postulates and seeks a personal highest and absolute beyond the empirical unity.

10. Von Hartmann; Ritschl.

A diametrical opposite to the above is Eduard von Hartmann (q.v.) in his works on the philosophy of religion-Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit im Stufengang seiner Entwickelung and Die Religion des Geistes (1882), of which the first (historicalcritical) part treated of the religious consciousness of humanity in the scale of its evolution and the second (systematic) part presented the "Religion of the Spirit." He puts the impersonality of God directly as postulate of the religious consciousness. Deity is for him as absolute Spirit one, and as such the absolute subsistence of the world. The consequence is cosmic monism; and this includes the real multiplicity as its internal manifold. From the ground of immanence is necessarily derived the impersonality of God. The world is in need of redemption; hence, pessimism is justified; but since the world is capable of redemption, teleological optimism is likewise warranted. At this point appeared a proposed total separation of religion or theology and metaphysics on the part of A. Ritschl (q.v.), and his followers, chief of whom are J. G. W. Herrmann and J. Kaftan (qq.v.), who are more or less attached to Kant but do not place their valuejudgments of the religious perception on the same plane with their ethical judgments and do not profess the derivation of these from them. These valuejudgments call forth feelings of pleasure or displeasure, whereby man maintains his supremacy over the world which he acquired by the help of God, or dispenses with such help for this end. The religious truths or facts of redemption must be realized in experience, without which there is no religious certainty. Certainty of the reality of God is dependent on the experience of the divine operation in man, arousing feeling and will; a sense of sin and a desire for blessedness are present, to which correspond an angry God and a merciful God. Additional proofs of the existence of God can avail no more than the recognition of him as the supreme law of the world. Only the moral proof is of value. More influenced by Kant on the side of the theory of knowledge is R. A. Lipsius (q.v.), who lays stress upon the antithesis between the empirical dependence in the world and moral freedom within. Religion is the ascent of the spirit to inner freedom in transcendent dependence upon God; a reciprocal relation between God and man, based upon the authentication of the Spirit of God in the spirit of man or divine revelation. With ethics as the basis of religion he would break entirely.

Among thinkers of most recent date philosophy of religion is placed on a par with science of religion. The Dutch scholar C. P. Tiele (q.v.) in Elements of the Science of Religion, Gifford Lectures, 1896-98 (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1897-99) and Grundriss der Religionswissenschaft (1904), in which he presents the two divisions of Morphology and Ontology of the Philosophy of Religion, took the ground that the philosophy of religion was neither philosophical dogma on religion, nor a confession of a so-called natural religion, nor that part of the old philosophy which dealt with the origin of things; but

that it was a philosophical investigation of the universal phenomenon ordinarily called religion. It is to attempt to comprehend the 11. Contem-religious in man, and thus announce porary its nature and establish its origin. For Thought. this purpose it is necessary to observe its historical evolution, its various tendencies, and the conditions and laws to which it is subject. An analysis is to follow; that is, a study of its various elements and revelations as psychological phenomena, in order to ascertain what is common and permanent in all religions. According to Tiele, religion is a spiritual state, or piety, which appears in word and act, representation and conduct, doctrine and life. Its nature is worship-religious respect to a superhuman, infinite power, as the basis of the existence of man and the world. Max Müller (q.v.) lays far more stress upon the historical, especially comparative history. He has the distinction of bringing into the science of religion the service of philology. True philosophy of religion is to him nothing else than the history of religion. He defines religion as the realization of the infinite, which he amends later, to the effect that only such realizations of the infinite come under the category of religion as are capable of influencing the ethical character of man. George Runze, who emphasizes the philological basis in his Sprache und Religion (1889), would condition all thinking by the nature of language to construct metaphor and myth. Recently an abundant literature has sprung up. In Holland, L. W. E. Rauwenhoff, Religionsphiloso phie (Brunswick, 1887), postulates belief in the supersensible. Much recognized has been L. A. Sabatier's (q.v.) Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire (Paris, 1897; 6th ed., 1907; Eng. transl., Outlines of Religious Philosophy based on Psychology and History, London, 1897), the tendency of which is shown by the title. In England Edward Caird in the Evolution of Religion, Gifford Lectures, 1890-92 (Glasgow, 1893), presents the religious principle as a necessary element of consciousness; John Caird (q.v.) in Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion attempts to reconcile faith and knowledge; and G. J. Romanes in Thoughts on Religion (London, 1895) would combine the doctrine of evolution with the concept of God. Among Italians, L. Valli, in Il fundamento psicologico della Religione (1904), has treated the subject in an individual but very sensible manner.

