All that proves the materiality of the mind, all that proves that however fpiritualized, it is yet but fpirit, or ether, or any fub tiller fubftance, if there is any, is in direct oppofition to Dr. Reid's theory. And therefore we think it of importance to obferve.

Thirdly, That Dr. Reid's philofophy neceffarily presup pofes the immateriality of the foul. This is indeed the great foundation of a theory which raises the mind at once above all the laws of matter, all the natural conceptions of men who feel nothing within them not clothed, however lightly, in bodily form, and the univerfal concurrence of all philofo phers before the prefent day. It is on this principle that Dr Reid afcribes fuch omnipotency to the mind, as to grafp and comprehend objects as they really are in their intimate na ture and effence, without the intervention of contact or preffure of any kind: and to determine itself, in its choice of ob jects and courfe of conduct freely, without preponderancy of motive, and by its own internal divine energy.. Here too, we obferve that Dr. Reid who reafons on the principles of common sense, flies in the face of that tribunal to which he ap peals. For can any thing appear more shockingly abfurd to the eye of common fenfe, than to affirm that the mind may exift though it exifts no where? and that the ubi the category of space has nothing to do with fpiritual exiftence? Does not the conftitution of nature lead us to believe that nothing exifts that is immaterial? Do we not then oppofe this dictate of nature when we affirm that a principle exifts in its nature and operations not fubject to the laws of matter? and, with regard to the fenfe of liberty, is it not an axiom that every action must have a motive, and every effect a caufe? We thus find Dr. Reid adopting or departing from the principles of common fenfe, according as his adherence or departure: fuits his purpose. On this fubject it is proper to be more particular; and to illuftrate ftill farther the inconfiftency of our moft learned and acute profeffor.

The doctor among his firft principles of contingent truths, principles which he places on an equal footing of clearness and certainty with the most felf-evident metaphpfical mathematical axiom, reckons a "fenfe of liberty."" Another first principle, I think is, that we have fome degree of power over our actions, and the determinations of our will-it is not more evident that mankind have a conviction of the exiftence of a material world, than that they have the convic tion of fome degree of power in themselves and others; every one over his own actions, and the determinations of his will." [See Effay VI.] This axiom is thus opposed to the axiom that every effect must have a caufe-Here we fee that the deci

fions of common fenfe, if this be one of them, are fometimes fallacious. Another first principle Dr. Reid takes to be, "that certain features of the countenance, founds of the "voice, and geftures of the body, indicate certain thoughts " and difpofitions of the mind."-And another first principle appears to him to be "that there is a certain regard due to human teftimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion"-Is it not poffible then to give any kind of analyfis of the lan-' guage of natural figns? or of our pronefs to give credit to teftimony? Dr. Reid might as well affirm that there is a natural and neceffary connexion between the fight or appearance of a lizard or toad, or other loathfome or noxious animal, and our abhorrence of them. Yet there are men, and nations of men, that ftroak and carefs toads and lizards, and think them very beautiful creatures. Undoubtedly, were fmiles uniformly accompanied or followed by mifchief, and frowns accompanied or followed as uniformly by acts of tenderness and beneficence, the child would foon learn, what indeed in advanced years he has fome reason to do, to put more trust in the latter than the former. But if there be a natural dif-` pofition in mankind to be foothed and pleased by fmiles and foft tones; and to be difcompofed and alarmed, at frowns," and harsh founds, and threatening geftures: that difpofition' may be accounted for by the connexion that we perceive between certain inward feelings and paffions in ourfelves, and our countenance, voice, and geftures. Being confcious of this connection in ourselves, we naturally fuppofe, that fuch a connection alfo takes place in others.-A like account can also be given of our proneness to give credit to human teftimony. The author of our nature has implanted in us a difpofition to exprefs fincerely every emotion and paffion of our mind, and by expreffing them to invite the fympathy of our fellow-men whether to enliven or to foothe and allay our feelings. Confcious of this difpofition in ourselves we readily transfer it to others. Therefore thefe two laft mentioned firft principles of Dr. Reid's are not in reality first principles, but are clearly refolvable into principles more general.Did our bounds permit, we might analize in like manner, many more of Dr. Reid's firft principles. On the whole it appears to us, that Dr. Reid's fondness for firft principles has led him to extend the province of what he calls intuitive judg ment very widely over the province of reafoning in a train, and the habitual affociation of ideas. And alfo, that some of his first principles are fallacious, and inconfiftent with each other. Dr. Reid very juftly observes" that opinions which

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contra

contradict first principles are diftinguished from other errors by this; that they are not only falfe, but abfurd: And that, to discountenance abfurdity, nature hath given us a particu-. lar emotion, to wit, that of ridicule." Now we appeal to our readers, and to our author himself, whether, among his firft principles in general, his firft principles of contingent, and his first principles of neceffary truth, there are not any, whether there, be not a great number, nay, whether the most of them are not of fuch a nature that their contraries can be conceived without the least emotion of ridicule.-By thus developing, and extending, and exemplifying his principles of common fenfe or intuitive judgment, which he makes fynonimous, the Doctor has greatly weakened our reverence for their authority. For when we have discovered their ufurpation in fome inftances, we are led to fufpect it in others. But it, is reafonable, to check this prejudice, and to examine whether intuitive judgment, or common fenfe, fuggefts any thing, or accounts for any thing, or confirms any thing concerning which the philofophical world was before perplexed or at a lofs.

And, here we obferve fourthly, that Dr. Reid's general theory of intuitive judgment and common fenfe, does not appear to us to fuggeft any thing, or to account for any thing, or to confirm any thing concerning which the philofophical world was before perplexed and at a lofs. And as this is the grand question concerning Dr. Reid's philofophy, we fhall enter into it as much as the limits of this monthly publication will admit.

