"ment of ftrokes, and the too frequently cold and affected clearness * "of the graver, were the great effentials of hiftorical engraving, gave "worth to his works by a bold mixture of free hatchings and dots, "placed together apparently without order, but with an inimitable> degree of tafte; and has left to pofterity most admirable examples "of the ftyle, in which grand compofitions ought to be treated. "His greatest works, which have not a very flattering appearance

66

to the ignorant eye, are the admiration of true connoitieurs, and 66 perfons of fine tafte. He acquired the most profound knowledge "of the art by the constant attention and study, which he bettowed 66 upon the fcience of defign, and the frequent ufe he made of "painting from nature. This great man always knew how to pene"trate into the genius of the painter he copied from; often improved 66 upon, and fometimes even furpaffed him." Thus far my author who then adds the following affertion: "without exception, he 66 was the most celebrated engraver, that ever existed in the historical "line. We have, fays he, feveral fubjects, which he engraved "from his own defigns, that manifefted as much taste, as character "and facility. But, in the battles of Alexander, he furpaffed even "the expectations of Le Brun himself."

We have only to add, that our author concludes these lives, as well as thofe of all the other artifts, with an account of their manner of engraving, and a lift of their moft confiderable works.

Prefixed to this volume is " an Effay on the Art of En graving," divided into feven chapters. In the 1ft, the author treats of the excellency of the art, of the qualities requifite for an engraver, of the different modes of engraving; to which are added what Mr. Strutt calls, "fome obfervations "concerning the criticifins upon prints," but which may be termed more properly rules for judging of the merit of engravings. Thefe we fhall lay before the public, as they may be of use to fuch as wish to become collectors.

In criticising upon prints, the following obfervations may not be unworthy of notice, fo far, at least, as they have any tendency to prevent an over-hafty decifion with refpect to their merit; for certainly no artist is fo liable to accidents, which may lead the unwary to misjudge of his works, as the engraver. His plates may be badly printed: copies may be impofed upon the collector for originals; and retouched impreffions of no value may be fold for genuine. Neither are thefe all the difadvantageous circumstances, which fhould come under our confideration. The works of the artist himself may be unequal, especially when they are exceedingly numerous. In this cafe, it is abfolutely neceffary for the collector to fee all, or the greater part of the engravings by fuch a master, or perhaps a prejudicial judgment may be formed from his wort prints, while the most excellent remain unfeen.

The works of all the old masters lie under thefe manifest difadvantages; but none more particularly fe, than thofe known by the name of little mafters, who are chiefly German artists, and diftinguished

diffinguifhed by the epithet of little, from the diminutivenefs of their works. Their plates, whilst in good condition, have often been badly printed; but the impreffions moft generally met with, are fuch, as are fpoiled by retouching, fo as not to retain the leaft fhadow of that excellence, which distinguishes the print in its ori ginal state.

For thefe caufes I conceive, no decided opinion ought to be formed of the works of an engraver, in general, and of the old mafters, in particular, till a number of their prints, and thofe too, fine impreffions, have been carefully examined. If these rules were candidly attended to, I am fure the latter would stand much higher in the public estimation, than they do at prefent.

Prints, if they be original works, may be confidered as beautiful, I. With respect to the drawing, the spirit of the compofition, or the management of the claire-obfcure, exclufive of the mecha nical part of the execution; and of this fpecies are the painter's etchings; or II. Principally for the excellence of the mechanical part of the engraving, as in the works of Wierix, Beham, and others of the German school efpecially; or III. For the correctness of defign, and freedom of execution, as in thofe of Henry Goltzius and his contemporaries: or IV. For the beauty of the finifling; and V. When they are copies from the paintings of others, the more ftriking resemblance they bear to the originals, from which they are taken. And no prints ought abfolutely to be thrown afide, if they excel in any one of these particular beauties, however they may be deficient in another. For want of this difcrimination, we too frequently fee many of the most valuable works of the old mafters, and etchings of the finest painters, paffed over with contempt by the unfkilful, when nothing can be more certain, than that the etchings of Guido, and other great artists, are as excellent in their way, as the moft highly finifhed and striking engravings of Edelink, Nanteuil, or Poilly.'