II. Analysis of Religion: After this historical review, it is in order to assume a position in regard to certain questions already raised: Is, on the whole,

a philosophy of religion warranted? Is

1. Method. it necessary? As soon as a scientific philosophic investigation is opened the religious side becomes a subject of inquiry, otherwise an element of first importance would be absent from human knowledge. Besides, philosophy of religion must constitute a part of the whole philosophic system. Philosophy of religion as such in name dates from the close of the eighteenth century. Previously its problems were treated in connection with metaphysics or ethics. Its position is properly after the series composed of metaphysics,

psychology, and, possibly, after ethics and esthetics. If it forms the conclusion of the philosophic series, then it is also the climax, since it pertains to the most momentous transactions of the soul-life. As to the division, the first step is an investigation of what is essential in all religions, upon a historical and psychological basis. This is to include not only what appeals to the susceptibility of a refined religious consciousness, but everything to which a possible standard of value may be applied to what constitutes the essence of religion from the lowest stages of development to the highest. As there is no common definition of religion, it depends upon every individual investigator how far he will extend the inclusive limits of religious phenomena, hoping that he may not be too much at variance with universal opinion. If the nature of religion in its essence is presumably found, the next step is to estimate the truth-value of religion and the representations formulated by religious persons. Should this vanish wholly and only an estimate of feeling remain, such representations could not maintain even this, for the intellect might possibly present them as nugatory. Here is the point of contact with metaphysics.

The activities and processes in the human soul are to be viewed in the threefold distinction of representation (cognition), feeling, and will; though it is understood that these are operated by the soul in complex combinations. This 2. Repre- division is of advantage, since the three sentation. leading modern contributors to the problem distinguish themselves accordingly: Kant representing the religion of ethics or will; Schleiermacher, of feeling; and Hegel, of the intellect. That religion was a matter of representation, thought, knowledge, was always held, and intellectualism prevailed from the age of Socrates. Wherever religion has been recognized representations play their part, and generally of a superhuman being; in the highly developed forms, of the transcendent spiritual being, God, the One. However, does the possession of truth, even the highest, constitute religion? Aristotle claimed knowledge of the prime Mover of things, but was not therefore religious. If any one knew God and divine things from the innermost unity of nature, if he even possessed absolute certainty of the beyond, and yet did not realize a relation with this supramundane or universal, or had not reconciled the variance between the infinite and himself the finite, or did not at least make the attempt, he would not possess what is called religion. Not even if for knowledge were substituted faith in the usual sense; that is not submission to the superhuman, but the lower step, as in the Alexandrine sense of "faith" in comparison with "knowledge." He could not be called pious, because the attitude toward the higher or highest is not yet present. Every religion develops representations, which supplant metaphysics. The mystic sets the highest before his mind, before he sinks into it; the Buddhist must have representation of Nirvana; yet either is concerned about something wholly different.

Feeling, on the other hand, plays a part, without

which a religion is unthinkable. This occurs first in a sense of dependence, which may be upon any incidental object to which power is ascribed (fetish);