Mr. Hume, to all our perceptions, and fenfations, gives the name of impreffions, whether we touch, taste, fmell, hear, fee, love, or hate, or defire, or will. These perceptions and fenfations when we recall them to remembrance, and make them objects of reflexion after they are past, Mr. Hume call thoughts or ideas. The whole materials or fur. niture of the mind may be reduced to perceptions or fenfations, thoughts or ideas; and the common origin of both is impreffion. Dr. Reid infifts that befides this impreffion, befides the perception of objects, the mind perceives, knows, judges, and is fenfible of their permanent existence: that our perceptions fuggeft fome fubftratum in which the qualities perceived, inhere, and exift. Now, it appears to us, that all this belief of a fubftratum and permanent exiftence of objects, is nothing more than what is implied or comprehended by Mr Hume in impreffions and perceptions. In the vivid conception of objects, whether introduced to the mind in the way of impreffions or ideas, there is implied a belief of their exiftence. That belief Dr. Reid calls a dictate of common,

Tenfe,

fenfe, a judgment of nature. Be it fo, be it a dictate of common fenfe, and a judgment of nature, it is a part of what. Mr. Hume calls perception: perception is the foundation on which it refts and a new name, is not a new difcovery. But, this belief, Dr. Reid affirms we ought not to reject, but to reft in the judgment of nature as fatisfactory and final, Mr. Hume and all men acknowledge this difpofition, or, if you will, judgment of nature, (for what fignifies it to dispute about words) to be fo fatisfactory that he cannot reject it, while the impreffion or perception on which it is involved is prefent to the mind and lafts. But when no fuch perception is, prefent, where is the object? Where it was before, replies, Dr. Reid. True, I believe its existence while by this difpute I recall it to my mind, or by any other principle of affociation; for then I have an idea of it: and a temporary, conception implies a temporary belief of an object. But be-. fides this vivid conception, impreffed by perception, recalled by fome affociation, or anticipated by a customary transition from one object to another, I know not any foundation of belief." By an original principle of our conftitution," faysDr. Reid in his inquiry, a certain fenfation of touch both, fuggefts to the mind the conception of hardness, and creates the belief of it," Mr. Hume includes belief in the conception of hardnefs. Dr. Reid only varies and prolongs the phrafeology, when he affirms that this fenfation both fug-. gefts to the mind the conception of hardness, and creates the belief of it. The Doctor on this occafion, and in other parts of his writings, talks myfteriously of natural figns and connections between the fign and the thing fignified, which he confiders as the interpretation of nature, and feems to place the fuggeftions of our fenfes on the fame footing with the natural expreffion of countenance, voice, and gefture, of which we. have faid fomethings above: in this there appears to be nothing but what is involved in darkness, myftery, or obscurity.

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That Dr. Reid has not in fact made any difcovery, he himself acknowledges when he fays, All reafoning must be from firft principles; and for first principles no other rea.. "fon can be given but this, that by the conftitution of our nature we are under the neceffity of affenting to them.' Dr. Reid cuts fhort all reasoning, even on fubjects that admit of reafoning by telling you, when your curiofity is excited by any queftion concerning the procefs of the mind in thinking, fuch is the conftitution of your nature." And where no other anfwer can really be given, the doctor of divinity afferts nothing more than is allowed by the fceptic.

But

But Dr. Reid infifts that "our fenfès give us a direct and diftinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves: whereas, of the fecondary qualities, our fenfes give us only a relative and obfcure notion. They inform us only, that they are qualities that affect us in a certain manner, that is, produce in us a certain fenfation; but, as to what they are in themselves, our fenfes leave us in the dark." Let us attend clofely to the information that our fenfes gives us concerning primary qualities. The primary qualities of body are extenfion, divifibility, figure, motion, folidity, hardness, foftnefs, and fluidity.-Now, fays Dr. Reid, "The folidity of a body means no more but that it excludes other bodies from occupying the fame place at the fame time-hardness, softness, and fluidity are different degrees of cohesion in the parts of a body-it is evident, therefore, that of the primary qualities we have a clear and diftinct notion; we know what they are, though we may be ignorant of their caufes." Solidity then is the caufe why any body or fubftance maintains exclufive poffeffion of a particular fpace: and fecondary qualities are conceived as the "unknown caufes or occafions of certain fenfations with which we are well acquainted." But is folidity a caufe better known than any fecondary quality? It is known by its property or effect of exclufively poffeffing a certain portion of space for a certain time, which definition implies in it nothing but relative ideas, and therefore the aggregate of all thefe ideas of "effect, exclufive poffeffion or occupation, fpace, time," the aggregate of all thefe ideas is itfelf relative. Primary qualities therefore are not more directly and diftinctly conceived as caufes, than fecondary qualities. And it is only as caufes that Dr. Reid pretends to penetrate them. He judges of them only by their effects to excite different ideas of different relations in the mind. "The folidity of a body means no more, but that it excludes other bodies from occupying the fame place at the fame time. Hardness, foftnefs, and fluidity are different degrees of cohesion in the parts of a body." We fubmit this definition to be attended to, and analized into its component parts by our readers. By a farther multiplication of words, we might render our meaning more obfcure which is, fhortly this, that primary qualities, like fecondary qualities, are just what they are conceived to be, and no more.

We therefore go on to obferve, fifthly, that while Dr. Reid explains the primary quality of folidity by its relation to fpace; the notion of fpace itfelf is originally obtained by the primary qualities of matter themfelves, folidity and extenfion. Therefore this manner of

reafoning