The 2d. chap. "treats of the antiquity of the art of engraving, and by whom it appears to have been first prac"tifed." Here the art is traced up to Tubal Cain, and various inftances from scripture are given of its being known to the Jews. This fhort chapter may perhaps please the antiquarian, but will give no fatisfaction either to the artist or connoiffeur.

In chap. 3d." the remains of antiquity are confidered

the military accoutrements of the barbarous nations orna"mented with engravings-an Egyptian figure of Ifis de"fcribed the defcription of the Etrufcan Patera and Para"zonium-the ftyle of engraving among the Anglo-Saxons "the brass plates on tomb ftones of ancient date-variety "of religious and domeftic ornaments executed with the " engraver."-This too is a chapter for the antiquarian. The contents of the 4th chap. are, the firft difcovery of producing impreffions from engraved plates confidered;

X 4

"and

4

"and the claim of the Germans and Italians to this inven ** tion examined; with an account of the most ancient en "gravings of each country, and a curious ípecimen of the "workmanship of an artist, supposed to be a native of Eng"land." The author here determines with much probability, that the art of taking impreffions from engraved plates was known to the Germans, at least ten years earlier than to the Italians. Notwithstanding what Mr. Strutt has faid, with regard to the high antiquity of the "curious fpecimen" mentioned in this chapter, he has alledged no fatisfactory reafons in proof of what he has advanced,

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"The peculiar ftyle of the German fchool, and an examination of the works of the artifts belonging to that "school; especially with respect to the mechanical part of "the execution of their engravings, from the year 1461 to 1500," form the contents of the 5th chapter. In the 6th, "the general style and character of defign among the Italian engravers, and the extent of their knowledge in the exe"cution of the mechanical part of their plates are examined, " from 1464 to 1500."

The nature of our work forbids us to enter minutely into the contents of thefe two chapters; we fhall only give the author's decifion in favour of the Italian school in his own words,

The prints belonging to the Italian fchool, from the very commencement of the art, are easily diftinguifhed from those engraved in Germany; not only by the vifible difference which appears in the execution of the mechanical part of the workmanship, but alfo by the fimplicity of ftyle, with which the former defigned the human figure; and this fimplicity in fome degree is constantly found in the fighteft Italian compofitions: being profeffedly acquired by the study of the works of antiquity, But perhaps the diftinction between the German and Italian engravings is no where more ftrikingly evident, than in the drawing of the draperies, and the difpofition of the folds. In the one, it is plain and unaffected; the folds are long and flowing, and the turn of the figures has always more or lefs of that grace, which is fo powerfully demonstrated in the ftatues, bafs reliefs, and other remains of the ancients whilst the Germans, forfaking nature, or contenting themselves with viewing her in difguife, and having no affistance to correct their taste, degenerated into what is called manner, and drew the human figure, not as it really did, but as they conceived it fhould appear to them.'

In chap. 7th, we have a defcription of the eight first "plates referred to in the effay."

The fubject of plate fifth is faid to be an engraver at work. -by the book, compaffes, fphere, &c. we fhould rather be difpofed to think that the print represents a mathematician, or philofopher in deep contemplation,

Upon

Upon the whole, this effay appears to be the work of laborious induftry, not the effort of genius. When Mr. Strutt fpeaks of dates, of facts, or of the mechanical part of the art, he appears in his native element, but when he attempts to rife to fcience and abstraction, he is no longer the fame. Many proofs of this are to be met with in the effay; but we have more particularly in our eye the commencement of Sect. 2. of the firft chapter, where he attempts to give definitions of tafte and judgment, as they relate to the arts. His definition of judgment is erroneous and incomplete, and he has confounded together taste and genius, which are in themfelves very different. Much might be faid against the language of this biographical repofitory, but as it is fufficiently clear to be understood, and as elegance is not effentially neceffary to a work of this kind, we forbear any particular ftrictures. Mr. Strutt, in his preface, feems to fay that the work is already completed; we wish to fee the remaining volume or volumes, and hope that the author will receive from the public an'adequate recompenfe for his labours.