or a useful or harmful part of nature 3. Feeling. (animal worship, star-cult, Sabaism, and perhaps animism); or nature with its inflexible laws as a whole, regarded either as animate or as pure mechanism (naturalism, Stoicism, Spinoza); or upon spirits, particularly of the deceased (ancestor-worship, and with it totemism). See COMPARATIVE RELIGION. Many like Herbert Spencer would derive all religion from the revering of the departed or ancestors. The mythological gods probably originated from the personification. of the powers of nature, as at a later stage the gods of the myths were allegorically reversed to powers of nature. By knowledge of his dualistic nature, man could conceive of the powers as persons and as spiritual, not without some degree of material form. The final view was that the infinite greatness and power over all was a spirit upon whom man was in all things dependent, yet possessing a certain self-existence and freedom. With these representations of the powers or of dependence upon them, feelings are bound up, either of like or dislike. The latter may accompany a representation of the contraction of human power and the diminution of the sense of self, and become strong aversion, such as fear of impending natural calamity. This feeling is still more intensified, if the sense of guilt be added. If feeling of dependence involves no more than fear, it is not religion. In the religious fear of God the element is much reduced, and the sense passes over into obedience and reverence. Neither can it be said that fear created the gods, because it must have been preceded by the representation of superhuman powers. The sense of fear or the resultant pain, physical or spiritual, leads to liberation from necessity, or salvation, which is hoped for or petitioned from the deities. This hope of salvation, which may pass over into certainty, is bound up with great joy over the sense that a beneficent power watches over man, so that no harm can befall him. A mode of fellowship or union with God develops, though not necessarily mystical; a vanishing of consciousness, though not a theosis; but a complete rest in God, the state of being hid in him, which constitutes blessedness. This is the climax of religion; it is joy without end. The feeling of dependence which starts with the utmost displeasure culminates with the highest bliss of submission to God, of the dissolution of personality, as in Buddhism; in Christianity the union with God in the celestial. The ultimate aim of religion is thus a feeling of good fortune, to use the expression; and as a practical concern of human spirit, religion thus corresponds to ethics.

If this be the case, desire next claims consideration with reference to the nature of religion. It must be admitted that religious phenomena in their evolution can not be understood without the

activity of the will. Necessity, or the

4. Will. desire to escape it, impels to a relation with the highest principle, by which liberation, salvation from evil, or even the escape from individual isolation from God are sought.

Religious Corporations

First, the desire seeks earthly goods, then the higher, for this life and the next. Beside and above physical necessity appear mental anxiety, earnest concern for the safety of the soul, and the desire for individual immortality. Necessity begets prayer. Sacrifices for the most part represent the effort to avert necessity. Specially active appear the religious phenomena when the moral precepts are taken as the commands of God, and their violation obscures the relation with the divine, or threatens with estrangement from God. Painful remorse results; in the lower stages with fear of punishment here or hereafter, in the upper in view of the inner longing for the highest. The ethical life may lose its self-dependence and be absorbed in the religious or at least be intimately complicated with it. At all events, in the case of a man who is inwardly religious, morality can not subsist without religion, but he must also be moral in practise. The religious state of life will then include all of man's activity, all of life; so that it may be observed as a continuous service to God. A conclusion of religiousness can not be made from acts which outwardly seem moral, not even those known as the forms of worship, often divided into prayer and sacrifice. To these performances belong the most manifold ceremonies, which are characteristic of all religions, and are, in part, symbolic in significance. For the greater multitude, the essential in religion manifests itself in these forms of worship; and, though they can not originate, they may reinforce the content, specially in communal fellowship. As the incorporation of the religious spirit of the community, they are symbols of unity as well as the medium of consensus on articles of belief. Through both, objective religion is constituted. It is striking how those who have rejected the previous metaphysics and all objective religion, like A. Comte, nevertheless revert to the construction of a ritual to the minutest detail, embracing both prayer and sacrament. Outward worship, though indispensable to objective religion, is not absolutely such to subjective religion. Those who realize supreme satisfaction in inner communion with the highest superhuman and feel themselves freed from all bodily and spiritual necessities may be said to possess religion, although they do not bring their inner states to outward representative acts of manifestation. For many the external must be regarded as a great aid in mediating the subjective with its supreme infinite object, though it be not regarded as essential. Self-expression is only natural, and the continued association of form with spirit clothes it with a validity that seems indispensable to the inner life.

