Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-ban Debate, 1945-1963

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Stanford University Press, 2007 - 358 pages
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Based on extensive research in government archives and private papers, this book analyzes the secret debate within the Eisenhower administration over the pursuit of a nuclear test-ban agreement. In contrast to much recent scholarship, this study concludes that Eisenhower strongly desired to reach an accord with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to cease nuclear weapons testing. For Eisenhower, a test ban would ease Cold War tensions, slow the nuclear arms race, and build confidence toward disarmament; however, he faced continual resistance from his early scientific advisers, most notably Lewis L. Strauss and Edward Teller. Extensive research into previously unavailable government archival sources and collections of private manuscripts reveals the manipulative acts of test-ban opponents and other factors that inhibited Eisenhower s actions throughout his presidency. Meticulously analyzed, these sources underscore Eisenhower's dependence on the counsel of his science advisors, such as Strauss, James R. Killian, and George B. Kistiakowsky, to determine the course he pursued in regard to several components of his national security strategy. In addition to its comprehensive analysis of the test-ban debate, this book makes important contributions to the scholarly literature assessing Eisenhower's leadership and his approach to arms control.
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Table des matières

Eisenhower and the Atomic Age 19451952
9
The Dawn of the Thermonuclear Age 1953
23
The BRAVO Shot and Rise of the TestBan Debate within
51
The TestBan Debate
68
A Moratorium on Candor
87
The Influence of Strauss the Fall of Stassen and the Rise
112
PSAC the Test Moratorium and the Geneva System
134
Stalemate at Geneva
165
The Threshold Ban the Paris Summit and the Farewell
200
Epilogue
233
Conclusion
255
Sources
337
Index x
351
Droits d'auteur

Expressions et termes fréquents

Fréquemment cités

Page 15 - Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose (Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon [New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946], p.
Page 1 - Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.
Page 230 - The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present — and is gravely to be regarded.
Page vii - On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved. 9. As stated in General Groves...
Page 34 - We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.
Page 10 - I expressed the hope that we would never have to use such a thing against any enemy because I disliked seeing the United States take the lead in introducing into war something as horrible and destructive as this new weapon was described to be.
Page 280 - The beauty of Eisenhower's policy is that to this day no one can be sure whether or not he would have responded militarily to an invasion of the offshore islands, and whether he would have used nuclear weapons.
Page 273 - Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive,
Page 23 - With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power.
Page vii - ... the doom of civilization or it might mean the perfection of civilization, that it might be a Frankenstein which would eat us up or it might be a project by which the peace of the world would be helped in becoming secure.

À propos de l'auteur (2007)

Benjamin Greene is Assistant Professor of History at Bowling Green State University in Ohio.

Informations bibliographiques