"due lenity the erring agent who, under "the influence of temptation, adopts the exception when it might have been more "prudent to have obferved the rule."

In an early part of the preceding discourse I had occasion briefly to allude to the three erroneous principles of morality, which, in the present day, are prevalent among ourfelves, expediency, honour, and cuftom. Several of their effects may deferve diftinct confideration. But fome few words muft previously be affigned to remarks on. the principles themselves.

Expediency, borrowed from the ftorehouse of fceptical philofophy, and placed, by its wifeft defenders, as nearly as might be done, on a Chriftian foundation, pronounces that an action is right or wrong accordingly as it tends to promote or to diminish general happinefs. Whatever is expedient is right. Every moral precept is fubject to exceptions. And of the expediency of regarding or difregarding the precept every man is in every cafe to judge for himself.

Honour, as a principle of action, refers to the estimation of the clafs of fociety in which the individual moves, and particularly of the higher ranks, whofe opinions will ever be of the moft preponderating

influence.

influence.

Its concern respecting moral actions is limited to fuch as are useful in fashionable intercourfe: and is particularly bestowed on those which have fomewhat of fplendor, commonly of falfe fplendor, in their exterior appearances.

Custom is the general guide of those. perfons who give little thought to the investigation of principles, and take their moral opinions upon truft from others.

On the claim of each or of all of these standards of right and wrong to determine the judgement and direct the conduct, it is sufficient to say, that no one of them is the fcriptural standard. They all depart from the law and the teftimony. They speak not according to this word: therefore there is no light in them.

Let us now advert to their effects.

I. One effect will be this: the morality produced will be uncertain and variable.

What confiftency, what ftability, can be expected in the morals, which are deduced from expediency? Wife men, be it admitted, fitting tranquil in their closets, and coolly viewing life and its temptations at a distance, may logically derive from the principle of expediency many moral rules analogous to C 4 injunctions

injunctions of Holy Writ. But when these wife men are brought forward into the tumult of bufinefs; when they are not to fpeculate, but to feel; when they are to decide, not for others, but for themselves: will they always retain their views of expediency unaltered? Will they always prefer their former conclufions to their prefent impreffions? And what will be the cafe with the multitude which is lefs wife? Every man is diftinctly informed that, with respect to every moral precept, and on every occafion of applying it, he is to judge for himself whether expediency will be moft. promoted by obeying or by difregarding it. Lofing fight, and he muft widely differ from the great mass of the followers of expediency if he will not practically lose fight, of ultimate tendencies to general happiness in present tendencies to his own private interest or perfonal indulgence; judging under the immediate influence of wishes or of fears; deciding in the very moment of temptation': is this the man whofe morality fhall be confiftent? His accommodating principle of morals will continually bend or be bent to circumftances. What he defires will recommend itself as expedient. What he diflikes will wear the aspect of tendencies ultimately unfavour

His

unfavourable to general happiness. moral proceedings will refemble the wanderings of a fhip without ballaft, driven by the wind and toffed.

What steadiness is to be expected in morals which depend on human eftimation? How changeable is po ular opinion, not merely on light occurrences of the day, but on politica fubjects and other grave topics, to which much reflection had been devoted! A kindred fluctuation will be manifeft, and from history and experience it is manifest, in moral fentiments. Among perfons who look to human estimation, to the tone of opinion prevalent in the higher circles, as a moral guide, there will be fashions in morals. At one time one moral virtue will advance a ftep in repute. Then it will lose ground; and another, favoured by the tide of circumftances, will take the lead. To these causes of unsteadiness in the morality built upon honour the following confideration is to be fubjoined. This morality lives upon character. In proportion as it is withdrawn from public obfervation, it languishes. In proportion as men, who act on the principle of honour, foresee a probability that their conduct in a particular inftance will not become known in those ranks of fociety, for

whose

whose countenance they are folicitous, the hold which their principle has upon them is weakened. According to the viciffitudes of fuch probabilities their morality

will vary.

What folidity can we anticipate in morality refting upon cuftom? As little as in cuftom itself. In men whose moral opinions borrow their hue from the complexion of those which prevail in the neighbourhood; consistency in moral reasoning, when upon fpecial occafions they are roused to a little reafoning on topics of this description, is not to be found. The fubject is new to them. It poffeffes no attraction in their eyes. A more intelligent and more welcome guide is at hand. "I do not wish to perplex

myself with metaphyfics. I fhall indulge "no abfurd fcruples. I do not profess to be "better than others. I am not afhamed of

keeping to the road in which the re

spectable people around me are walking.” Such, when interpreted into words, are the thoughts of the followers of cuftom. How can their morality, fuftained by no knowledge, invigorated by no habits of investigation, wandering with the wanderings of the crowd, be other than inconftant and uncertain ?

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