To generalize from the foregoing, it may be said that religion pertains to the entire soul-life. It is

practical not theoretical; though the 5. General- latter is warranted in the sphere of ization. representation. The religious process opening with a feeling of necessity proceeds to desire of relief and happiness, and culminates in the reconciliation of the aim with the transcendent or immanent infinite. Optimism and pessimism are thus interrelated. Redemption (or | salvation) is the most adequate term in the relig

ious vocabulary. It implies first something to be released from, then, in succession, the inclination, the inmost yearning, and the final attainment. Law and Gospel, sin and grace, are the antitheses in Christianity, to be reconciled in salvation; the latter appearing also in Buddhism, although, as also in the Kantian ethics, here man must save himself. Although the common principle of all religions, from the lowest fetishism, is the aspiration for redemption, yet the representation of the higher powers as the objective of the desire is very much diversified; variously, according to geographical situation, customs, stages of civilization, as also the creative imagination, and, specially, according to the tremendous influence of divinely gifted personalities as mediators of a revelation, who deepen, illumine, and inspire, not only the representations but also the entire religious life. In Christianity thus is presented the God-man as Redeemer. Though representations are indispensable to religion, subjective and objective, yet they can not claim to belong to the concept or essence of religion. Monotheism may or must be assumed to satisfy religious requirement; yet it is not exclusively the only religious form. In the sphere of representation evolution takes place, while the essential remains constant. On the whole, it is to be assumed that evolution was ascending toward the purer and more spiritual; but it is uncertain whether the original form was not monotheistic, and there was a downward process. Ethnic religions would not then be primitive, but degenerate growths. To regard henotheism as primitive is impossible because it can occur only with polytheism. Proper is it, indeed, not to assume only one primitive form but various forms that have developed gradually in different

zones.

To estimate the relative truth-value of religion, it is necessary to distinguish between the religions that turn toward a higher universal for redemption and those that seek it by themselves. The latter are represented by Buddhism, al6. Relative though this soon, for the greater Estimation. masses, reverted to the other form. The question of truth depends on whether its aim is actualized, and there is no doubt that this comes to reality in experience. The same standard must hold true for the other religions as well. However, there is involved also in this estimation of the true reality of a religion its relation to the representations of its highest being or beings. The question would then be whether the representations correspond to the reality which philosophical thought professes to attain. In monotheistic faiths and Christianity, which are regarded as the highest forms, a foremost subject of consideration is the existence of God with reference to which the community is to be established, and its closer determination. Briefly, scientific thought arrives at the certain assumption of a being, which is absolute, infinite, and as such is unity, and is all-inclusive, even of man. If man finds himself constrained to regard the ultimate elements of being, as analogous to his subjective self, to be apprehended as spiritual, inasmuch as this is immediately given in consciousness and matter dissolves in the effort to con

ceive it, then infinite being as such is spiritual, and man has his ground in the infinite spiritual Being, and is dependent upon it. If the religious consciousness assumes this final universal as God, it is easy to regard the same as transcendent, without this being essential for religion. If it further ascribes to God personality and ethical attributes, these involve the conception of the being of God in contradictions, and can not define the same metaphysically; they become matters of faith, or objective conceptions adaptable to human need, whose satisfaction may be regarded as necessary; but according to their content these determinations defy proof. The intellectual proofs for the divine existence from the time of Aristotle, as also the apologetic arguments, are not final. Most convincing is the teleological, yet this halts before the evidence of much that is not purposive, and before evil in the world, which is regarded by the religious as belonging to the plan of the whole and is overcome, but not convincingly explained, by intellectual thought. The weakest is the moral argument, which assumes unproved premises. Though not final, these arguments at most increase probability. Proofs for other specifically religious, in a measure Christian, dogmas, such as that of the Trinity, are still less convincing. Here appeal must be made to faith, not to reason. See RELIGION; GOD, IV. (M. HEINZET.) BIBLIOGRAPHY: For the history of the philosophy of religion consult: J. Berger, Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie, Berlin, 1800; C. Bartholmess, Hist. critique des doctrines religieuses de la philosophie moderne, 2 vols., Paris, 1855; A. Stöckl, Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie, Mainz, 1878; B. Pünjer, Geschichte der christlichen religionsphilosophie seit der Reformation, 2 vols., Brunswick, 1880– 1883; idem, Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie, ib. 1886; G. Runze, Der ontologische Gottesbeweis. Kritische Darstellung seiner Geschichte, Halle, 1881; H. K. H. Delff, Grundzüge der Entwickelungsgeschichte der Religion, Leipsic, 1883; A. Gilliot, Études historiques et critiques sur les religions et institutions comparées, Paris, 1883; L. Carran, La Philosophie religieuse en Angleterre depuis Locke jusqu'à nos jours, Paris, 1898; O. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage, 3d ed., Berlin, 1896, Eng. transl., Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History, 4 vols.. London, 1897; idem, Philosophy of Religion, 2 vols., London, 1894 (Gifford Lectures); A. Caldecott, The Philosophy of Religion, in England and America, London, 1901; N. H. Marshall, Die gegenwärtigen Richtungen der Religionsphilosophie in England und ihre erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen, Berlin, 1902.

