winter. At that very time the 'Thalia' and the 'Urgent,' if not other transports, were lying uncommissioned and unemployed in our home ports. But it would have cost money to bring these vessels into commission, and so the old store-ship was employed. The route chosen for her also showed a total disregard, not only for the comfort of the men, but for the safety of the ship. The Suez Canal would have given a smoother and a safer passage for such a ship at such a time of year; but a saving again was to be effected, and the ship, in addition to her Australian cargo, was crammed with stores for the Cape of Good Hope, in order to attempt to show a low transport bill.

No sooner were the stores and men embarked in the 'Megara' than it was found she leaked from stem to stern. Remonstrances were made by her officers and crew; but the orders of the Admiralty hurried her away from Devonport to Cork. There, again, her leaky condition was plainly manifested, and the ship lightened by a hundred tons of stores.

Faithful reports, no doubt, were made by the officers at Cork, so far as they could see; but the ship was not docked; and the plates—so thin that the labourers at Sheerness employed to survey her could put a knife through them-could not be gauged when the ship was afloat and filled with stores.

6

But

in spite of remonstrance, in spite of warning, in spite of entreaty, the Megara' was packed off, with her leaky topsides, her thin plates, her heavy cargo, and her 380 men. What became of her we all know. Her perilous passage ended on St. Paul's Island in the Southern Ocean, and the examination there seems to show that the cause of the leak was that the plates were 'worn through.'

We see what this Administration does with the men. Five hundred drowned by their culpable negligence in the 'Captain ;' three hundred deserted, on account of their recklessness, from the Flying Squadron; three hundred and eighty shipwrecked on a desert island, on account of their niggardliness, from the 'Megæra; and if we add the cost of the ships so sacrificed to the bill, we shall not find so much saving as is claimed by the friends and supporters of the Ministry.

For the claim of this Government to the confidence of the country has been based entirely upon its supposed economy. the three successive years in which they have framed the Navy Estimates they boast a large saving. Let us test this claim. For 1869-70 a saving was claimed of 957,3571., but of this 600,9607. was, as admitted by Mr. Childers, due to Mr. Corry's reforms; 356,3977. is, therefore, the saving in the first year of economy. In 1870-71, a further saving is claimed of 746,1117.;

so that the total saving supposed to be effected in three years is to be obtained by multiplying the first of these sums by 3, and the second by 2, and adding the products. This shews a saving in three years of 2,561,4131. Fer contra, we have the increase in this year's estimate 385,8267. and 500,000l. appropriated to the Naval service out of the 2,000,0007. voted as a supplementary estimate last year, when war broke out between France and Prussia, making 885,826., which reduces the saving in three years to 1,675,5877., or about half-a-million a year; but when we set against this the fact that our naval stores have been reduced from a stock of three-years' seasoned articles in store to a hand-to-mouth policy, and charge the 'Captain' and 'Megara,' worth at least half-a-million, to the account, we shall find that the saving to the country has resulted in inefficiency and may terminate in disaster. The cautious and strong sense of the Duke of Somerset has pronounced sentence on the Administration which he generally supports, and which he has vainly endeavoured to save from folly. In a caustic and terse epigram, which will never be forgotten, he has stigmatised for ever the military and naval policy of the present Administration:-'An army that can't march, and ships that won't swim,' as the result of three years of boastful economical government.

The ships that won't swim deserve something more than a passing notice. After the loss of the 'Captain,' when Mr. Childers and his colleagues in the Cabinet were devising every means to shift the responsibility from their shoulders, they hit upon the expedient of appointing a Committee of scientific and naval men, presided over by a colleague of their own, to report on the designs of ships of war. At first, reports were diligently circulated to the effect that this Committee was to make a searching inquiry into the cause of the loss of the 'Captain ;' and thus another stop was put to any Parliamentary inquiry into that disaster. Then, when the order of reference to this Committee was made public, it was found that it was not called upon to inquire into the cause of the loss of the 'Captain' at all, from which consideration, indeed, it was entirely excluded. Nevertheless, the Government organs still continued to mislead the public by calling the Committee on Designs' the "Captain' Committee,' which, like the difficult derivation in the Latin Grammar of lucus a non lucendo, will give plenty of food for inquiry to future commentators.

The Committee on Designs of Ships of War has, however, concluded its valuable labours. It was specially summoned to consider the ships which Mr. Childers caused to be constructed.

The

6

The 'Fury,' as we anticipated last year-the joint product, as we were assured by the Times,' of Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Childers-has entirely disappeared from Pembroke Dockyard, so that we shall not have this grand opportunity for ascertaining whether Mr. Gladstone or Mr. Reed is the better shipbuilder. It is at least satisfactory to find that the Fury' has disappeared harmlessly from the dockyard, where she had no crew and was altogether imaginary, rather than that she should have gone down with all hands, as befel the 'Captain.' Mr. Childers's 'own' ships in whose designs we are not aware that he received the valuable assistance of the Prime Minister--are the 'Devastation' and 'Thunderer' of one class, and the 'Cyclops,' 'Hecate,' 'Hydra,' and 'Gorgon' of another. Of the Devastation' and "Thunderer,' the Committee on Design report that the Devastation' should be completed with a heavy superstructure, to give her more freeboard; and that the Thunderer' should be completed as originally designed. The Committee think that, as they have no masts, they will not be blown over like the 'Captain.' Two very able members of the Committee, Admirals Elliot and Ryder, have urged strongly what they consider very grave defects in these ships; but the Committee state

That the fact has necessarily been present to their minds that the "Devastation," as well as her sister ship, is already in a very advanced state, and that, once satisfied as to her safety at sea, nothing short of very obvious defects and a certainty of arriving at any manifest improvements would justify them in introducing into a carefully considered design of this kind, any large changes.'

