that it is the war of principles that Canning meant. The author is not without anxiety for the result. Principles, it appears, are a very dangerous matter. If it were necessary for the German Confederation to conciliate England by important commercial concessions, and France by surrendering up the left bank of the Rhine, this would be a less misfortune than the triumph of the French-English (!) constitutional principles; through these "the Demagogues would become Kings and Regents of Germany!" A pretty sort of a lecture indeed, an urgent motive for the German Princes, (for the people naturally are not even contemplated) to draw out their forces, and to drive England and France, together with the Demagogues, in couples. But, among the contemplations of the author with regard to the conflicts of States, there is still one which has great probability, viz. that Austria will again find in England her old ally. Now this would hardly be an alliance for war, but rather an alliance for the preservation of the peace of Europe.

But the revolution must in every way be combated in Germany. "Opinions are not shot down by cannon balls, nor run through with bayonets."

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This tone is new in the mouth of so legitimate a writer. He continues:

"Herein however lies the greatest mistake which "the Monarchical Governments have been guilty of "in our time. Nowhere, up to this time, has good political instruction been given to the people. "In the universities, the professorships of politics "have been left vacant, in order to impede the "spread of false political theories, without reflecting "that, in the perusal of history, false political opi"nions would be disseminated with the greater fa

cility, if the minds of the students were not prepared by profound and scientific views."

We recommend to the author the Manual of Dahlmann, wherein he may see how the affair of politics is treated in the different universities. One thing however appears really to deserve reflection: that the Germans love the Revolution for itself; for example the Polish Revolution. Is this really

the case? The wish to see an independent Poland, cannot in itself, and for itself be so very revolutionary; Prince Metternich declared at the Congress of Vienna, that his Imperial Master ardently cherished this wish, and had only rendered it subordinate to other grand considerations. "L'Em

pereur ayant de nouveau

subordonné ses

veux en faveur de l'independance de la Pologne aux grandes considerations, &c. &c.'

The last investigation finally treats of the developement of the German Confederation "under an "equal or unequal influence of Austria and Prus"sia." An equal influence is not to be imagined, and immediately afterwards the startling prospect is brought to view," that sooner or later the influ"ence of both powers may be paralyzed." Austria will in every case be put in the back ground. But it is said of Prussia, "that it will have to expect in "time a much more powerful opposition from the "Diet, than from the Cabinet of Vienna; this circum"stance may perhaps cause the Cabinet of Berlin to

attempt to weaken or to break the political power "of the Diet; but happily Austria will for the same "reasons strive to maintain the Diet in its importance and existence."

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And from this therefore we are to deduce, that the independence of the smaller German States can neither be guaranteed by Prussia nor by Austria; that consequently the guarantee of a great Foreign Power must be welcome to the Diet. We have really some difficulty in comprehending whence

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this conclusion is drawn. In each of the two German Great Powers, lies the guarantee against the subjugation of the weaker States by the other of the two, and on this account the guarantee of a third foreign Power is necessary! Then it is said, England by her insular position, and being therefore a mere maritime Power, does not aspire to afford this guarantee; the choice then remains between France and Russia.

Undoubtedly so far as England is concerned, she would decline any German Protectorate. Already the connection with Hanover has given sufficient grounds of discontent to the nation, and annoyance enough to George the First, Second, and Third. England's policy is purely national, and as such, purely egotistical. What policy is not so? The German liberals would bitterly deceive themselves, were they to suppose that Englandwould stir a finger to preserve their Constitutions. England is only so far interested in their maintenance, that in a war of principles, it could not be doubtful for which side the voice of the people in the Constitutional States would pronounce itself. But England's policy consists exactly in avoiding such a war! As regards also the independence of single

German States of the Confederation, England is interested only in a limited degree, as regards perhaps the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. But it is the interest of England in general, that the German States should not fall under the direct or indirect supremacy of a Foreign Power, and that Germany should remain intact; it is a matter of indifference in what limits and in what number of separate States. But in the interior, and indeed in the greater part of Germany, there is no confidence, no heart towards England, and no change will take place in this, no happy interchange of political relations will ensue between England and Germany, until England shall have purified her commercial system, and come to an understanding, on reasonable principles of reciprocity, with the German States. Such a disposition on the side of England will not appear (as the excited organs of the Customs' Union States imagine) as the forced result of necessity, but it will appear as founded on the true interests of England. Ger many will accept with pleasure the hand so pre sented, but not with cordial warmth as the hand of a friend.

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