For studies in the philosophy of religion consult: J. Matter, Philosophie de la religion, 2 vols., Paris, 1857; A. M. Fairbairn, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History, London, 1876; I. Richard, Essai de philosophie religieuse, Heidelberg, 1877; H. Lotze, Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie, Leipsic, 1882; J. Martineau, Study of Religion, its Sources and Contents, Oxford, 1888; idem, Seat of Authority in Religion, 2d ed., London, 1890; R. Seydl, Religionsphilosophie in Umriss, Freiburg, 1893; J. Caird, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 6th ed., Glasgow, 1896; A. Sabatier, Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion, 7th ed., Paris, 1903, Eng. transl. of earlier ed., Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, London, 1897; F. Engels, Religion, philosophie, socialisme, Paris, 1901; R. Eucken, Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, Leipsic, 1901; A. Dorner, Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie, Leipsic, 1903; G. Galloway, Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Edinburgh, 1904; E. Tröltsch, in Die Philosophie zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, Festschrift für Kuno Fischer, pp. 104-162, Heidelberg, 1904; J. Watson, Philosophical Basis of Religion, Glasgow, 1907; B. Wehnert, Wissenschaft, Philosophie, Kunst und Religion, Dortmund, 1910. Much of the literature in and under RELIGION is pertinent.

Religious Corporations

RELIGION, PRIMITIVE. See COMPARATIVE RELIGION, VI., 1.

RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES.

Legal Basis (§ 1).

Method of Incorporation (§ 2).

Corporations Sole and Aggregate (§ 3). Objects of Incorporation (§ 4).

Powers (§ 5).

1. Legal Basis.

The corporation formed for the purposes of religion is an important element in American ecclesiastical organization. The American religious corporation differs in origin, function, and power from the ecclesiastical corporation known to European law which is the product of canon law, and has been developed by analogy from the corporation of the civil law based upon the Roman law. It is not an American development of the English legal ecclesiastical corporation, which is composed entirely of ecclesiastical persons and subject to ecclesiastical judicatories. The religious corporation in the United States belongs to the class of civil corporations, not for profit, which are organized and controlled according to the principles of common law and equity as administered by the civil courts. Distinction is necessary between the corporation and the religious society or church with which it may be connected. The church is a spiritual and ecclesiastical body, and as such does not receive incorporation. It is from the membership of the religious society that the corporation is formed. The corporation exercises its functions for the welfare of the church body, over which, however, it has no control. It can not alter the faith of the church, or receive or expel members, or dictate relations with other church bodies. While the religious corporation is frequently organized to carry on some religious enterprise without connection with a local church body, the greater number of religious corporations in the United States are directly connected with some local church body, and it is in this connection that their powers and duties will be considered.

Only a sovereign power can create a corporation, and this power now rests with the legislative branch of the state governments and of the 2. Method federal government. Prior to the of Incor- American revolution religious corpoporation. rations were created either by royal

charter or by provincial authority derived from the crown. After the revolution they were incorporated either by special acts of the state legislatures or under the provisions of general statutes. In its charter are contained the organic law of a corporation and the legal evidence of its right to the exercise of corporate franchises. When incorporation is effected under the provisions of a general statute, the terms such a statute applicable to that particular corporation are by law read into its charter. Such a charter is a grant of powers by the State, and it also has the nature of a contract in such a sense that it can not thereafter be altered or revoked without the consent of the corporation unless the State has reserved to itself the right so to alter or revoke. The general statutes under which

