiftinct, and there are others that are diftin&t and scientific. The former, Dr. Reid thinks may be got from the senses alone, but that the latter can not be ob.. tained without some degree of judgment. There are two ways in which we get the notion of relations, by means of judgment. The first is, by comparing the related objects, when we have before had the conception of both. By this comparison, according to Dr. Reid, we perceive the relation either immediately, or by a process of reasoning. That my foot is longer than my finger, 1 perceive immediately, and that three is the half of fix. This immediate perception, is immediate and intuitive judgment. That the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, is perceived by a process of reasoning, in which it will be acknowledged there is judgment. Another way, in which we get the notion of relations, according to Dr. Reid, is, when by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or judge that it must, from its nature have a certain relation to something else, which before perhaps we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain relation between them. Thus when we attend to colour, figure, weight, we cannot help judging these to be qualities which cannot exist withoutą
fubje&t; fubiject; that is, something which is coloured, figured, heavy.
Dr. Reid, wlio ushered his doctrines into the world by his inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense, explains the meaning of the terms common fense, and shews that fenfe, in its inoft coinmon' and there, fore its most proper meaning, fignifies judgment. " We af: cribe,” says he, "to reafon two offices or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the fecond, is to draw conclusions that are not self-evident, from those that are." The first of these is the province of common senfe, which therefore, according to Dr. Reid, coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only. another name for one branch, or one degree of reason.
Mr. Lock having declared it to be the result of his reason. ing on the subject of knowledge, that " knowledge seemed to him; to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas," and that “ in this alone it confifts.” Dr. Reid considers this, as a very important point, not only on its own account, but on account of its necessary connection with Mr. Lock's system, which is such, as that both must ftand or fall together : for if there is any part, says he, of human knowledge which does not confiit in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, it must follow, that there are objects of thought and of contemplation which are not ideas.
That neceffary' or abstract truths are perceived by the agreement or disagreement of ideas, Dr. Reid seems not unwilling to allow, ratlier than pofitively and explicitely to affirm. But, be obferves, that there is another great class of truths, which are not abstract and necessary, and therefore, cannot be perceived by the agreements and disagreements of ideas. These are, all the truths we know concerning the real existence of things; the truth of our own existence ; of the existence of other things, inanimate, animal and rational, and of their various attributes and relations. These truths may be called contingent truths. Our author, here excepts only the existence and attributes of the supreme Being, which is the only necessary existence he knows regard ing exiftence. And he concludes, that since knowledge can be attained of things which are not ideas, knowledge is a perception of agreements and difagreements, not of ideas, but of things that are not ideas?
One of the most important distinctions of our judgments, says Dr. Reidz.is, that some of them are intuitive, others grounded on argument. He puts the question whether there
be no mark or criterion, whereby first principles or intuitive judgments that are really fuch, may be distinguished from those that assume the character without a just title; on these matters he offers the following propositions, declaring his readiness to change his opinion upon conviction. First, he holds it to be certain and even demonstrable, that all knowledge got by. reasoning must be built upon first principles. Secondly, that some first principles yield conclusions that are certain, others, such as are probable, in various degrees, from the highett probability to the lowest. Thirdly, that it would contribute greatly to the stability of human knowledge, and consequently to the improvement of it, if the first principles upon which the various operations of it are grounded, were pointed out and ascertained. Fourthly, that nature hath not left us deftitute of means whereby the candid and honest part of mankind, may be brought to unanimity when they differ about first principles. For in the first place, in such controversies, every man is a competent judge ;' and in the second we may observe, that opinions which contradi&t first principles are distinguished from other errors by this ; that they are not only false but abfurd; and thirdly, it may be observed, that although it be contrary to the nature of first principles, to admit of direct or apodictical proof; yet there are certain ways of reasoning even about them, by which those that are just and solid may be confirm. ed, and those that are falie may be detected. For example, it is a good argument ad hominem, if it can be shewn that a first principle which a man rejects, stands upon the same footing with others which he admits. Thus the faculties of consciousness, of memory, of external sense, and of reason, are all equally the gifts of nature : and no good reason can be affigned for receiving the testimony of one of them which is not of equal force with regard to the others. Our author goes on to enumerate the first principles, or intuitive judgments, from which we may reason concerning contingent truths. These he refolves.immediately into the conftitution of our nature, places them on a footing with natural instincts, and considers the evidence of fuch principles as resembling light, which, at the same time, that it discovers ALL VISIBLE OBJECTS, discovers also ITSELF.
Concerning most of the principles of neceffary truths, there has been no dispute. Dr. Reid makes fome remarks on thcle, of which the truth has been called in question. These remarks, are in the same spirit with the leading principles of Dr. Reid's philosophy, of which we have given a general account collected from the whole of his writings, as our bounds do not permitrus to enter into an accurate and