They further say that they

'feel when it becomes their duty to re-examine their design regarded as a type, and with a view to the construction of future ships of war, it is not impossible that, untrammelled as they will then be by considerations connected with the best mode of treating a nearly completed hull, the suggestions put forward by our colleagues, and other modifications, may commend themselves to our judgment.'

The paraphrase of this is, 'We can't recommend these ships. Stop the "Fury;" but, as the "Devastation" and "Thunderer are both far advanced, we cannot recommend you to leave them unfinished and waste all the labour and material already expended. It does not much matter how they are finished. Try one one way, and one another. As they have no masts, they won't capsize; so go on and prosper, but don't do it again.'

The four ships of the Cyclops' breed are, however, not so well spoken of. They, too, may be finished, as so much has been spent on them. They may prove useful vessels for the

defence

defence of our harbours; but take care that you choose fine weather for proceeding even from one port to another on our storm-beaten western shore. If they attempt to make passages from one port to another in' anything but favourable weather' they would be dangerous ships. The Sub-Committee recommend for their safety a superstructure. With this, they state, 'these ships would be both safe and steady amongst waves of a period not longer than 10 seconds. Amongst waves of a longer period they would roll considerably; but with superstructures they would not be unsafe.' The Committee on Design publish the Report of the scientific Sub-Committee, which reports these ships unsafe under certain ordinary conditions without superstructures; but finding that these superstructures would interfere with the all-round fire of the guns, recommend that no superstructure shall be added. Truly valuable ships, which, if left able to fight-the purpose for which they are intended-must run the risk of rolling over if employed in going from port to port; or, if made safe for a coasting voyage, will be incapacitated for fighting an action in stormy weather in the narrow seas! Shade of Drake! what would he have thought of such a condition for ships to attack a Spanish Armada? Is the Duke of Somerset not more than justified in his friendly criticism on theSHIPS THAT WON'T SWIM'?

6

Our chronicle of naval events would not be complete if we omitted to notice the grounding of the Agincourt,' and the mode in which it has been dealt with by the Admiralty. The squadron is coming out of the bay of Gibraltar. To save coal (one of the chief hobbies of this Admiralty) it is to be kept well out of the strong current running through the Straits. The squadron is what, with a single ship, would have been called well clear of all danger. Admiral Wellesley's ship was clear of danger, and it is idle to say that the second in command was so rigidly bound by the prescribed order of steaming to run stem on to a well-known danger, any more than he would have been bound to run over a P. and O. steamer if he had met her in the Straits steering across the path of the squadron. Admiral Wellesley was no doubt shaving it close, but he had no right to expect from an able, experienced officer like Admiral Wilmot such unreasoning pipeclay obedience, to the manifest risk of the line he was leading. However, the mistake being made, and a display of vigorous and active seamanship having saved the ship, a court-martial investigates the matter, tries the captain and two officers of the Agincourt,' and inflicts on them what it considers sufficient punishment. The Admiralty, who feel that with the Megara,' and 'Slaney,' and 'Psyche,' and 'Cap

tain' lost, and the general course of their administration much discredited, something must be done to recover their reputation, determine to show what strong men they are, and sacrifice both the admirals to save themselves. In the first place, it must be obvious to the public conscience, that it is wrong to punish any one without giving him an opportunity to defend himself. This, unless the Prerogative is again to set up the Star Chamber, is still the privilege of every Englishman. The sacrifice of Admiral Wellesley is probably the meanest act ever perpetrated by public men. A year ago he was Commander-in-Chief in North America; a command was, however, required for an excellent officer, the brother-in-law of the Secretary of State for War. The command of the Channel Fleet falling vacant, a telegram was sent to Admiral Wellesley, asking him to resign the most important command in peace, except the Mediterranean, which an Admiral can hold, and to take command of the Channel Fleet. He declined; a further communication was made to him, that there was a possibility of war, and that he was looked to as the man to command the Channel Fleet. Under these circumstances he had no alternative but to accept the command forced upon him; and the brother-in-law of the minister was cleverly provided for in a pleasant command. Admiral Wellesley came home and found that our Ministry had determined not to go to war, and that he had been juggled out of his command under false pretences. The change of station brought, of course, its expenses, and the Channel command was less highly paid than the North American. The Admiralty were so afraid of exposure, however, that they increased the pay, especially, for Admiral Wellesley, in command of the Channel Fleet. And now this man, on whom a year ago they relied (or said they relied), above all others, to command a fleet in war, is deprived of his command without trial for what is at the worst but one slight error in judgment, which could not have happened if he had been well supported by the officers appointed for this special purpose.

Two points of detail here arise for consideration; and first, we think that the old plan, which allowed an Admiral to select his staff officers, should be revived. It is for the public good that the officer who is responsible to the country should have the selection of those who are to carry out his orders. A complete chain of responsibility can never be established unless all the staff are men whose peculiarities are known to the Commanderin-Chief, and on whose zealous and friendly co-operation he can fully rely. The same argument holds good with regard to the

second