Religious Dramas

In

religious corporations can now be formed in most of the American states contain provisions authorizing the legislature to alter, amend, or repeal any charter granted. Another limitation of corporate powers is that charters granted to corporations by the State may be seized either for non-use or misuse of powers. Further, the granting of a charter does not prevent a state from exercising to a reasonable extent its police or judicial powers. some states the duration or life of a religious corporation is limited by statute. If no limit is specified, the corporation may enjoy a perpetual existence. The life of a religious corporation dates in law from its organization, not from the time it began to exercise its corporate powers. That a religous corporation is a corporation de facto may be proved by showing the existence of a charter at a prior time, or by showing some law under which it could have been created and an actual use of the rights claimed to have been conferred. Where such a body has for a number of years and in good faith exercised the privileges of a corporation, its legal incorporation will be presumed. If the statute which provides for the incorporation of religious societies does not make incorporation obligatory upon such societies but merely prescribes the mode of incorporation, in case there is no evidence that a society took any of the steps prescribed or assumed to act as a corporation, its incorporation under the statute will not be presumed. But a mere use of corporate powers limited to the maintenance of religious observances is not sufficient to establish a corporation de facto (Van Buren vs. Reformed Church, 62 Barb. N. Y. 495).

Classified as to the number of natural persons vested with corporate powers, religious corporations are either aggregate or sole. By far the greater number are aggregate, composed of 3. Corthree or more persons. The corporaporations tion sole is found where one person Sole and holding an ecclesiastical office is by Aggregate. law vested with all the attributes of a corporation. Such corporate attributes attach to the office and pass to each succeeding incumbent, thereby maintaining continuously the life of the corporation. During a vacancy in the ecclesiastical office the law regards the corporate functions as suspended merely and not as destroyed. The ecclesiastical corporation sole has not been favored in American legislation. It is expressly forbidden in the states of Delaware, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania. It is provided for by statute in the states of Oregon and New Jersey. Massachusetts and several other states have granted charters of incorporation to single church officials by special legislative acts. The object of the churches in securing such incorporations was to make more effective certain features of their polities. Incorporation of this kind has been sought by denominations having an episcopal form of polity. Thus the Oregon statute provides for the granting of corporate powers to bishops, overseers, and presiding elders. The composition of the religious corporations aggregate depends upon the provisions of the statute in each state, and in this matter the states are broadly divided. The language of many

statutes is to the effect that any religious society or church may become incorporated by following a prescribed procedure. The language of other statutes is to the effect that religious societies or churches having appointed or elected trustees, the same may become a civil corporation. This difference is not as radical as would appear, for in cases where the law permits churches to be incorporated, provision is made for the election or appointment of trustees in whom are vested the corporate functions, thereby leaving to the church body the sole duty of producing such trustees. Under either system the corporations have the same functions in law. In a number of states supplemental provisions have been enacted to provide corporations composed of certain officials for the benefit of churches of particular denominations.

The primary object of religious incorporation in the United States is the care of real property de

voted to the purposes of religion. In

4. Objects the corporation as such is vested the of Incor- title to church property. Along with poration. the vesting of such title go all the attributes of legal ownership, to be exercised, however, solely for the benefit of the religious body which the corporation serves. In this relation the corporation is a trustee and the church is the party with the full beneficial interest. While the corporation so serves the church, it is not within the jurisdiction of the church judicatories, but is responsible for the proper performance of its duties to the civil courts, before whom it may be brought by any party in interest. The courts have recognized, in addition to the primary trust for the holding of specific property and its right use for the benefit of a certain religious body, religious corporations as possessing the inherent capacity of executing additional trusts of a distinctly religious, charitable, or educational nature if not too far removed from the primary object of the particular corporation acting as trustee. With this sanction many special trust funds have developed in the hands of local religious corporations. The dissolution of a local church body does not cause the dissolution of the corporation so long as there is real property to be held or transferred or trusts to be administered.

In order properly to perform their functions religious corporations are now vested with ample

powers. The granting of increased

5. Powers. powers was a marked feature of legislation during the second half of the nineteenth century. Conspicuous was the increase in the amount of real property which religious corporations might hold. Moreover, all the normal powers of private corporations have been recognized as belonging to religious corporations. Specifically, these corporations have power to preserve their existence by filling vacancies. They may for their own government adopt by-laws, which, however, may not be inconsistent either with the provisions of the statute under which the corporation was organized or with the rules adopted by the church body with which the corporation is connected. If the local church is a member of some denominational organization, the by-laws of a local