ART. II. Efays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. By Thomas - Reid, D. D. F. R. S. Profeffor of Moral Philofophy in the Univerfity of Glafgow. 4to. 11. 5s. boards, Bell, Edinburgh, Robinsons, London, 1785.

[ Continued from our laft. ]

UR learned profeffor having from a preceding train of reasoning concluded, that without fome degree of judg ment, a man can neither diftinguish, nor divide, nor form any general notion, fimple or complex, proceeds thus:

There cannot be any propofition in language which does not involve some general conception. The propofition, that I exift, which Des Cartes thought the first of all truths, and the foundation of all knowledge, cannot be conceived without the conception of existence, one of the most abstract general conceptions. A man cannot believe his own existence, or the exiftence of any thing he fees or remembers, until he has fo much judgment as to diftinguish things that really exift from things which are only conceived. He fees a man fix feet high; he conceives a man fixty feet high; he judges the first object to exift, because he fees it; the fecond he does not judge to exift, because he only conceives it. Now, I would afk, whether he can attribute existence to the first object, and not to the fecond, without knowing what existence means? It is impoffible.

How early the notion of existence enters into the mind, I cannot determine; but it muft certainly be in the mind, as foon as we can affirm of any thing, with understanding, that it exifts.

"In every other propofition, the predicate at least must be a general notion; a predicable and an univerfal, being one and the fame. Befides this, every propofition either affirms or denies. And no man can have a distinct conception of a propofition, who

does

does not understand diftinctly the meaning of affirming or denying! but thefe are very general conceptions, and as was before obferved, are derived from judgment, as their fource and origin.

I am fenfible that a strong objection may be made to this rea, foning, and that it may feem to lead to an abfurdity, or a contra diction. It may be faid, that every judgment is a mental affirmation or negation. If therefore fome previous exercife of judgment. be neceffary to understand what is meant by affirmation or nega tion, the exercise of judgment must go before any judgment, which is abfurd.

In like manner, every judgment may be expreffed by a propofi tion, and a propofition must be conceived before we can judge of it, If therefore we cannot conceive the meaning of a propofition without a previous exercife of judgment, it follows that judgment muft be previous to the conception of any propofition, and at the fame time that the conception of a propofition must be previous to all judgment, which is a contradiction.

The reader may pleafe to obferve, that I have limited what I have faid to diftinct conception, and fome degree of judgment; and it is by this means I hope to avoid this labyrinth of abfurdity and contradiction. The faculties of conception and judgment have an infancy and a maturity as man has. What I have faid is limited to their mature state. I believe in their infant state they are very weak and indiftinct; and that, by imperceptible degrees, they grow to maturity, each giving aid to the other, and receiving aid from it. But which of them firft began this friendly intercourfe, is beyond my ability to determine. It is like the question concerning the bird and the egg.

In the prefent ftate of things, it is true, that every bird comes from an egg, and every egg from a bird; and each may be faid to be previous to the other. But if we go back to the orgin of things, there must have been fome bird that did not come from any egg, or fome egg that did not come from any bird.

In like manner, in the mature state of man, distinct conception of a propofition fuppofes fome previous exercise of judgment, and diftinct judgment fuppofes diftinct conception. Each may truly be faid to come from the other, as the bird from the egg, and the egg from the bird. But if we trace back this fucceffion to its ori gin, that is, to the first propofition that was ever conceived by the man, and the first judgment he ever formed, I determine nothing about them, nor do I know in what order, or how they were pro duced, any more than how the bones grow in the womb of her that is with child.

The first exercife of thefe faculties of conception and judgment is hid, like the fources of the Nile, in an unknown region.

The neceffity of fome degree of judgment to clear and diftinct conceptions of things, may, I think, be illuftrated by this fimili tude.

An artist, suppose a carpenter, cannot work in his art without tools, and these tools must be made by art. The exercife of the art therefore is neceffary to make the tools, and the tools are neceffary to the exercife of the art. There is the fame appearance of contradiction, as in what I have advanced concerning the neceffity

of