and mineral qualities; and, if it reasons wrong within its assumptive sphere of geology, it can never transmute its false reasoning into true reasoning, by virtue of any physical resources of its own whereas, Newton's philosophy being essentially logical, that is, rational, possessed always a rectifying and conservative principle in itself. In Newton, intuitive logic was dominant; and mathematics, were only the steps by which his logic ascended to the elevation to which it attained. In the mineral geology, physical impressions are dominant; and its logic, is only an artificial instrument which it seeks to employ for arranging those impressions. How many eminent mathematicians had seen apples fall to the ground, before the intuitive LOGIC of Newton's mind apprehended the phenomenon! How different that logic was from the logic of the mineral geology, we have seen by the difference of their respective conclusions. CHAPTER V. It will now be easy to point out, after the preceding distinction, the cause of the signal contradiction thus subsisting between Newton and the Mineral Geology. It is simply this; that, in attempting to reason of the MODE of first formations by Newton's method of analysis and induction, the mineral geology has not carried the process of analysis far enough back; whereas, Newton carried it as far back as it could extend. Let us hear Newton himself. 66 66 66 By this way of analysis," said he, we may proceed from compounds to ingredients, and "from motions to the forces producing them; “and, in general, from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general 66 66 66 66 ones, till the argument end in the MOST GENE66 RAL. This is the method of analysis. And "the synthesis consists in assuming the causes, discovered and established, as principles; and by them explaining the phenomena proceeding from them, and proving the explanations1." To set this doctrine in all its light, I shall subjoin the commentary of his exact reporter upon this passage. 66 66 In order to proceed with perfect security, 1 Optics, lib. iii. in fin. "and to put an end for ever to disputes, he pro 66 66 66 posed, that, in our inquiries into nature, the methods of analysis and synthesis should be both employed in a proper order; that we "should begin with the phenomena or effects, and "from them investigate the powers or causes that 66 66 66 66 operate in nature; that, from particular causes "we should proceed to the more general ones, till "the argument end in the most general: this "is the method of analysis. Being once pos"sessed of these causes, that we should then descend, in a contrary order; and from them, as established principles, explain all phenomena that are their consequences, and prove our explanations and this is synthesis. It is evident, that as in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis, ought ever to precede the method of composition, or the synthesis. For, in any other way we can never be sure that we assume the principles which really obtain in nature; and that our system, after we have composed it with great labour, is not mere dream and illusion 1. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 Now, the analysis of the mineral geology does not extend beyond mineral matter; whereas, that of Newton went back to all matter, of which mineral matter is only a part. It must be evident, that it is in the highest degree unphilosophical to 1 MACLAURIN, Account of Sir I. Newton's Phil. p. 9. institute an argument on the MODE of the first formation of mineral matter, otherwise than by investigating the MODE of the first formation of all matter in the general, and then, descending to that of mineral matter in the particular: because, by so doing, we necessarily leave behind us the general principle of the mode of the first formation of all matter; and, by assuming a partial principle for a general one, and continually employing it as a general one, we must proceed in error through all our inductions, and the result must be, an error in our ultimate conclusion. This has been the case with the mineral geology; for, the principle of truth lay precisely in that part of the subject, in which the analysis of Newton reached beyond that of the other; which principle being, therefore, not comprehended in the other, it proceeded without its light and guidance; and thence, the opposition of principles and conclusions between the two. 66 66 66 The more general is the analysis, the more general also will be the induction; and the argument by induction (says Newton) may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how "much the induction is more general." The converse of this maxim must be equally true: that the argument by induction may be looked upon as so much the weaker, by how much the induction is less general. But, the induction of the mineral geology is less general than that of Newton; and, therefore, it is weaker in the same degree. In the method of analysis and induction, the extent of the induction must depend upon the extent of the analysis: we cannot conclude securely, further than we have analysed; we can descend no further by synthesis, than we have ascended by analysis; if the latter has been limited to chemical and mechanical causes, we shall conclude to the same; and, if these comprise not the most general cause, the most general cause will not be included in the induction. But, the MODE of first formation, necessarily supposes the most general cause. By confining the analysis to mineral matter detached from universal matter, and by working entirely within that circumscribed sphere, the view of the mineral geology was narrowed to the peculiar characters which distinguish it as a class of matter, namely, appearances or similitudes of chemical action; and attempting, by principles collected within that partial sphere of contemplation, "to explain its phenomena" and to conclude of the mode of its first formation, and forgetting that it was only a part of a whole, the mode of whose first formation was necessarily the mode of the first formation of all its parts; it ascribed the mineral structure of this globe altogether to chemical action, as promptly, and with as little hesitation, as it would ascribe to chemical action, a measure of Glauber's salts or sugar-candy, in the shop of a chemist or a confectioner: thus, falling into the class of, what Bacon entitles, impedi"ments of knowledge in slipping off particular |